| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Trading a little too heavily on letting the code path be the same whether
we were creating shared data structures or only attaching to them,
InitPredicateLocks() inserted the "scratch" PredicateLockTargetHash entry
unconditionally. This is just wrong if we're in a postmaster child,
which would only reach this code in EXEC_BACKEND builds. Most of the
time, the hash_search(HASH_ENTER) call would simply report that the
entry already existed, causing no visible effect since the code did not
bother to check for that possibility. However, if this happened while
some other backend had transiently removed the "scratch" entry, then
that other backend's eventual RestoreScratchTarget would suffer an
assert failure; this appears to be the explanation for a recent failure
on buildfarm member culicidae. In non-assert builds, there would be
no visible consequences there either. But nonetheless this is a pretty
bad bug for EXEC_BACKEND builds, for two reasons:
1. Each new backend would perform the hash_search(HASH_ENTER) call
without holding any lock that would prevent concurrent access to the
PredicateLockTargetHash hash table. This creates a low but certainly
nonzero risk of corruption of that hash table.
2. In the event that the race condition occurred, by reinserting the
scratch entry too soon, we were defeating the entire purpose of the
scratch entry, namely to guarantee that transaction commit could move
hash table entries around with no risk of out-of-memory failure.
The odds of an actual OOM failure are quite low, but not zero, and if
it did happen it would again result in corruption of the hash table.
The user-visible symptoms of such corruption are a little hard to predict,
but would presumably amount to misbehavior of SERIALIZABLE transactions
that'd require a crash or postmaster restart to fix.
To fix, just skip the hash insertion if IsUnderPostmaster. I also
inserted a bunch of assertions that the expected things happen
depending on whether IsUnderPostmaster is true. That might be overkill,
since most comparable code in other functions isn't quite that paranoid,
but once burnt twice shy.
In passing, also move a couple of lines to places where they seemed
to make more sense.
Diagnosis of problem by Thomas Munro, patch by me. Back-patch to
all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/10593.1500670709@sss.pgh.pa.us
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The race condition goes like this:
1. GetNewTransactionId advances nextXid e.g. from 100 to 101
2. GetOldestActiveTransactionId reads the new nextXid, 101
3. GetOldestActiveTransactionId loops through the proc array. There are no
active XIDs there, so it returns 101 as the oldest active XID.
4. GetNewTransactionid stores XID 100 to MyPgXact->xid
So, GetOldestActiveTransactionId returned XID 101, even though 100 only
just started and is surely still running.
This would be hard to hit in practice, and even harder to spot any ill
effect if it happens. GetOldestActiveTransactionId is only used when
creating a checkpoint in a master server, and the race condition can only
happen on an online checkpoint, as there are no backends running during a
shutdown checkpoint. The oldestActiveXid value of an online checkpoint is
only used when starting up a hot standby server, to determine the starting
point where pg_subtrans is initialized from. For the race condition to
happen, there must be no other XIDs in the proc array that would hold back
the oldest-active XID value, which means that the missed XID must be a top
transaction's XID. However, pg_subtrans is not used for top XIDs, so I
believe an off-by-one error is in fact inconsequential. Nevertheless, let's
fix it, as it's clearly wrong and the fix is simple.
This has been wrong ever since hot standby was introduced, so backport to
all supported versions.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/e7258662-82b6-7a45-56d4-99b337a32bf7@iki.fi
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Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20170711.163441.241981736.horiguchi.kyotaro@lab.ntt.co.jp
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When the checkpointer writes the shutdown checkpoint, it checks
afterwards whether any WAL has been written since it started and
throws a PANIC if so. At that point, only walsenders are still
active, so one might think this could not happen, but walsenders can
also generate WAL, for instance in BASE_BACKUP and logical decoding
related commands (e.g. via hint bits). So they can trigger this panic
if such a command is run while the shutdown checkpoint is being
written.
