| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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mdtruncate() forgot to FileClose() a segment's mdfd_vfd, when deleting
it. That lead to a fd.c handle to a truncated file being kept open until
backend exit.
The issue appears to have been introduced way back in 1a5c450f3024ac5,
before that the handle was closed inside FileUnlink().
The impact of this bug is limited - only VACUUM and ON COMMIT TRUNCATE
for temporary tables, truncate files in place (i.e. TRUNCATE itself is
not affected), and the relation has to be bigger than 1GB. The
consequences of a leaked fd.c handle aren't severe either.
Discussion: <20160908220748.oqh37ukwqqncbl3n@alap3.anarazel.de>
Backpatch: all supported releases
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Renaming a file using rename(2) is not guaranteed to be durable in face
of crashes; especially on filesystems like xfs and ext4 when mounted
with data=writeback. To be certain that a rename() atomically replaces
the previous file contents in the face of crashes and different
filesystems, one has to fsync the old filename, rename the file, fsync
the new filename, fsync the containing directory. This sequence is not
generally adhered to currently; which exposes us to data loss risks. To
avoid having to repeat this arduous sequence, introduce
durable_rename(), which wraps all that.
Also add durable_link_or_rename(). Several places use link() (with a
fallback to rename()) to rename a file, trying to avoid replacing the
target file out of paranoia. Some of those rename sequences need to be
durable as well. There seems little reason extend several copies of the
same logic, so centralize the link() callers.
This commit does not yet make use of the new functions; they're used in
a followup commit.
Author: Michael Paquier, Andres Freund
Discussion: 56583BDD.9060302@2ndquadrant.com
Backpatch: All supported branches
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e3f4cfc7 introduced a LWLockHeldByMe() call, without the corresponding
Assert() surrounding it.
Spotted by Coverity.
Backpatch: 9.1+, like the previous commit
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At the end of crash recovery, unlogged relations are reset to the empty
state, using their init fork as the template. The init fork is copied to
the main fork without going through shared buffers. Unfortunately WAL
replay so far has not necessarily flushed writes from shared buffers to
disk at that point. In normal crash recovery, and before the
introduction of 'fast promotions' in fd4ced523 / 9.3, the
END_OF_RECOVERY checkpoint flushes the buffers out in time. But with
fast promotions that's not the case anymore.
To fix, force WAL writes targeting the init fork to be flushed
immediately (using the new FlushOneBuffer() function). In 9.5+ that
flush can centrally be triggered from the code dealing with restoring
full page writes (XLogReadBufferForRedoExtended), in earlier releases
that responsibility is in the hands of XLOG_HEAP_NEWPAGE's replay
function.
Backpatch to 9.1, even if this currently is only known to trigger in
9.3+. Flushing earlier is more robust, and it is advantageous to keep
the branches similar.
Typical symptoms of this bug are errors like
'ERROR: index "..." contains unexpected zero page at block 0'
shortly after promoting a node.
Reported-By: Thom Brown
Author: Andres Freund and Michael Paquier
Discussion: 20150326175024.GJ451@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: 9.1-
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On insert the CheckForSerializableConflictIn() test was performed
before the page(s) which were going to be modified had been locked
(with an exclusive buffer content lock). If another process
acquired a relation SIReadLock on the heap and scanned to a page on
which an insert was going to occur before the page was so locked,
a rw-conflict would be missed, which could allow a serialization
anomaly to be missed. The window between the check and the page
lock was small, so the bug was generally not noticed unless there
was high concurrency with multiple processes inserting into the
same table.
This was reported by Peter Bailis as bug #11732, by Sean Chittenden
as bug #13667, and by others.
The race condition was eliminated in heap_insert() by moving the
check down below the acquisition of the buffer lock, which had been
the very next statement. Because of the loop locking and unlocking
multiple buffers in heap_multi_insert() a check was added after all
inserts were completed. The check before the start of the inserts
was left because it might avoid a large amount of work to detect a
serialization anomaly before performing the all of the inserts and
the related WAL logging.
