| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Don't move parenthesized lines to the left, even if that means they
flow past the right margin.
By default, BSD indent lines up statement continuation lines that are
within parentheses so that they start just to the right of the preceding
left parenthesis. However, traditionally, if that resulted in the
continuation line extending to the right of the desired right margin,
then indent would push it left just far enough to not overrun the margin,
if it could do so without making the continuation line start to the left of
the current statement indent. That makes for a weird mix of indentations
unless one has been completely rigid about never violating the 80-column
limit.
This behavior has been pretty universally panned by Postgres developers.
Hence, disable it with indent's new -lpl switch, so that parenthesized
lines are always lined up with the preceding left paren.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4dd0dad0dd9eea4be9cc1412373a8c89 wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is just to have a clean base state for testing of Piotr Stefaniak's
latest version of FreeBSD indent. I fixed up a couple of places where
pgindent would have changed format not-nicely. perltidy not included.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/VI1PR03MB119959F4B65F000CA7CD9F6BF2CC0@VI1PR03MB1199.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
If authentication over an SSL connection fails, with sslmode=prefer,
libpq will reconnect without SSL and retry. However, we did not clear
the variables related to GSS, SSPI, and SASL authentication state, when
reconnecting. Because of that, the second authentication attempt would
always fail with a "duplicate GSS/SASL authentication request" error.
pg_SSPI_startup did not check for duplicate authentication requests like
the corresponding GSS and SASL functions, so with SSPI, you would leak
some memory instead.
Another way this could manifest itself, on version 10, is if you list
multiple hostnames in the "host" parameter. If the first server requests
Kerberos or SCRAM authentication, but it fails, the attempts to connect to
the other servers will also fail with "duplicate authentication request"
errors.
To fix, move the clearing of authentication state from closePGconn to
pgDropConnection, so that it is cleared also when re-connecting.
Patch by Michael Paquier, with some kibitzing by me.
Backpatch down to 9.3. 9.2 has the same bug, but the code around closing
the connection is somewhat different, so that this patch doesn't apply.
To fix this in 9.2, I think we would need to back-port commit 210eb9b743
first, and then apply this patch. However, given that we only bumped into
this in our own testing, we haven't heard any reports from users about
this, and that 9.2 will be end-of-lifed in a couple of months anyway, it
doesn't seem worth the risk and trouble.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRuOUm0MyJaUy9L3eXYJU3AKCZ-0-03=-aDTZJGV4GyWw@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The logic to free the buffer after the gss_init_sec_context() call was
always a bit wonky. Because gss_init_sec_context() sets the GSS context
variable, conn->gctx, we would in fact always attempt to free the buffer.
That only works, because previously conn->ginbuf.value was initialized to
NULL, and free(NULL) is a no-op. Commit 61bf96cab0 refactored things so
that the GSS input token buffer is allocated locally in pg_GSS_continue,
and not held in the PGconn object. After that, the now-local ginbuf.value
variable isn't initialized when it's not used, so we pass a bogus pointer
to free().
To fix, only try to free the input buffer if we allocated it. That was the
intention, certainly after the refactoring, and probably even before that.
But because there's no live bug before the refactoring, I refrained from
backpatching this.
The bug was also independently reported by Graham Dutton, as bug #14690.
Patch reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6288d80e-a0bf-d4d3-4e12-7b79c77f1771%40iki.fi
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20170605130954.1438.90535%40wrigleys.postgresql.org
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Storing passwords in plaintext hasn't been a good idea for a very long
time, if ever. Now seems like a good time to finally forbid it, since we're
messing with this in PostgreSQL 10 anyway.
Remove the CREATE/ALTER USER UNENCRYPTED PASSSWORD 'foo' syntax, since
storing passwords unencrypted is no longer supported. ENCRYPTED PASSWORD
'foo' is still accepted, but ENCRYPTED is now just a noise-word, it does
the same as just PASSWORD 'foo'.
Likewise, remove the --unencrypted option from createuser, but accept
--encrypted as a no-op for backward compatibility. AFAICS, --encrypted was
a no-op even before this patch, because createuser encrypted the password
before sending it to the server even if --encrypted was not specified. It
added the ENCRYPTED keyword to the SQL command, but since the password was
already in encrypted form, it didn't make any difference. The documentation
was not clear on whether that was intended or not, but it's moot now.