To fix this, divide the walsender shutdown into two phases. First,
checkpointer, itself triggered by postmaster, sends a
PROCSIG_WALSND_INIT_STOPPING signal to all walsenders. If the backend
is idle or runs an SQL query this causes the backend to shutdown, if
logical replication is in progress all existing WAL records are
processed followed by a shutdown. Otherwise this causes the walsender
to switch to the "stopping" state. In this state, the walsender will
reject any further replication commands. The checkpointer begins the
shutdown checkpoint once all walsenders are confirmed as
stopping. When the shutdown checkpoint finishes, the postmaster sends
us SIGUSR2. This instructs walsender to send any outstanding WAL,
including the shutdown checkpoint record, wait for it to be replicated
to the standby, and then exit.
Author: Andres Freund, based on an earlier patch by Michael Paquier
Reported-By: Fujii Masao, Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170602002912.tqlwn4gymzlxpvs2@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: 9.4, where logical decoding was introduced
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Mark our rusage reportage string translatable; remove quotes from type
names; unify formatting of very similar messages.
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This addresses the new warning types -Wformat-truncation
-Wformat-overflow that are part of -Wall, via -Wformat, in GCC 7.
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Commit fa31b6f4e supposed that we didn't have to worry about that
anymore, but it seems that RHEL5 is like that, and that's still
a supported platform. Put back the prior coding under an #ifdef,
adding an explicit fcntl() to retain the desired CLOEXEC property.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/12307.1493325329@sss.pgh.pa.us
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The logical decoding machinery already preserved all the required
catalog tuples, which is sufficient in the course of normal logical
decoding, but did not guarantee that non-catalog tuples were preserved
during computation of the initial snapshot when creating a slot over
the replication protocol.
This could cause a corrupted initial snapshot being exported. The
time window for issues is usually not terribly large, but on a busy
server it's perfectly possible to it hit it. Ongoing decoding is not
affected by this bug.
To avoid increased overhead for the SQL API, only retain additional
tuples when a logical slot is being created over the replication
protocol. To do so this commit changes the signature of
CreateInitDecodingContext(), but it seems unlikely that it's being
used in an extension, so that's probably ok.
In a drive-by fix, fix handling of
ReplicationSlotsComputeRequiredXmin's already_locked argument, which
should only apply to ProcArrayLock, not ReplicationSlotControlLock.
Reported-By: Erik Rijkers
Analyzed-By: Petr Jelinek
Author: Petr Jelinek, heavily editorialized by Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9a897b86-46e1-9915-ee4c-da02e4ff6a95@2ndquadrant.com
Backport: 9.4, where logical decoding was introduced.
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Although the postmaster doesn't currently create a self-pipe or any
latches, there's discussion of it doing so in future. It's also
conceivable that a shared_preload_libraries extension would try to
create such a thing in the postmaster process today. In that case
the self-pipe FDs would be inherited by forked child processes.
latch.c was entirely unprepared for such a case and could suffer an
assertion failure, or worse try to use the inherited pipe if somebody
called WaitLatch without having called InitializeLatchSupport in that
process. Make it keep track of whether InitializeLatchSupport has been
called in the *current* process, and do the right thing if state has
been inherited from a parent.
Apply FD_CLOEXEC to file descriptors created in latch.c (the self-pipe,
as well as epoll event sets). This ensures that child processes spawned
in backends, the archiver, etc cannot accidentally or intentionally mess
with these FDs. It also ensures that we end up with the right state
for the self-pipe in EXEC_BACKEND processes, which otherwise wouldn't
know to close the postmaster's self-pipe FDs.
Back-patch to 9.6, mainly to keep latch.c looking similar in all branches
it exists in.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/8322.1493240739@sss.pgh.pa.us
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The POSIX standard does not say that the success return value for
fcntl(F_SETFD) and fcntl(F_SETFL) is zero; it says only that it's not -1.
We had several calls that were making the stronger assumption. Adjust
them to test specifically for -1 for strict spec compliance.
The standard further leaves open the possibility that the O_NONBLOCK
flag bit is not the only active one in F_SETFL's argument. Formally,
therefore, one ought to get the current flags with F_GETFL and store
them back with only the O_NONBLOCK bit changed when trying to change
the nonblock state. In port/noblock.c, we were doing the full pushup
in pg_set_block but not in pg_set_noblock, which is just weird. Make
both of them do it properly, since they have little business making
any assumptions about the socket they're handed. The other places
where we're issuing F_SETFL are working with FDs we just got from
pipe(2), so it's reasonable to assume the FDs' properties are all
default, so I didn't bother adding F_GETFL steps there.
