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-rw-r--r--src/backend/libpq/crypt.c469
1 files changed, 260 insertions, 209 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
index e6d3a7cf439..2dcb4f1be95 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* crypt.c--
- * Look into pg_shadow and check the encrypted password with the one
- * passed in from the frontend.
+ * Look into pg_shadow and check the encrypted password with the one
+ * passed in from the frontend.
*
* Modification History
*
@@ -28,262 +28,313 @@
#include <crypt.h>
#endif
-char** pwd_cache = NULL;
-int pwd_cache_count = 0;
+char **pwd_cache = NULL;
+int pwd_cache_count = 0;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-char* crypt_getpwdfilename() {
+char *
+crypt_getpwdfilename()
+{
- static char* pfnam = NULL;
+ static char *pfnam = NULL;
- if (!pfnam) {
- pfnam = (char*)malloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_FILE) + 2);
- sprintf(pfnam, "%s/%s", DataDir, CRYPT_PWD_FILE);
- }
+ if (!pfnam)
+ {
+ pfnam = (char *) malloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_FILE) + 2);
+ sprintf(pfnam, "%s/%s", DataDir, CRYPT_PWD_FILE);
+ }
- return pfnam;
+ return pfnam;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-char* crypt_getpwdreloadfilename() {
+char *
+crypt_getpwdreloadfilename()
+{
- static char* rpfnam = NULL;
+ static char *rpfnam = NULL;
- if (!rpfnam) {
- char* pwdfilename;
+ if (!rpfnam)
+ {
+ char *pwdfilename;
- pwdfilename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
- rpfnam = (char*)malloc(strlen(pwdfilename) + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_RELOAD_SUFX) + 1);
- sprintf(rpfnam, "%s%s", pwdfilename, CRYPT_PWD_RELOAD_SUFX);
- }
+ pwdfilename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
+ rpfnam = (char *) malloc(strlen(pwdfilename) + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_RELOAD_SUFX) + 1);
+ sprintf(rpfnam, "%s%s", pwdfilename, CRYPT_PWD_RELOAD_SUFX);
+ }
- return rpfnam;
+ return rpfnam;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static
-FILE* crypt_openpwdfile() {
- char* filename;
- FILE* pwdfile;
+FILE *
+crypt_openpwdfile()
+{
+ char *filename;
+ FILE *pwdfile;
- filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
- pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
+ filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
+ pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
- return pwdfile;
+ return pwdfile;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static
-int compar_user(const void* user_a, const void* user_b) {
-
- int min,
- value;
- char* login_a;
- char* login_b;
-
- login_a = *((char**)user_a);
- login_b = *((char**)user_b);
-
- /* We only really want to compare the user logins which are first. We look
- * for the first SEPSTR char getting the number of chars there are before it.
- * We only need to compare to the min count from the two strings.
- */
- min = strcspn(login_a, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- value = strcspn(login_b, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- if (value < min)
- min = value;
-
- /* We add one to min so that the separator character is included in the
- * comparison. Why? I believe this will prevent logins that are proper
- * prefixes of other logins from being 'masked out'. Being conservative!
- */
- return strncmp(login_a, login_b, min + 1);
+int
+compar_user(const void *user_a, const void *user_b)
+{
+
+ int min,
+ value;
+ char *login_a;
+ char *login_b;
+
+ login_a = *((char **) user_a);
+ login_b = *((char **) user_b);
+
+ /*
+ * We only really want to compare the user logins which are first. We
+ * look for the first SEPSTR char getting the number of chars there
+ * are before it. We only need to compare to the min count from the
+ * two strings.
+ */
+ min = strcspn(login_a, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
+ value = strcspn(login_b, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
+ if (value < min)
+ min = value;
+
+ /*
+ * We add one to min so that the separator character is included in
+ * the comparison. Why? I believe this will prevent logins that are
+ * proper prefixes of other logins from being 'masked out'. Being
+ * conservative!
+ */
+ return strncmp(login_a, login_b, min + 1);
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static
-void crypt_loadpwdfile() {
-
- char* filename;
- int result;
- FILE* pwd_file;
- char buffer[256];
-
- filename = crypt_getpwdreloadfilename();
- result = unlink(filename);
-
- /* We want to delete the flag file before reading the contents of the pg_pwd
- * file. If result == 0 then the unlink of the reload file was successful.
- * This means that a backend performed a COPY of the pg_shadow file to
- * pg_pwd. Therefore we must now do a reload.