While investigating this bug, other SSI bugs which were even harder
to hit in practice were noticed and fixed, an unnecessary check
(covered by another check, so redundant) was removed from
heap_update(), and comments were improved.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Kevin Grittner and Thomas Munro
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RemoveLocalLock() must consider the possibility that LockAcquireExtended()
failed to palloc the initial space for a locallock's lockOwners array.
I had evidently meant to cope with this hazard when the code was originally
written (commit 1785acebf2ed14fd66955e2d9a55d77a025f418d), but missed that
the pfree needed to be protected with an if-test. Just to make sure things
are left in a clean state, reset numLockOwners as well.
Per low-memory testing by Andreas Seltenreich. Back-patch to all supported
branches.
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Back-patch 9.3-era commit eeb6f37d89fc60c6449ca12ef9e91491069369cb, to
improve the older branches' ability to cope with pg_dump dumping a large
number of tables.
I back-patched into 9.2 and 9.1, but not 9.0 as it would have required a
significant amount of refactoring, thus negating the argument that this
is by-now-well-tested code.
Jeff Janes, reviewed by Amit Kapila and Heikki Linnakangas.
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Don't print a WARNING if we get ESRCH from a kill() that's attempting
to cancel an autovacuum worker. It's possible (and has been seen in the
buildfarm) that the worker is already gone by the time we are able to
execute the kill, in which case the failure is harmless. About the only
plausible reason for reporting such cases would be to help debug corrupted
lock table contents, but this is hardly likely to be the most important
symptom if that happens. Moreover issuing a WARNING might scare users
more than is warranted.
Also, since sending a signal to an autovacuum worker is now entirely a
routine thing, and the worker will log the query cancel on its end anyway,
reduce the message saying we're doing that from LOG to DEBUG1 level.
Very minor cosmetic cleanup as well.
Since the main practical reason for doing this is to avoid unnecessary
buildfarm failures, back-patch to all active branches.
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The argument that this is a sufficiently-expected case to be silently
ignored seems pretty thin. Andres had brought it up back when we were
still considering that most fsync failures should be hard errors, and it
probably would be legit not to fail hard for ETXTBSY --- but the same is
true for EROFS and other cases, which is why we gave up on hard failures.
ETXTBSY is surely not a normal case, so logging the failure seems fine
from here.
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Commit 2ce439f3379aed857517c8ce207485655000fc8e introduced a rather serious
regression, namely that if its scan of the data directory came across any
un-fsync-able files, it would fail and thereby prevent database startup.
Worse yet, symlinks to such files also caused the problem, which meant that
crash restart was guaranteed to fail on certain common installations such
as older Debian.
After discussion, we agreed that (1) failure to start is worse than any
consequence of not fsync'ing is likely to be, therefore treat all errors
in this code as nonfatal; (2) we should not chase symlinks other than
those that are expected to exist, namely pg_xlog/ and tablespace links
under pg_tblspc/. The latter restriction avoids possibly fsync'ing a
much larger part of the filesystem than intended, if the user has left
random symlinks hanging about in the data directory.
This commit takes care of that and also does some code beautification,
mainly moving the relevant code into fd.c, which seems a much better place
for it than xlog.c, and making sure that the conditional compilation for
the pre_sync_fname pass has something to do with whether pg_flush_data
works.
I also relocated the call site in xlog.c down a few lines; it seems a
bit silly to be doing this before ValidateXLOGDirectoryStructure().
The similar logic in initdb.c ought to be made to match this, but that
change is noncritical and will be dealt with separately.
Back-patch to all active branches, like the prior commit.
Abhijit Menon-Sen and Tom Lane
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The point of the assertion is to ensure that the arrays allocated in stack
are large enough, but the check was one item short.
This won't matter in practice because MaxIndexTuplesPerPage is an
overestimate, so you can't have that many items on a page in reality.
But let's be tidy.