Also, while password_encryption='on' is still accepted as an alias for
'md5', it is now marked as hidden, so that it is not listed as an accepted
value in error hints, for example. That's not directly related to removing
'plain', but it seems better this way.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/16e9b768-fd78-0b12-cfc1-7b6b7f238fde@iki.fi
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
password_encryption was a boolean before version 10, so cope with "on" and
"off".
Also, change the behavior with "plain", to treat it the same as "md5".
We're discussing removing the password_encryption='plain' option from the
server altogether, which will make this the only reasonable choice, but
even if we kept it, it seems best to never send the password in cleartext.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The new function supports creating SCRAM verifiers, in addition to md5
hashes. The algorithm is chosen based on password_encryption, by default.
This fixes the issue reported by Jeff Janes, that there was previously
no way to create a SCRAM verifier with "\password".
Michael Paquier and me
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAMkU%3D1wfBgFPbfAMYZQE78p%3DVhZX7nN86aWkp0QcCp%3D%2BKxZ%3Dbg%40mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This contains some protocol changes to SASL authentiation (which is new
in v10):
* For future-proofing, in the AuthenticationSASL message that begins SASL
authentication, provide a list of SASL mechanisms that the server
supports, for the client to choose from. Currently, it's always just
SCRAM-SHA-256.
* Add a separate authentication message type for the final server->client
SASL message, which the client doesn't need to respond to. This makes
it unambiguous whether the client is supposed to send a response or not.
The SASL mechanism should know that anyway, but better to be explicit.
Also, in the server, support clients that don't send an Initial Client
response in the first SASLInitialResponse message. The server is supposed
to first send an empty request in that case, to which the client will
respond with the data that usually comes in the Initial Client Response.
libpq uses the Initial Client Response field and doesn't need this, and I
would assume any other sensible implementation to use Initial Client
Response, too, but let's follow the SASL spec.
Improve the documentation on SASL authentication in protocol. Add a
section describing the SASL message flow, and some details on our
SCRAM-SHA-256 implementation.
Document the different kinds of PasswordMessages that the frontend sends
in different phases of SASL authentication, as well as GSS/SSPI
authentication as separate message formats. Even though they're all 'p'
messages, and the exact format depends on the context, describing them as
separate message formats makes the documentation more clear.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Álvaro Hernández Tortosa.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqS-aFg0iM3AQOJwKDv_0WkAedRjs1W2X8EixSz+sKBXCQ@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Move the responsibility of reading the data from the authentication request
message from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth(). This way, PQconnectPoll()
doesn't need to know about all the different authentication request types,
and we don't need the extra fields in the pg_conn struct to pass the data
from PQconnectPoll() to pg_fe_sendauth() anymore.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6490b975-5ee1-6280-ac1d-af975b19fb9a%40iki.fi
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This used to mean "Visual C++ except in those parts where Borland C++
was supported where it meant one of those". Now that we don't support
Borland C++ anymore, simplify by using _MSC_VER which is the normal way
to detect Visual C++.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add required #includes for htonl. Per buildfarm members pademelon/gaur.
* Remove unnecessary "#include <utils/memutils>".
* Fix checking for empty string in pg_SASL_init. (Reported by Peter
Eisentraut and his compiler)
* Move code in pg_SASL_init to match the recent changes (commit ba005f193d)
to pg_fe_sendauth() function, where it's copied from.
* Return value of malloc() was not checked for NULL in
scram_SaltedPassword(). Fix by avoiding the malloc().
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Backpatch to all supported versions, where applicable, to make backpatching
of future fixes go more smoothly.
Josh Soref
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CACZqfqCf+5qRztLPgmmosr-B0Ye4srWzzw_mo4c_8_B_mtjmJQ@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Formerly an alternate password file could only be selected via the
environment variable PGPASSFILE; now it can also be selected via a
new connection parameter "passfile", corresponding to the conventions
for most other connection parameters. There was some concern about
this creating a security weakness, but it was agreed that that argument
was pretty thin, and there are clear use-cases for handling password
files this way.