- */
- if (!pwd_cache || !result) {
- if (pwd_cache) { /* free the old data only if this is a reload */
- while (pwd_cache_count--) {
- free((void*)pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count]);
- }
- free((void*)pwd_cache);
- pwd_cache = NULL;
- pwd_cache_count = 0;
- }
-
- if (!(pwd_file = crypt_openpwdfile()))
- return;
-
- /* Here is where we load the data from pg_pwd.
- */
- while (fgets(buffer, 256, pwd_file) != NULL) {
- /* We must remove the return char at the end of the string, as this will
- * affect the correct parsing of the password entry.
- */
- if (buffer[(result = strlen(buffer) - 1)] == '\n')
- buffer[result] = '\0';
-
- pwd_cache = (char**)realloc((void*)pwd_cache, sizeof(char*) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
- pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count++] = strdup(buffer);
- }
- fclose(pwd_file);
-
- /* Now sort the entries in the cache for faster searching later.
- */
- qsort((void*)pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char*), compar_user);
- }
+void
+crypt_loadpwdfile()
+{
+
+ char *filename;
+ int result;
+ FILE *pwd_file;
+ char buffer[256];
+
+ filename = crypt_getpwdreloadfilename();
+ result = unlink(filename);
+
+ /*
+ * We want to delete the flag file before reading the contents of the
+ * pg_pwd file. If result == 0 then the unlink of the reload file was
+ * successful. This means that a backend performed a COPY of the
+ * pg_shadow file to pg_pwd. Therefore we must now do a reload.
+ */
+ if (!pwd_cache || !result)
+ {
+ if (pwd_cache)
+ { /* free the old data only if this is a
+ * reload */
+ while (pwd_cache_count--)
+ {
+ free((void *) pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count]);
+ }
+ free((void *) pwd_cache);
+ pwd_cache = NULL;
+ pwd_cache_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pwd_file = crypt_openpwdfile()))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Here is where we load the data from pg_pwd.
+ */
+ while (fgets(buffer, 256, pwd_file) != NULL)
+ {
+
+ /*
+ * We must remove the return char at the end of the string, as
+ * this will affect the correct parsing of the password entry.
+ */
+ if (buffer[(result = strlen(buffer) - 1)] == '\n')
+ buffer[result] = '\0';
+
+ pwd_cache = (char **) realloc((void *) pwd_cache, sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
+ pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count++] = strdup(buffer);
+ }
+ fclose(pwd_file);
+
+ /*
+ * Now sort the entries in the cache for faster searching later.
+ */
+ qsort((void *) pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char *), compar_user);
+ }
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static
-void crypt_parsepwdentry(char* buffer, char** pwd, char** valdate) {
-
- char* parse = buffer;
- int count,
- i;
-
- /* skip to the password field
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- parse += (strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR) + 1);
-
- /* store a copy of user password to return
- */
- count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- *pwd = (char*)malloc(count + 1);
- strncpy(*pwd, parse, count);
- (*pwd)[count] = '\0';
- parse += (count + 1);
-
- /* store a copy of date login becomes invalid
- */
- count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
- *valdate = (char*)malloc(count + 1);
- strncpy(*valdate, parse, count);
- (*valdate)[count] = '\0';
- parse += (count + 1);
+void
+crypt_parsepwdentry(char *buffer, char **pwd, char **valdate)
+{
+
+ char *parse = buffer;
+ int count,
+ i;
+
+ /*
+ * skip to the password field
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ parse += (strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR) + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * store a copy of user password to return
+ */
+ count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
+ *pwd = (char *) malloc(count + 1);
+ strncpy(*pwd, parse, count);
+ (*pwd)[count] = '\0';
+ parse += (count + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * store a copy of date login becomes invalid
+ */
+ count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
+ *valdate = (char *) malloc(count + 1);
+ strncpy(*valdate, parse, count);
+ (*valdate)[count] = '\0';
+ parse += (count + 1);
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static
-int crypt_getloginfo(const char* user, char** passwd, char** valuntil) {
-
- char* pwd;
- char* valdate;
- void* fakeout;
-
- *passwd = NULL;
- *valuntil = NULL;
- crypt_loadpwdfile();
-