Spotted by Anastasia Lubennikova. Backpatch to all supported versions, like
the patch that added the assertion.
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The old one didn't include %m anywhere, and required extra
translation.
Report by Peter Eisentraut. Fix by me. Review by Tom Lane.
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Commit 81c45081 introduced a new RBM_ZERO_AND_LOCK mode to ReadBuffer, which
takes a lock on the buffer before zeroing it. However, you cannot take a
lock on a local buffer, and you got a segfault instead. The version of that
patch committed to master included a check for !isLocalBuf, and therefore
didn't crash, but oddly I missed that in the back-patched versions. This
patch adds that check to the back-branches too.
RBM_ZERO_AND_LOCK mode is only used during WAL replay, and in hash indexes.
WAL replay only deals with shared buffers, so the only way to trigger the
bug is with a temporary hash index.
Reported by Artem Ignatyev, analysis by Tom Lane.
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pg_win32_is_junction() was a typo for pgwin32_is_junction(). open()
was used not only in a two-argument form, which breaks on Windows,
but also where BasicOpenFile() should have been used.
Per reports from Andrew Dunstan and David Rowley.
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Otherwise, if there's another crash, some writes from after the first
crash might make it to disk while writes from before the crash fail
to make it to disk. This could lead to data corruption.
Back-patch to all supported versions.
Abhijit Menon-Sen, reviewed by Andres Freund and slightly revised
by me.
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When LockBufferForCleanup() has to wait for getting a cleanup lock on a
buffer it does so by setting a flag in the buffer header and then wait
for other backends to signal it using ProcWaitForSignal().
Unfortunately LockBufferForCleanup() missed that ProcWaitForSignal() can
return for other reasons than the signal it is hoping for. If such a
spurious signal arrives the wait flags on the buffer header will still
be set. That then triggers "ERROR: multiple backends attempting to wait
for pincount 1".
The fix is simple, unset the flag if still set when retrying. That
implies an additional spinlock acquisition/release, but that's unlikely
to matter given the cost of waiting for a cleanup lock. Alternatively
it'd have been possible to move responsibility for maintaining the
relevant flag to the waiter all together, but that might have had
negative consequences due to possible floods of signals. Besides being
more invasive.
This looks to be a very longstanding bug. The relevant code in
LockBufferForCleanup() hasn't changed materially since its introduction
and ProcWaitForSignal() was documented to return for unrelated reasons
since 8.2. The master only patch series removing ImmediateInterruptOK
made it much easier to hit though, as ProcSendSignal/ProcWaitForSignal
now uses a latch shared with other tasks.
Per discussion with Kevin Grittner, Tom Lane and me.
Backpatch to all supported branches.
Discussion: 11553.1423805224@sss.pgh.pa.us
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If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244
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GetLockConflicts() has for a long time not properly terminated the
returned array. During normal processing the returned array is zero
initialized which, while not pretty, is sufficient to be recognized as
a invalid virtual transaction id. But the HotStandby case is more than
aesthetically broken: The allocated (and reused) array is neither
zeroed upon allocation, nor reinitialized, nor terminated.
Not having a terminating element means that the end of the array will
not be recognized and that recovery conflict handling will thus read
ahead into adjacent memory. Only terminating when hitting memory
content that looks like a invalid virtual transaction id. Luckily
this seems so far not have caused significant problems, besides making
recovery conflict more expensive.
Discussion: 20150127142713.GD29457@awork2.anarazel.de
Backpatch into all supported branches.
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In LWLockRelease() (and in 9.4+ LWLockUpdateVar()) we release enqueued
waiters using PGSemaphoreUnlock(). As there are other sources of such
unlocks backends only wake up if MyProc->lwWaiting is set to false;
which is only done in the aforementioned functions.
Before this commit there were dangers because the store to lwWaitLink
could become visible before the store to lwWaitLink. This could both
happen due to compiler reordering (on most compilers) and on some
platforms due to the CPU reordering stores.