Also, while pg_set_block deserves some points for trying to do things
right, somebody had decided that it'd be even better to cast fcntl's
third argument to "long". Which is completely loony, because POSIX
clearly says the third argument for an F_SETFL call is "int".
Given the lack of field complaints, these missteps apparently are not
of significance on any common platforms. But they're still wrong,
so back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30882.1492800880@sss.pgh.pa.us
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this makes buffer access strategy have no effect.
Change was a part of commit 48354581a49c30f5757c203415aa8412d85b0f70 during 9.6
release cycle, so backpath to 9.6
Reported-by: Jim Nasby
Author: Alexander Korotkov
Reviewed-by: Jim Nasby, Andres Freund
https://commitfest.postgresql.org/13/1029/
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Windows apparently will not detect socket write-ready events unless a
preceding send attempt returned WSAEWOULDBLOCK. In many usage patterns
that's satisfied by the caller of WaitEvenSetWait(), but not always.
Apply the same solution that we already had in pgwin32_select(), namely to
perform a dummy WSASend() call with len=0. This will return WSAEWOULDBLOCK
if there's no buffer space (even though it could legitimately do nothing
and report success, which makes me a bit nervous about this solution;
but since it's been working fine in libpq, let's roll with it).
In passing, improve the comments about this in pgwin32_select(), and remove
duplicated code there.
Back-patch to 9.6 where WaitEventSetWait() was introduced. We might need
to back-patch something similar into predecessor code. But given the lack
of complaints so far, it's not clear that the case ever gets exercised
in the back branches, so I'm not going to expend effort on it right now.
This should resolve recurring failures on buildfarm member bowerbird,
which has been failing since 1e8a85009 went in.
Diagnosis and patch by Petr Jelinek, cosmetic adjustments by me.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/5b6a6d6d-fb45-0afb-2e95-5600063c3dbd@2ndquadrant.com
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This could result in corruption of the init fork of an unlogged index
if the ambuildempty routine for that index used shared buffers to
create the init fork, which was true for brin, gin, gist, and hash
indexes.
Patch by me, based on an earlier patch by Michael Paquier, who also
reviewed this one. This also incorporates an idea from Artur
Zakirov.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CACYUyc8yccE4xfxhqxfh_Mh38j7dRFuxfaK1p6dSNAEUakxUyQ@mail.gmail.com
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Several places in fd.c had badly-thought-through handling of error returns
from lseek() and close(). The fact that those would seldom fail on valid
FDs is probably the reason we've not noticed this up to now; but if they
did fail, we'd get quite confused.
LruDelete and LruInsert actually just Assert'd that lseek never fails,
which is pretty awful on its face.
In LruDelete, we indeed can't throw an error, because that's likely to get
called during error abort and so throwing an error would probably just lead
to an infinite loop. But by the same token, throwing an error from the
close() right after that was ill-advised, not to mention that it would've
left the LRU state corrupted since we'd already unlinked the VFD from the
list. I also noticed that really, most of the time, we should know the
current seek position and it shouldn't be necessary to do an lseek here at
all. As patched, if we don't have a seek position and an lseek attempt
doesn't give us one, we'll close the file but then subsequent re-open
attempts will fail (except in the somewhat-unlikely case that a
FileSeek(SEEK_SET) call comes between and allows us to re-establish a known
target seek position). This isn't great but it won't result in any state
corruption.
Meanwhile, having an Assert instead of an honest test in LruInsert is
really dangerous: if that lseek failed, a subsequent read or write would
read or write from the start of the file, not where the caller expected,
leading to data corruption.
In both LruDelete and FileClose, if close() fails, just LOG that and mark
the VFD closed anyway. Possibly leaking an FD is preferable to getting
into an infinite loop or corrupting the VFD list. Besides, as far as I can
tell from the POSIX spec, it's unspecified whether or not the file has been
closed, so treating it as still open could be the wrong thing anyhow.
I also fixed a number of other places that were being sloppy about
behaving correctly when the seekPos is unknown.