Julian Markwort, reviewed by Fabien Coelho, some adjustments by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a4b4f4f1-7b58-a0e8-5268-5f7db8e8ccaa@uni-muenster.de
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Avoid memory leak in conninfo_uri_parse_options. Use the current host
rather than the comma-separated list of host names when the host name
is needed for GSS, SSPI, or SSL authentication. Document the way
connect_timeout interacts with multiple host specifications.
Takayuki Tsunakawa
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
It's also possible to specify a separate port for each host.
Previously, we'd loop over every address returned by looking up the
host name; now, we'll try every address for every host name.
Patch by me. Victor Wagner wrote an earlier patch for this feature,
which I read, but I didn't use any of his code. Review by Mithun Cy.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When building libpq, ip.c and md5.c were symlinked or copied from
src/backend/libpq into src/interfaces/libpq, but now that we have a
directory specifically for routines that are shared between the server and
client binaries, src/common/, move them there.
Some routines in ip.c were only used in the backend. Keep those in
src/backend/libpq, but rename to ifaddr.c to avoid confusion with the file
that's now in common.
Fix the comment in src/common/Makefile to reflect how libpq actually links
those files.
There are two more files that libpq symlinks directly from src/backend:
encnames.c and wchar.c. I don't feel compelled to move those right now,
though.
Patch by Michael Paquier, with some changes by me.
Discussion: <69938195-9c76-8523-0af8-eb718ea5b36e@iki.fi>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Whenever this function is used with the FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM flag,
it's good practice to include FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS as well.
Otherwise, if the message contains any %n insertion markers, the function
will try to fetch argument strings to substitute --- which we are not
passing, possibly leading to a crash. This is exactly analogous to the
rule about not giving printf() a format string you're not in control of.
Noted and patched by Christian Ullrich.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch certain files through 9.1
|
| |
|
|
| |
Patch by CharSyam, plus a few more I spotted with grep.
|
| |
|
|
| |
Report by Tom Lane
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Some users run their applications in chroot environments that lack an
/etc/passwd file. This means that the current UID's user name and home
directory are not obtainable. libpq used to be all right with that,
so long as the database role name to use was specified explicitly.
But commit a4c8f14364c27508233f8a31ac4b10a4c90235a9 broke such cases by
causing any failure of pg_fe_getauthname() to be treated as a hard error.
In any case it did little to advance its nominal goal of causing errors
in pg_fe_getauthname() to be reported better. So revert that and instead
put some real error-reporting code in place. This requires changes to the
APIs of pg_fe_getauthname() and pqGetpwuid(), since the latter had
departed from the POSIX-specified API of getpwuid_r() in a way that made
it impossible to distinguish actual lookup errors from "no such user".
To allow such failures to be reported, while not failing if the caller
supplies a role name, add a second call of pg_fe_getauthname() in
connectOptions2(). This is a tad ugly, and could perhaps be avoided with
some refactoring of PQsetdbLogin(), but I'll leave that idea for later.
(Note that the complained-of misbehavior only occurs in PQsetdbLogin,
not when using the PQconnect functions, because in the latter we will
never bother to call pg_fe_getauthname() if the user gives a role name.)
In passing also clean up the Windows-side usage of GetUserName(): the
recommended buffer size is 257 bytes, the passed buffer length should
be the buffer size not buffer size less 1, and any error is reported
by GetLastError() not errno.
Per report from Christoph Berg. Back-patch to 9.4 where the chroot
failure case was introduced. The generally poor reporting of errors
here is of very long standing, of course, but given the lack of field
complaints about it we won't risk changing these APIs further back
(even though they're theoretically internal to libpq).
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch certain files through 9.0
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This includes removing tabs after periods in C comments, which was
applied to back branches, so this change should not effect backpatching.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Previously user name memory allocation failures were ignored and the
default user name set to NULL.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
krb5 has been deprecated since 8.3, and the recommended way to do
Kerberos authentication is using the GSSAPI authentication method
(which is still fully supported).
libpq retains the ability to identify krb5 authentication, but only
gives an error message about it being unsupported. Since all authentication
is initiated from the backend, there is no need to keep it at all
in the backend.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Update all files in head, and files COPYRIGHT and legal.sgml in all back
branches.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
| |
This function no longer takes an argument.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Previously missing or invalid service files returned NULL. Also fix
pg_upgrade to report "out of memory" for a null return from
PQconndefaults().