The possible consequence of this is that a backend stops waiting
before lwWaitLink is set to NULL. If that backend then tries to
acquire another lock and has to wait there the list could become
corrupted once the lwWaitLink store is finally performed.
Add a write memory barrier to prevent that issue.
Unfortunately the barrier support has been only added in 9.2. Given
that the issue has not knowingly been observed in praxis it seems
sufficient to prohibit compiler reordering using volatile for 9.0 and
9.1. Actual problems due to compiler reordering are more likely
anyway.
Discussion: 20140210134625.GA15246@awork2.anarazel.de
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Unlogged relations are only reset when performing a unclean
restart. That means they have to be synced to disk during clean
shutdowns. During normal processing that's achieved by registering a
buffer's file to be fsynced at the next checkpoint when flushed. But
ResetUnloggedRelations() doesn't go through the buffer manager, so
nothing will force reset relations to disk before the next shutdown
checkpoint.
So just make ResetUnloggedRelations() fsync the newly created main
forks to disk.
Discussion: 20140912112246.GA4984@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch to 9.1 where unlogged tables were introduced.
Abhijit Menon-Sen and Andres Freund
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Backport commit cc52d5b33ff5df29de57dcae9322214cfe9c8464 back to 9.1
to allow backpatching some unlogged table fixes that use fsync_fname.
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There was a window in RestoreBackupBlock where a page would be zeroed out,
but not yet locked. If a backend pinned and locked the page in that window,
it saw the zeroed page instead of the old page or new page contents, which
could lead to missing rows in a result set, or errors.
To fix, replace RBM_ZERO with RBM_ZERO_AND_LOCK, which atomically pins,
zeroes, and locks the page, if it's not in the buffer cache already.
In stable branches, the old RBM_ZERO constant is renamed to RBM_DO_NOT_USE,
to avoid breaking any 3rd party extensions that might use RBM_ZERO. More
importantly, this avoids renumbering the other enum values, which would
cause even bigger confusion in extensions that use ReadBufferExtended, but
haven't been recompiled.
Backpatch to all supported versions; this has been racy since hot standby
was introduced.
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CREATE DATABASE and ALTER DATABASE .. SET TABLESPACE copy the source
database directory on the filesystem level. To ensure the on disk
state is consistent they block out users of the affected database and
force a checkpoint to flush out all data to disk. Unfortunately, up to
now, that checkpoint didn't flush out dirty buffers from unlogged
relations.
That bug means there could be leftover dirty buffers in either the
template database, or the database in its old location. Leading to
problems when accessing relations in an inconsistent state; and to
possible problems during shutdown in the SET TABLESPACE case because
buffers belonging files that don't exist anymore are flushed.
This was reported in bug #10675 by Maxim Boguk.
Fix by Pavan Deolasee, modified somewhat by me. Reviewed by MauMau and
Fujii Masao.
Backpatch to 9.1 where unlogged tables were introduced.
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get_raw_page tried to validate the supplied block number against
RelationGetNumberOfBlocks(), which of course is only right when
accessing the main fork. In most cases, the main fork is longer
than the others, so that the check was too weak (allowing a
lower-level error to be reported, but no real harm to be done).
However, very small tables could have an FSM larger than their heap,
in which case the mistake prevented access to some FSM pages.
Per report from Torsten Foertsch.
In passing, make the bad-block-number error into an ereport not elog
(since it's certainly not an internal error); and fix sloppily
maintained comment for RelationGetNumberOfBlocksInFork.
This has been wrong since we invented relation forks, so back-patch
to all supported branches.
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It's critical that the backend's idea of LOBLKSIZE match the way data has
actually been divided up in pg_largeobject. While we don't provide any
direct way to adjust that value, doing so is a one-line source code change
and various people have expressed interest recently in changing it. So,
just as with TOAST_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE, it seems prudent to record the value in
pg_control and cross-check that the backend's compiled-in setting matches
the on-disk data.