Also, I changed FileSeek to return -1 with EINVAL for the cases where it
detects a bad offset, rather than throwing a hard elog(ERROR). It seemed
pretty inconsistent that some bad-offset cases would get a failure return
while others got elog(ERROR). It was missing an offset validity check for
the SEEK_CUR case on a closed file, too.
Back-patch to all supported branches, since all this code is fundamentally
identical in all of them.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2982.1487617365@sss.pgh.pa.us
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Backpatch to all supported versions, where applicable, to make backpatching
of future fixes go more smoothly.
Josh Soref
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CACZqfqCf+5qRztLPgmmosr-B0Ye4srWzzw_mo4c_8_B_mtjmJQ@mail.gmail.com
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Doing so doesn't seem to be within the purpose of the per user
connection limits, and has particularly unfortunate effects in
conjunction with parallel queries.
Backpatch to 9.6 where parallel queries were introduced.
David Rowley, reviewed by Robert Haas and Albe Laurenz.
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The interface for the function was changed in
d72731a70450b5e7084991b9caa15cb58a2820df but the comments of the
function was not updated.
Patch by Yugo Nagata.
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Commit 4aec49899e5782247e134f94ce1c6ee926f88e1c reorganized the order
of operations here so that we no longer increment the number of "extra
waits" before locking the semaphore, but it did not change the
starting value of extraWaits from 0 to -1 to compensate. In the worst
case, this could leak a semaphore count, but that seems to be unlikely
in practice.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CAA4eK1JyVqXiMba+-a589Rk0pyHsyKkGxeumVKjU6Y74hdrVLQ@mail.gmail.com
Amit Kapila, per an off-list report by Dilip Kumar. Reviewed by me.
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Rearrange a bit of code to ensure that 'mode' in LWLockRelease is
obviously always set, which seems a bit cleaner and avoids a compiler
warning (thanks to Robert for the suggestion!).
Back-patch back to 9.5 where the warning is first seen.
Author: Stephen Frost
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20161129152102.GR13284%40tamriel.snowman.net
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If we do not reset the FD_READ event, WaitForMultipleObjects won't
return it again again unless we've meanwhile read from the socket,
which is generally true but not guaranteed. WaitEventSetWaitBlock
itself may fail to return the event to the caller if the latch is
also set, and even if we changed that, the caller isn't obliged to
handle all returned events at once. On non-Windows systems, the
socket-read event is purely level-triggered, so this issue does
not exist. To fix, make Windows reset the event when needed.
This bug was introduced by 98a64d0bd713cb89e61bef6432befc4b7b5da59e,
and causes hangs when trying to use the pldebugger extension.
Patch by Amit Kapial. Reported and tested by Ashutosh Sharma, who
also provided some analysis. Further analysis by Michael Paquier.
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When a relation is truncated, it is important that the FSM is truncated as
well. Otherwise, after recovery, the FSM can return a page that has been
truncated away, leading to errors like:
ERROR: could not read block 28991 in file "base/16390/572026": read only 0
of 8192 bytes
We were using MarkBufferDirtyHint() to dirty the buffer holding the last
remaining page of the FSM, but during recovery, that might in fact not
dirty the page, and the FSM update might be lost.
To fix, use the stronger MarkBufferDirty() function. MarkBufferDirty()
requires us to do WAL-logging ourselves, to protect from a torn page, if
checksumming is enabled.
Also fix an oversight in visibilitymap_truncate: it also needs to WAL-log
when checksumming is enabled.
Analysis by Pavan Deolasee.
Discussion: <CABOikdNr5vKucqyZH9s1Mh0XebLs_jRhKv6eJfNnD2wxTn=_9A@mail.gmail.com>
Backpatch to 9.3, where we got data checksums.
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I somehow had assumed that in the spinlock (in turn possibly using
semaphores) based fallback atomics implementation 32 bit writes could be
done without a lock. As far as the write goes that's correct, since
postgres supports only platforms with single-copy atomicity for aligned
32bit writes. But writing without holding the spinlock breaks
read-modify-write operations like pg_atomic_compare_exchange_u32(),
since they'll potentially "miss" a concurrent write, which can't happen
in actual hardware implementations.
In 9.6+ when using the fallback atomics implementation this could lead
to buffer header locks not being properly marked as released, and
potentially some related state corruption. I don't see a related danger
in 9.5 (earliest release with the API), because pg_atomic_write_u32()
wasn't used in a concurrent manner there.
