diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/libpq')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c | 104 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/crypt.c | 8 |
3 files changed, 57 insertions, 57 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c index 68792cb45e7..8ecb17bae69 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c @@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ * Don't reveal user information to an unauthenticated client. We don't * want an attacker to be able to probe whether a particular username is * valid. In SCRAM, the server has to read the salt and iteration count - * from the user's password verifier, and send it to the client. To avoid + * from the user's stored secret, and send it to the client. To avoid * revealing whether a user exists, when the client tries to authenticate * with a username that doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid SCRAM - * verifier in pg_authid, we create a fake salt and iteration count + * secret in pg_authid, we create a fake salt and iteration count * on-the-fly, and proceed with the authentication with that. In the end, * we'll reject the attempt, as if an incorrect password was given. When * we are performing a "mock" authentication, the 'doomed' flag in @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static char *build_server_first_message(scram_state *state); static char *build_server_final_message(scram_state *state); static bool verify_client_proof(scram_state *state); static bool verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state); -static void mock_scram_verifier(const char *username, int *iterations, +static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key); static bool is_scram_printable(char *p); static char *sanitize_char(char c); @@ -202,13 +202,13 @@ pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf) * * Initialize a new SCRAM authentication exchange status tracker. This * needs to be called before doing any exchange. It will be filled later - * after the beginning of the exchange with verifier data. + * after the beginning of the exchange with authentication information. * * 'selected_mech' identifies the SASL mechanism that the client selected. * It should be one of the mechanisms that we support, as returned by * pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms(). * - * 'shadow_pass' is the role's password verifier, from pg_authid.rolpassword. + * 'shadow_pass' is the role's stored secret, from pg_authid.rolpassword. * The username was provided by the client in the startup message, and is * available in port->user_name. If 'shadow_pass' is NULL, we still perform * an authentication exchange, but it will fail, as if an incorrect password @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, const char *shadow_pass) { scram_state *state; - bool got_verifier; + bool got_secret; state = (scram_state *) palloc0(sizeof(scram_state)); state->port = port; @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, errmsg("client selected an invalid SASL authentication mechanism"))); /* - * Parse the stored password verifier. + * Parse the stored secret. */ if (shadow_pass) { @@ -256,30 +256,30 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, if (password_type == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256) { - if (parse_scram_verifier(shadow_pass, &state->iterations, &state->salt, + if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &state->iterations, &state->salt, state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey)) - got_verifier = true; + got_secret = true; else { /* - * The password looked like a SCRAM verifier, but could not be + * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be * parsed. */ ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("invalid SCRAM verifier for user \"%s\"", + (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", state->port->user_name))); - got_verifier = false; + got_secret = false; } } else { /* - * The user doesn't have SCRAM verifier. (You cannot do SCRAM + * The user doesn't have SCRAM secret. (You cannot do SCRAM * authentication with an MD5 hash.) */ - state->logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" does not have a valid SCRAM verifier."), + state->logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" does not have a valid SCRAM secret."), state->port->user_name); - got_verifier = false; + got_secret = false; } } else @@ -289,18 +289,18 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, * considered normal, since the caller requested it, so don't set log * detail. */ - got_verifier = false; + got_secret = false; } /* - * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM verifier, we still go through + * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through * the motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an * incorrect password. This is to avoid revealing information to an * attacker. */ - if (!got_verifier) + if (!got_secret) { - mock_scram_verifier(state->port->user_name, &state->iterations, + mock_scram_secret(state->port->user_name, &state->iterations, &state->salt, state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey); state->doomed = true; } @@ -443,12 +443,12 @@ pg_be_scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen, } /* - * Construct a verifier string for SCRAM, stored in pg_authid.rolpassword. + * Construct a SCRAM secret, for storing in pg_authid.rolpassword. * * The result is palloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it. */ char * -pg_be_scram_build_verifier(const char *password) +pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password) { char *prep_password; pg_saslprep_rc rc; @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ pg_be_scram_build_verifier(const char *password) (errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR), errmsg("could not generate random salt"))); - result = scram_build_verifier(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, + result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password); if (prep_password) @@ -480,13 +480,13 @@ pg_be_scram_build_verifier(const char *password) } /* - * Verify a plaintext password against a SCRAM verifier. This is used when + * Verify a plaintext password against a SCRAM secret. This is used when * performing plaintext password authentication for a user that has a SCRAM - * verifier stored in pg_authid. + * secret stored in pg_authid. */ bool scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, - const char *verifier) + const char *secret) { char *encoded_salt; char *salt; @@ -499,14 +499,14 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, char *prep_password; pg_saslprep_rc rc; - if (!parse_scram_verifier(verifier, &iterations, &encoded_salt, + if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &encoded_salt, stored_key, server_key)) { /* - * The password looked like a SCRAM verifier, but could not be parsed. + * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be parsed. */ ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("invalid SCRAM verifier for user \"%s\"", username))); + (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username))); return false; } @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, if (saltlen < 0) { ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("invalid SCRAM verifier for user \"%s\"", username))); + (errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username))); return false; } @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, pfree(prep_password); /* - * Compare the verifier's Server Key with the one computed from the + * Compare the secret's Server Key with the one computed from the * user-supplied password. */ return memcmp(computed_key, server_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) == 0; @@ -542,18 +542,18 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, /* - * Parse and validate format of given SCRAM verifier. + * Parse and validate format of given SCRAM secret. * * On success, the iteration count, salt, stored key, and server key are - * extracted from the verifier, and returned to the caller. For 'stored_key' + * extracted from the secret, and returned to the caller. For 'stored_key' * and 'server_key', the caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size * SCRAM_KEY_LEN. Salt is returned as a base64-encoded, null-terminated * string. The buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function. * - * Returns true if the SCRAM verifier has been parsed, and false otherwise. + * Returns true if the SCRAM secret has been parsed, and false otherwise. */ bool -parse_scram_verifier(const char *verifier, int *iterations, char **salt, +parse_scram_secret(const char *secret, int *iterations, char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) { char *v; @@ -569,30 +569,30 @@ parse_scram_verifier(const char *verifier, int *iterations, char **salt, char *decoded_server_buf; /* - * The verifier is of form: + * The secret is of form: * * SCRAM-SHA-256$<iterations>:<salt>$<storedkey>:<serverkey> */ - v = pstrdup(verifier); + v = pstrdup(secret); if ((scheme_str = strtok(v, "$")) == NULL) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; if ((iterations_str = strtok(NULL, ":")) == NULL) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; if ((salt_str = strtok(NULL, "$")) == NULL) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; if ((storedkey_str = strtok(NULL, ":")) == NULL) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; if ((serverkey_str = strtok(NULL, "")) == NULL) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; /* Parse the fields */ if (strcmp(scheme_str, "SCRAM-SHA-256") != 0) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; errno = 0; *iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &p, 10); if (*p || errno != 0) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; /* * Verify that the salt is in Base64-encoded format, by decoding it, @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ parse_scram_verifier(const char *verifier, int *iterations, char **salt, decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(salt_str, strlen(salt_str), decoded_salt_buf, decoded_len); if (decoded_len < 0) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; *salt = pstrdup(salt_str); /* @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ parse_scram_verifier(const char *verifier, int *iterations, char **salt, decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(storedkey_str, strlen(storedkey_str), decoded_stored_buf, decoded_len); if (decoded_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; memcpy(stored_key, decoded_stored_buf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN); decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(serverkey_str)); @@ -622,29 +622,29 @@ parse_scram_verifier(const char *verifier, int *iterations, char **salt, decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(serverkey_str, strlen(serverkey_str), decoded_server_buf, decoded_len); if (decoded_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN) - goto invalid_verifier; + goto invalid_secret; memcpy(server_key, decoded_server_buf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN); return true; -invalid_verifier: +invalid_secret: *salt = NULL; return false; } /* - * Generate plausible SCRAM verifier parameters for mock authentication. + * Generate plausible SCRAM secret parameters for mock authentication. * - * In a normal authentication, these are extracted from the verifier + * In a normal authentication, these are extracted from the secret * stored in the server. This function generates values that look - * realistic, for when there is no stored verifier. + * realistic, for when there is no stored secret. * - * Like in parse_scram_verifier(), for 'stored_key' and 'server_key', the + * Like in parse_scram_secret(), for 'stored_key' and 'server_key', the * caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size SCRAM_KEY_LEN, and * the buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function. */ static void -mock_scram_verifier(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt, +mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) { char *raw_salt; diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c index 3ef0171192f..0cf65ba5de7 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c @@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail) * If 'md5' authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform 'md5' or * 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on the type of password the user * has. If it's an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if it's a - * SCRAM verifier, we must do SCRAM authentication. + * SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication. * * If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM. If the user * had an MD5 password, CheckSCRAMAuth() will fail. diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c index 784fb227aa2..9add6a14b23 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ get_role_password(const char *role, char **logdetail) } /* - * What kind of a password verifier is 'shadow_pass'? + * What kind of a password type is 'shadow_pass'? */ PasswordType get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass) @@ -97,14 +97,14 @@ get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass) strlen(shadow_pass) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN && strspn(shadow_pass + 3, MD5_PASSWD_CHARSET) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN - 3) return PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5; - if (parse_scram_verifier(shadow_pass, &iterations, &encoded_salt, + if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &iterations, &encoded_salt, stored_key, server_key)) return PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256; return PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT; } /* - * Given a user-supplied password, convert it into a verifier of + * Given a user-supplied password, convert it into a secret of * 'target_type' kind. * * If the password is already in encrypted form, we cannot reverse the @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role, return encrypted_password; case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256: - return pg_be_scram_build_verifier(password); + return pg_be_scram_build_secret(password); case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT: elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password with 'plaintext'"); |