Also tweak the code in inv_api.c so that fetches from pg_largeobject
explicitly verify that the length of the data field is not more than
LOBLKSIZE. Formerly we just had Asserts() for that, which is no protection
at all in production builds. In some of the call sites an overlength data
value would translate directly to a security-relevant stack clobber, so it
seems worth one extra runtime comparison to be sure.
In the back branches, we can't change the contents of pg_control; but we
can still make the extra checks in inv_api.c, which will offer some amount
of protection against running with the wrong value of LOBLKSIZE.
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This was not changed in HEAD, but will be done later as part of a
pgindent run. Future pgindent runs will also do this.
Report by Tom Lane
Backpatch through all supported branches, but not HEAD
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Commit fad153ec45299bd4d4f29dec8d9e04e2f1c08148 modified sinval.c to reduce
the number of calls into sinvaladt.c (which require taking a shared lock)
by keeping a local buffer of collected-but-not-yet-processed messages.
However, if processing of the last message in a batch resulted in a
recursive call to ReceiveSharedInvalidMessages, we could overwrite that
message with a new one while the outer invalidation function was still
working on it. This would be likely to lead to invalidation of the wrong
cache entry, allowing subsequent processing to use stale cache data.
The fix is just to make a local copy of each message while we're processing
it.
Spotted by Andres Freund. Back-patch to 8.4 where the bug was introduced.
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If a palloc in a critical section fails, it becomes a PANIC.
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Clear errno before calling readdir() and handle old MinGW errno bug
while adding full test coverage for readdir/closedir failures.
Backpatch through 8.4.
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A fake relcache entry can "own" a SmgrRelation object, like a regular
relcache entry. But when it was free'd, the owner field in SmgrRelation
was not cleared, so it was left pointing to free'd memory.
Amazingly this apparently hasn't caused crashes in practice, or we would've
heard about it earlier. Andres found this with Valgrind.
Report and fix by Andres Freund, with minor modifications by me. Backpatch
to all supported versions.
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Evidence from buildfarm member crake suggests that the new test_shm_mq
module is routinely crashing the server due to the arrival of a SIGUSR1
after the shared memory segment has been unmapped. Although processes
using the new dynamic background worker facilities are more likely to
receive a SIGUSR1 around this time, the problem is also possible on older
branches, so I'm back-patching the parts of this change that apply to
older branches as far as they apply.
It's already generally the case that code checks whether these pointers
are NULL before deferencing them, so the important thing is mostly to
make sure that they do get set to NULL before they become invalid. But
in master, there's one case in procsignal_sigusr1_handler that lacks a
NULL guard, so add that.
Patch by me; review by Tom Lane.
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In ordinary operation, VACUUM must be careful to take a cleanup lock on
each leaf page of a btree index; this ensures that no indexscans could
still be "in flight" to heap tuples due to be deleted. (Because of
possible index-tuple motion due to concurrent page splits, it's not enough
to lock only the pages we're deleting index tuples from.) In Hot Standby,
the WAL replay process must likewise lock every leaf page. There were
several bugs in the code for that:
* The replay scan might come across unused, all-zero pages in the index.
While btree_xlog_vacuum itself did the right thing (ie, nothing) with
such pages, xlogutils.c supposed that such pages must be corrupt and
would throw an error. This accounts for various reports of replication
failures with "PANIC: WAL contains references to invalid pages". To
fix, add a ReadBufferMode value that instructs XLogReadBufferExtended
not to complain when we're doing this.
* btree_xlog_vacuum performed the extra locking if standbyState ==
STANDBY_SNAPSHOT_READY, but that's not the correct test: we won't open up
for hot standby queries until the database has reached consistency, and
we don't want to do the extra locking till then either, for fear of reading
corrupted pages (which bufmgr.c would complain about). Fix by exporting a
new function from xlog.c that will report whether we're actually in hot
standby replay mode.