The state variable of local buffers, before this change, were
manipulated using pg_atomic_write_u32(), to avoid unnecessary
synchronization overhead. As that'd not be the case anymore, introduce
and use pg_atomic_unlocked_write_u32(), which does not correctly
interact with RMW operations.
This bug only caused issues when postgres is compiled on platforms
without atomics support (i.e. no common new platform), or when compiled
with --disable-atomics, which explains why this wasn't noticed in
testing.
Reported-By: Tom Lane
Discussion: <14947.1475690465@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Backpatch: 9.5-, where the atomic operations API was introduced.
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We must test GetLastError() even when CreateFileMapping() returns a
non-null handle. If that value were left over from some previous system
call, we might be fooled into thinking the segment already existed.
Experimentation on Windows 7 suggests that CreateFileMapping() clears
the error code on success, but it is not documented to do so, so let's
not rely on that happening in all Windows releases.
Amit Kapila
Discussion: <20811.1474390987@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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Commits 470d886c3 et al intended to fix the problem that the postmaster
selected the same "random" DSM control segment ID on every start. But
using PostmasterRandom() for that destroys the intended property that the
delay between random_start_time and random_stop_time will be unpredictable.
(Said delay is probably already more predictable than we could wish, but
that doesn't mean that reducing it by a couple orders of magnitude is OK.)
Revert the previous patch and add a comment warning against misuse of
PostmasterRandom. Fix the original problem by calling srandom() early in
PostmasterMain, using a low-security seed that will later be overwritten
by PostmasterRandom.
Discussion: <20789.1474390434@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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Otherwise, every startup gets the same "random" value, which is
definitely not what was intended.
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Otherwise, attempts to run multiple postmasters running on the same
machine may fail, because Windows sometimes returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
rather than ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when there is an existing segment.
Hitting this bug is much more likely because of another defect not
fixed by this patch, namely that dsm_postmaster_startup() uses
random() which returns the same value every time. But that's not
a reason not to fix this.
Kyotaro Horiguchi and Amit Kapila, reviewed by Michael Paquier
Discussion: <CAA4eK1JyNdMeF-dgrpHozDecpDfsRZUtpCi+1AbtuEkfG3YooQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Daniel Gustafsson
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mdtruncate() forgot to FileClose() a segment's mdfd_vfd, when deleting
it. That lead to a fd.c handle to a truncated file being kept open until
backend exit.
The issue appears to have been introduced way back in 1a5c450f3024ac5,
before that the handle was closed inside FileUnlink().
The impact of this bug is limited - only VACUUM and ON COMMIT TRUNCATE
for temporary tables, truncate files in place (i.e. TRUNCATE itself is
not affected), and the relation has to be bigger than 1GB. The
consequences of a leaked fd.c handle aren't severe either.
Discussion: <20160908220748.oqh37ukwqqncbl3n@alap3.anarazel.de>
Backpatch: all supported releases
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I found that half a dozen (nearly 5%) of our AllocSetContextCreate calls
had typos in the context-sizing parameters. While none of these led to
especially significant problems, they did create minor inefficiencies,
and it's now clear that expecting people to copy-and-paste those calls
accurately is not a great idea. Let's reduce the risk of future errors
by introducing single macros that encapsulate the common use-cases.
Three such macros are enough to cover all but two special-purpose contexts;
those two calls can be left as-is, I think.
While this patch doesn't in itself improve matters for third-party
extensions, it doesn't break anything for them either, and they can
gradually adopt the simplified notation over time.
In passing, change TopMemoryContext to use the default allocation
parameters. Formerly it could only be extended 8K at a time. That was
probably reasonable when this code was written; but nowadays we create
many more contexts than we did then, so that it's not unusual to have a
couple hundred K in TopMemoryContext, even without considering various
dubious code that sticks other things there. There seems no good reason
not to let it use growing blocks like most other contexts.
Back-patch to 9.6, mostly because that's still close enough to HEAD that
it's easy to do so, and keeping the branches in sync can be expected to
avoid some future back-patching pain. The bugs fixed by these changes
don't seem to be significant enough to justify fixing them further back.