- if (pwd_cache) {
- char** pwd_entry;
- char user_search[NAMEDATALEN + 2];
-
- sprintf(user_search, "%s\t", user);
- fakeout = (void*)&user_search;
- if ((pwd_entry = (char**)bsearch((void*)&fakeout, (void*)pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char*), compar_user))) {
- crypt_parsepwdentry(*pwd_entry, &pwd, &valdate);
- *passwd = pwd;
- *valuntil = valdate;
- return STATUS_OK;
- }
-
- return STATUS_OK;
- }
-
- return STATUS_ERROR;
+int
+crypt_getloginfo(const char *user, char **passwd, char **valuntil)
+{
+
+ char *pwd;
+ char *valdate;
+ void *fakeout;
+
+ *passwd = NULL;
+ *valuntil = NULL;
+ crypt_loadpwdfile();
+
+ if (pwd_cache)
+ {
+ char **pwd_entry;
+ char user_search[NAMEDATALEN + 2];
+
+ sprintf(user_search, "%s\t", user);
+ fakeout = (void *) &user_search;
+ if ((pwd_entry = (char **) bsearch((void *) &fakeout, (void *) pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char *), compar_user)))
+ {
+ crypt_parsepwdentry(*pwd_entry, &pwd, &valdate);
+ *passwd = pwd;
+ *valuntil = valdate;
+ return STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ return STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#if 0
-MsgType crypt_salt(const char* user) {
-
- char* passwd;
- char* valuntil;
-
- if (crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil) == STATUS_ERROR)
- return STARTUP_UNSALT_MSG;
-
- if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0' || !strcmp(passwd, "\\N")) {
- if (passwd) free((void*)passwd);
- if (valuntil) free((void*)valuntil);
- return STARTUP_UNSALT_MSG;
- }
-
- free((void*)passwd);
- if (valuntil) free((void*)valuntil);
- return STARTUP_SALT_MSG;
+MsgType
+crypt_salt(const char *user)
+{
+
+ char *passwd;
+ char *valuntil;
+
+ if (crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil) == STATUS_ERROR)
+ return STARTUP_UNSALT_MSG;
+
+ if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0' || !strcmp(passwd, "\\N"))
+ {
+ if (passwd)
+ free((void *) passwd);
+ if (valuntil)
+ free((void *) valuntil);
+ return STARTUP_UNSALT_MSG;
+ }
+
+ free((void *) passwd);
+ if (valuntil)
+ free((void *) valuntil);
+ return STARTUP_SALT_MSG;
}
+
#endif
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-int crypt_verify(Port* port, const char* user, const char* pgpass) {
-
- char* passwd;
- char* valuntil;
- char* crypt_pwd;
- int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
- AbsoluteTime vuntil,
- current;
-
- if (crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil) == STATUS_ERROR)
- return STATUS_ERROR;
-
- if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0') {
- if (passwd) free((void*)passwd);
- if (valuntil) free((void*)valuntil);
- return STATUS_ERROR;
- }
-
- /*
- * Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
- * authentication method being used for this connection.
- */
-
- crypt_pwd = (port->auth_method == uaCrypt ? crypt(passwd, port->salt) : passwd);
-
- if (!strcmp(pgpass, crypt_pwd)) {
- /* check here to be sure we are not past valuntil
- */
- if (!valuntil || strcmp(valuntil, "\\N") == 0)
- vuntil = INVALID_ABSTIME;
- else
- vuntil = nabstimein(valuntil);
- current = GetCurrentAbsoluteTime();
- if (vuntil != INVALID_ABSTIME && vuntil < current)
- retval = STATUS_ERROR;
- else
- retval = STATUS_OK;
- }
-
- free((void*)passwd);
- if (valuntil) free((void*)valuntil);
-
- return retval;
+int
+crypt_verify(Port *port, const char *user, const char *pgpass)
+{
+
+ char *passwd;
+ char *valuntil;
+ char *crypt_pwd;
+ int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
+ AbsoluteTime vuntil,
+ current;
+
+ if (crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil) == STATUS_ERROR)
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+
+ if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0')
+ {
+ if (passwd)
+ free((void *) passwd);
+ if (valuntil)
+ free((void *) valuntil);
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
+ * authentication method being used for this connection.
+ */
+
+ crypt_pwd = (port->auth_method == uaCrypt ? crypt(passwd, port->salt) : passwd);
+
+ if (!strcmp(pgpass, crypt_pwd))
+ {
+
+ /*
+ * check here to be sure we are not past valuntil
+ */
+ if (!valuntil || strcmp(valuntil, "\\N") == 0)
+ vuntil = INVALID_ABSTIME;
+ else
+ vuntil = nabstimein(valuntil);
+ current = GetCurrentAbsoluteTime();
+ if (vuntil != INVALID_ABSTIME && vuntil < current)
+ retval = STATUS_ERROR;
+ else
+ retval = STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ free((void *) passwd);
+ if (valuntil)
+ free((void *) valuntil);
+
+ return retval;
}