* To ensure full coverage of the index in the replay scan, btvacuumscan
would emit a dummy WAL record for the last page of the index, if no
vacuuming work had been done on that page. However, if the last page
of the index is all-zero, that would result in corruption of said page,
since the functions called on it weren't prepared to handle that case.
There's no need to lock any such pages, so change the logic to target
the last normal leaf page instead.
The first two of these bugs were diagnosed by Andres Freund, the other one
by me. Fixes based on ideas from Heikki Linnakangas and myself.
This has been wrong since Hot Standby was introduced, so back-patch to 9.0.
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This prevents a possible longjmp out of the signal handler if a timeout
or SIGINT occurs while something within the handler has transiently set
ImmediateInterruptOK. For safety we must hold off the timeout or cancel
error until we're back in mainline, or at least till we reach the end of
the signal handler when ImmediateInterruptOK was true at entry. This
syncs these functions with the logic now present in handle_sig_alarm.
AFAICT there is no live bug here in 9.0 and up, because I don't think we
currently can wait for any heavyweight lock inside these functions, and
there is no other code (except read-from-client) that will turn on
ImmediateInterruptOK. However, that was not true pre-9.0: in older
branches ProcessIncomingNotify might block trying to lock pg_listener, and
then a SIGINT could lead to undesirable control flow. It might be all
right anyway given the relatively narrow code ranges in which NOTIFY
interrupts are enabled, but for safety's sake I'm back-patching this.
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These bugs can cause data loss on standbys started with hot_standby=on at
the moment they start to accept read only queries, by marking committed
transactions as uncommited. The likelihood of such corruptions is small
unless the primary has a high transaction rate.
5a031a5556ff83b8a9646892715d7fef415b83c3 fixed bugs in HS's startup logic
by maintaining less state until at least STANDBY_SNAPSHOT_PENDING state
was reached, missing the fact that both clog and subtrans are written to
before that. This only failed to fail in common cases because the usage
of ExtendCLOG in procarray.c was superflous since clog extensions are
actually WAL logged.
f44eedc3f0f347a856eea8590730769125964597/I then tried to fix the missing
extensions of pg_subtrans due to the former commit's changes - which are
not WAL logged - by performing the extensions when switching to a state
> STANDBY_INITIALIZED and not performing xid assignments before that -
again missing the fact that ExtendCLOG is unneccessary - but screwed up
twice: Once because latestObservedXid wasn't updated anymore in that
state due to the earlier commit and once by having an off-by-one error in
the loop performing extensions. This means that whenever a
CLOG_XACTS_PER_PAGE (32768 with default settings) boundary was crossed
between the start of the checkpoint recovery started from and the first
xl_running_xact record old transactions commit bits in pg_clog could be
overwritten if they started and committed in that window.
Fix this mess by not performing ExtendCLOG() in HS at all anymore since
it's unneeded and evidently dangerous and by performing subtrans
extensions even before reaching STANDBY_SNAPSHOT_PENDING.
Analysis and patch by Andres Freund. Reported by Christophe Pettus.
Backpatch down to 9.0, like the previous commit that caused this.
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Callers expect that they only have to set the right resource owner when
creating a BufFile, not during subsequent operations on it. While we could
insist this be fixed at the caller level, it seems more sensible for the
BufFile to take care of it. Without this, some temp files belonging to
a BufFile can go away too soon, eg at the end of a subtransaction,
leading to errors or crashes.
Reported and fixed by Andres Freund. Back-patch to all active branches.
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1. In heap_hot_search_buffer(), the PredicateLockTuple() call is passed
wrong offset number. heapTuple->t_self is set to the tid of the first
tuple in the chain that's visited, not the one actually being read.
2. CheckForSerializableConflictIn() uses the tuple's t_ctid field
instead of t_self to check for exiting predicate locks on the tuple. If
the tuple was updated, but the updater rolled back, t_ctid points to the
aborted dead tuple.
Reported by Hannu Krosing. Backpatch to 9.1.