Discussion: <21072.1472321324@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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This coding pattern creates a race condition, because if an interesting
interrupt happens after we've checked InterruptPending but before we reset
our latch, the latch-setting done by the signal handler would get lost,
and then we might block at WaitLatch in the next iteration without ever
noticing the interrupt condition. You can put the CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS
before WaitLatch or after ResetLatch, but not between them.
Aside from fixing the bugs, add some explanatory comments to latch.h
to perhaps forestall the next person from making the same mistake.
In HEAD, also replace gather_readnext's direct call of
HandleParallelMessages with CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS. It does not seem clean
or useful for this one caller to bypass ProcessInterrupts and go straight
to HandleParallelMessages; not least because that fails to consider the
InterruptPending flag, resulting in useless work both here
(if InterruptPending isn't set) and in the next CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS call
(if it is).
This thinko seems to have been introduced in the initial coding of
storage/ipc/shm_mq.c (commit ec9037df2), and then blindly copied into all
the subsequent parallel-query support logic. Back-patch relevant hunks
to 9.4 to extirpate the error everywhere.
Discussion: <1661.1469996911@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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This reverts commit 88cf37d2a86d5b66380003d7c3384530e3f91e40 as well
as follow-on commits ea9c4a16d5ad88a1d28d43ef458e3209b53eb106 and
c57562725d219c4249b82f4a4fb5aaeee3ae0d53. We've learned about as much
as we can from the buildfarm.
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Examination of the results from anole and gharial suggests that we're
only managing to track the size of one of the two stacks of IA64 machines.
Some googling gave the answer: on HPUX11, the register stack is reported
as a page type I don't see in pstat.h on my HPUX10 box. Let's try
testing for that.
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After a look at preliminary results from commit 88cf37d2a86d5b66,
I realized it'd be a good idea to spew out the maximum depth measurement
seen by check_stack_depth. So add some quick-n-dirty code to do that.
Like the previous commit, this will be reverted once we've gathered
a set of buildfarm runs with it.
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This patch is meant to gather information from the buildfarm members, and
will be reverted in a day or so. The idea is to try to find out the
high-water stack consumption while running the regression tests,
particularly on IA64 which is suspected to use much more stack than other
architectures. On machines with pmap, we can use that; but the IA64 farm
members are running HPUX, so also include some bespoke code for HPUX.
(I've tested the latter on HPUX 10/HPPA; not entirely sure it will work
on HPUX 11/IA64, but we'll soon find out.)
Discussion: <CAM-w4HMwwcwaVvYcAH0_FGtG5GeXdYVRfvG81pXnSJWHnCfosQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Author: Masahiko Sawada
Discussion: CAD21AoBD=Of1OzL90Xx4Q-3j=-2q7=S87cs75HfutE=eCday2w@mail.gmail.com
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Commit 3bd261ca18c67eafe18088e58fab511e3b965418 should have updated
this, but didn't.
Extracted from a larger patch by Piotr Stefaniak.
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Commit b8fd1a09f3 renamed XLOG_HINT to XLOG_FPI, but neglected two
places.
Backpatch to 9.3, like that commit.
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Since indexes are created without valid LSNs, an index created
while a snapshot older than old_snapshot_threshold existed could
cause queries to return incorrect results when those old snapshots
were used, if any relevant rows had been subject to early pruning
before the index was built. Prevent usage of a newly created index
until all such snapshots are released, for relations where this can
happen.
Questions about the interaction of "snapshot too old" with index
creation were initially raised by Andres Freund.
Reviewed by Robert Haas.
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Transmit the leader's temp-namespace state to workers. This is important
because without it, the workers do not really have the same search path
as the leader. For example, there is no good reason (and no extant code
either) to prevent a worker from executing a temp function that the
leader created previously; but as things stood it would fail to find the
temp function, and then either fail or execute the wrong function entirely.
We still prohibit a worker from creating a temp namespace on its own.
In effect, a worker can only see the session's temp namespace if the leader
had created it before starting the worker, which seems like the right
semantics.