Patch by Steve Singer, rewritten by me
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
asprintf(), aside from not being particularly portable, has a fundamentally
badly-designed API; the psprintf() function that was added in passing in
the previous patch has a much better API choice. Moreover, the NetBSD
implementation that was borrowed for the previous patch doesn't work with
non-C99-compliant vsnprintf, which is something we still have to cope with
on some platforms; and it depends on va_copy which isn't all that portable
either. Get rid of that code in favor of an implementation similar to what
we've used for many years in stringinfo.c. Also, move it into libpgcommon
since it's not really libpgport material.
I think this patch will be enough to turn the buildfarm green again, but
there's still cosmetic work left to do, namely get rid of pg_asprintf()
in favor of using psprintf(). That will come in a followon patch.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Add asprintf(), pg_asprintf(), and psprintf() to simplify string
allocation and composition. Replacement implementations taken from
NetBSD.
Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>
Reviewed-by: Asif Naeem <anaeem.it@gmail.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This is the first run of the Perl-based pgindent script. Also update
pgindent instructions.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Only adjusted the user-exposed messages and documentation, not all
source code comments.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Fully update git head, and update back branches in ./COPYRIGHT and
legal.sgml files.
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
It turns out the reason we hadn't found out about the portability issues
with our credential-control-message code is that almost no modern platforms
use that code at all; the ones that used to need it now offer getpeereid(),
which we choose first. The last holdout was NetBSD, and they added
getpeereid() as of 5.0. So far as I can tell, the only live platform on
which that code was being exercised was Debian/kFreeBSD, ie, FreeBSD kernel
with Linux userland --- since glibc doesn't provide getpeereid(), we fell
back to the control message code. However, the FreeBSD kernel provides a
LOCAL_PEERCRED socket parameter that's functionally equivalent to Linux's
SO_PEERCRED. That is both much simpler to use than control messages, and
superior because it doesn't require receiving a message from the other end
at just the right time.
Therefore, add code to use LOCAL_PEERCRED when necessary, and rip out all
the credential-control-message code in the backend. (libpq still has such
code so that it can still talk to pre-9.1 servers ... but eventually we can
get rid of it there too.) Clean up related autoconf probes, too.
This means that libpq's requirepeer parameter now works on exactly the same
platforms where the backend supports peer authentication, so adjust the
documentation accordingly.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Even though our existing code for handling credentials control messages has
been basically unchanged since 2001, it was fundamentally wrong: it did not
ensure proper alignment of the supplied buffer, and it was calculating
buffer sizes and message sizes incorrectly. This led to failures on
platforms where alignment padding is relevant, for instance FreeBSD on
64-bit platforms, as seen in a recent Debian bug report passed on by
Martin Pitt (http://bugs.debian.org//cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=612888).
Rewrite to do the message-whacking using the macros specified in RFC 2292,
following a suggestion from Theo de Raadt in that thread. Tested by me
on Debian/kFreeBSD-amd64; since OpenBSD and NetBSD document the identical
CMSG API, it should work there too.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
This warning is new in gcc 4.6 and part of -Wall. This patch cleans
up most of the noise, but there are some still warnings that are
trickier to remove.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This allows non-Windows clients to connect to a Windows
server with SSPI authentication.
Christian Ullrich, largely modified by me
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
parameter against server cert's CN field) to succeed in the case where
both host and hostaddr are specified. As with the existing precedents
for Kerberos, GSSAPI, SSPI, it is the calling application's responsibility
that host and hostaddr match up --- we just use the host name as given.
Per bug #5559 from Christopher Head.
In passing, make the error handling and messages for the no-host-name-given
failure more consistent among these four cases, and correct a lie in the
documentation: we don't attempt to reverse-lookup host from hostaddr
if host is missing.
Back-patch to 8.4 where SSL cert verification was introduced.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
the GSSAPI libraries crash.
Noted by Zdenek Kotala
|