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If a tuple was frozen while its predicate locks mattered,
read-write dependencies could be missed, resulting in failure to
detect conflicts which could lead to anomalies in committed
serializable transactions.
This field was added to the tag when we still thought that it was
necessary to carry locks forward to a new version of an updated
row. That was later proven to be unnecessary, which allowed
simplification of the code, but elimination of xmin from the tag
was missed at the time.
Per report and analysis by Heikki Linnakangas.
Backpatch to 9.1.
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lo_open registers the currently active snapshot, and checks if the
large object exists after that. Normally, snapshots registered by lo_open
are unregistered at end of transaction when the lo descriptor is closed, but
if we error out before the lo descriptor is added to the list of open
descriptors, it is leaked. Fix by moving the snapshot registration to after
checking if the large object exists.
Reported by Pavel Stehule. Backpatch to 8.4. The snapshot registration
system was introduced in 8.4, so prior versions are not affected (and not
supported, anyway).
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In some cases with higher numbers of subtransactions
it was possible for us to incorrectly initialize
subtrans leading to complaints of missing pages.
Bug report by Sergey Konoplev
Analysis and fix by Andres Freund
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AllocateFile(), AllocateDir(), and some sister routines share a small array
for remembering requests, so that the files can be closed on transaction
failure. Previously that array had a fixed size, MAX_ALLOCATED_DESCS (32).
While historically that had seemed sufficient, Steve Toutant pointed out
that this meant you couldn't scan more than 32 file_fdw foreign tables in
one query, because file_fdw depends on the COPY code which uses
AllocateFile(). There are probably other cases, or will be in the future,
where this nonconfigurable limit impedes users.
We can't completely remove any such limit, at least not without a lot of
work, since each such request requires a kernel file descriptor and most
platforms limit the number we can have. (In principle we could
"virtualize" these descriptors, as fd.c already does for the main VFD pool,
but not without an additional layer of overhead and a lot of notational
impact on the calling code.) But we can at least let the array size be
configurable. Hence, change the code to allow up to max_safe_fds/2
allocated file requests. On modern platforms this should allow several
hundred concurrent file_fdw scans, or more if one increases the value of
max_files_per_process. To go much further than that, we'd need to do some
more work on the data structure, since the current code for closing
requests has potentially O(N^2) runtime; but it should still be all right
for request counts in this range.
Back-patch to 9.1 where contrib/file_fdw was introduced.
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The array allocated by GetRunningTransactionLocks() needs to be pfree'd
when we're done with it. Otherwise we leak some memory during each
checkpoint, if wal_level = hot_standby. This manifests as memory bloat
in the checkpointer process, or in bgwriter in versions before we made
the checkpointer separate.
Reported and fixed by Naoya Anzai. Back-patch to 9.0 where the issue
was introduced.
In passing, improve comments for GetRunningTransactionLocks(), and add
an Assert that we didn't overrun the palloc'd array.
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PathNameOpenFile failed to ensure that the correct value of errno was
returned to its caller after a failure (because it incorrectly supposed
that free() can never change errno). In some cases this would result
in a user-visible failure because an expected ENOENT errno was replaced
with something else. Bogus EINVAL failures have been observed on OS X,
for example.
There were also a couple of places that could mangle an important value
of errno if FDDEBUG was defined. While the usefulness of that debug
support is highly debatable, we might as well make it safe to use,
so add errno save/restore logic to the DO_DB macro.
Per bug #8167 from Nelson Minar, diagnosed by RhodiumToad.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
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Peter Geoghegan
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The old formula didn't take into account that each WAL sender process needs
a spinlock. We had also already exceeded the fixed number of spinlocks
reserved for misc purposes (10). Bump that to 30.
Backpatch to 9.0, where WAL senders were introduced. If I counted correctly,
9.0 had exactly 10 predefined spinlocks, and 9.1 exceeded that, but bump the
limit in 9.0 too because 10 is uncomfortably close to the edge.