Also, transmit the leader's BackendId to workers, and arrange for workers
to use that when determining the physical file path of a temp relation
belonging to their session. While the original intent was to prevent such
accesses entirely, there were a number of holes in that, notably in places
like dbsize.c which assume they can safely access temp rels of other
sessions anyway. We might as well get this right, as a small down payment
on someday allowing workers to access the leader's temp tables. (With
this change, directly using "MyBackendId" as a relation or buffer backend
ID is deprecated; you should use BackendIdForTempRelations() instead.
I left a couple of such uses alone though, as they're not going to be
reachable in parallel workers until we do something about localbuf.c.)
Move the thou-shalt-not-access-thy-leader's-temp-tables prohibition down
into localbuf.c, which is where it actually matters, instead of having it
in relation_open(). This amounts to recognizing that access to temp
tables' catalog entries is perfectly safe in a worker, it's only the data
in local buffers that is problematic.
Having done all that, we can get rid of the test in has_parallel_hazard()
that says that use of a temp table's rowtype is unsafe in parallel workers.
That test was unduly expensive, and if we really did need such a
prohibition, that was not even close to being a bulletproof guard for it.
(For example, any user-defined function executed in a parallel worker
might have attempted such access.)
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Prior to this patch, it was occasionally possible, after shm_mq_sendv
had previously returned SHM_MQ_DETACHED, for a later shm_mq_sendv
operation to fail an assertion instead of just again returning
SHM_MQ_ATTACHED. From the shm_mq code's point of view, it was
expecting to be called again with the same arguments, since the
previous operation had only partially completed. However, a caller
who isn't using non-blocking mode won't be prepared to repeat the call
with the same arguments, and this code shouldn't expect that they
will. Repair in such a way that we'll be OK whether the next call
uses the same arguments or not.
Found by Andreas Seltenreich. Analysis and sketch of fix by Amit
Kapila. Patch by me, reviewed by Amit Kapila.
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Mostly these are just comments but there are a few in documentation
and a handful in code and tests. Hopefully this doesn't cause too much
unnecessary pain for backpatching. I relented from some of the most
common like "thru" for that reason. The rest don't seem numerous
enough to cause problems.
Thanks to Kevin Lyda's tool https://pypi.python.org/pypi/misspellings
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Use MAXALIGN size/alignment to guarantee that later uses of memory are
aligned correctly. E.g. epoll_event might need 8 byte alignment on some
platforms, but earlier allocations like WaitEventSet and WaitEvent might
not sized to guarantee that when purely using sizeof().
Found by myself while testing on an Sun Ultra 5 (Sparc IIi) with some
editorializing by Andres Freund.
In passing fix a couple typos in the area
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BRIN was relying on the ability to remove a tuple from an index page,
then putting another tuple in the same line pointer. But PageAddItem
refuses to add a tuple beyond the first free item past the last used
item, and in particular, it rejects an attempt to add an item to an
empty page anywhere other than the first line pointer. PageAddItem
issues a WARNING and indicates to the caller that it failed, which in
turn causes the BRIN calling code to issue a PANIC, so the whole
sequence looks like this:
WARNING: specified item offset is too large
PANIC: failed to add BRIN tuple
To fix, create a new function PageAddItemExtended which is like
PageAddItem except that the two boolean arguments become a flags bitmap;
the "overwrite" and "is_heap" boolean flags in PageAddItem become
PAI_OVERWITE and PAI_IS_HEAP flags in the new function, and a new flag
PAI_ALLOW_FAR_OFFSET enables the behavior required by BRIN.
PageAddItem() retains its original signature, for compatibility with
third-party modules (other callers in core code are not modified,
either).
Also, in the belt-and-suspenders spirit, I added a new sanity check in
brinGetTupleForHeapBlock to raise an error if an TID found in the revmap
is not marked as live by the page header. This causes it to react with
"ERROR: corrupted BRIN index" to the bug at hand, rather than a hard
crash.
Backpatch to 9.5.
Bug reported by Andreas Seltenreich as detected by his handy sqlsmith
fuzzer.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/87mvni77jh.fsf@elite.ansel.ydns.eu
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Commit 1aba62ec moved the range check of that option form guc.c into
bufmgr.c, but introduced a bug by changing a >= 0.0 to > 0.0, which made
the value 0 no longer accepted. Put it back.
Reported by Jeff Janes, diagnosed by Tom Lane
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