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In situations where there are over 8MB of empty pages at the end of
a table, the truncation work for trailing empty pages takes longer
than deadlock_timeout, and there is frequent access to the table by
processes other than autovacuum, there was a problem with the
autovacuum worker process being canceled by the deadlock checking
code. The truncation work done by autovacuum up that point was
lost, and the attempt tried again by a later autovacuum worker. The
attempts could continue indefinitely without making progress,
consuming resources and blocking other processes for up to
deadlock_timeout each time.
This patch has the autovacuum worker checking whether it is
blocking any other thread at 20ms intervals. If such a condition
develops, the autovacuum worker will persist the work it has done
so far, release its lock on the table, and sleep in 50ms intervals
for up to 5 seconds, hoping to be able to re-acquire the lock and
try again. If it is unable to get the lock in that time, it moves
on and a worker will try to continue later from the point this one
left off.
While this patch doesn't change the rules about when and what to
truncate, it does cause the truncation to occur sooner, with less
blocking, and with the consumption of fewer resources when there is
contention for the table's lock.
The only user-visible change other than improved performance is
that the table size during truncation may change incrementally
instead of just once.
Backpatched to 9.0 from initial master commit at
b19e4250b45e91c9cbdd18d35ea6391ab5961c8d -- before that the
differences are too large to be clearly safe.
Jan Wieck
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This reverts commit c11130690d6dca64267201a169cfb38c1adec5ef in favor of
actually fixing the problem: namely, that we should never have been
modifying the checkpoint record's nextXid at this point to begin with.
The nextXid should match the state as of the checkpoint's logical WAL
position (ie the redo point), not the state as of its physical position.
It's especially bogus to advance it in some wal_levels and not others.
In any case there is no need for the checkpoint record to carry the
same nextXid shown in the XLOG_RUNNING_XACTS record just emitted by
LogStandbySnapshot, as any replay operation will already have adopted
that value as current.
This fixes bug #7710 from Tarvi Pillessaar, and probably also explains bug
#6291 from Daniel Farina, in that if a checkpoint were in progress at the
instant of XID wraparound, the epoch bump would be lost as reported.
(And, of course, these days there's at least a 50-50 chance of a checkpoint
being in progress at any given instant.)
Diagnosed by me and independently by Andres Freund. Back-patch to all
branches supporting hot standby.
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Previously we performed VirtualXactLockTableInsert
but didn't set MyProc->lxid for Startup process.
pg_locks now correctly shows "1/1" for vxid
of Startup process during Hot Standby.
At end of Hot Standby the Virtual Transaction
was not deleted, leading to problems after
promoting to normal running for some commands,
such as CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY.
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Andres Freund and Simon Riggs
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If an SMgrRelation is not "owned" by a relcache entry, don't allow it to
live past transaction end. This design allows the same SMgrRelation to be
used for blind writes of multiple blocks during a transaction, but ensures
that we don't hold onto such an SMgrRelation indefinitely. Because an
SMgrRelation typically corresponds to open file descriptors at the fd.c
level, leaving it open when there's no corresponding relcache entry can
mean that we prevent the kernel from reclaiming deleted disk space.
(While CacheInvalidateSmgr messages usually fix that, there are cases
where they're not issued, such as DROP DATABASE. We might want to add
some more sinval messaging for that, but I'd be inclined to keep this
type of logic anyway, since allowing VFDs to accumulate indefinitely
for blind-written relations doesn't seem like a good idea.)
This code replaces a previous attempt towards the same goal that proved
to be unreliable. Back-patch to 9.1 where the previous patch was added.
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This reverts commit fba105b1099f4f5fa7283bb17cba6fed2baa8d0c.
That approach had problems with the smgr-level state not tracking what
we really want to happen, and with the VFD-level state not tracking the
smgr-level state very well either. In consequence, it was still possible
to hold kernel file descriptors open for long-gone tables (as in recent
report from Tore Halset), and yet there were also cases of FDs being closed
undesirably soon. A replacement implementation will follow.
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