| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Looking up a nonexistent user ID would lead to a null pointer
dereference. That's unlikely to happen here, but perhaps
not impossible.
Thinko in commit 4d5111b3f, noticed by Coverity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Remove src/port/user.c, call getpwuid_r() directly. This reduces some
complexity and allows better control of the error behavior. For
example, the old code would in some circumstances silently truncate
the result string, or produce error message strings that the caller
wouldn't use.
src/port/user.c used to be called src/port/thread.c and contained
various portability complications to support thread-safety. These are
all obsolete, and all but the user-lookup functions have already been
removed. This patch completes this by also removing the user-lookup
functions.
Also convert src/backend/libpq/auth.c to use getpwuid_r() for
thread-safety.
Originally, I tried to be overly correct by using
sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX) to get the buffer size for getpwuid_r(),
but that doesn't work on FreeBSD. All the OS where I could find the
source code internally use 1024 as the suggested buffer size, so I
just ended up hardcoding that. The previous code used BUFSIZ, which
is an unrelated constant from stdio.h, so its use seemed
inappropriate.
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/5f293da9-ceb4-4937-8e52-82c25db8e4d3%40eisentraut.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Not all messages that libpq received from the server would be sent
through our message tracing logic. This commit tries to fix that by
introducing a new function pqParseDone which make it harder to forget
about doing so.
The messages that we now newly send through our tracing logic are:
- CopyData (received by COPY TO STDOUT)
- Authentication requests
- NegotiateProtocolVersion
- Some ErrorResponse messages during connection startup
- ReadyForQuery when received after a FunctionCall message
Author: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAGECzQSoPHtZ4xe0raJ6FYSEiPPS+YWXBhOGo+Y1YecLgknF3g@mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
If tracing was enabled during connection startup, these messages would
previously be listed in the trace output as something like this:
F 54 Unknown message: 70
mismatched message length: consumed 4, expected 54
With this commit their type and contents are now correctly listed:
F 36 StartupMessage 3 0 "user" "foo" "database" "alvherre"
F 54 SASLInitialResponse "SCRAM-SHA-256" 32 'n,,n=,r=nq5zEPR/VREHEpOAZzH8Rujm'
F 108 SASLResponse 'c=biws,r=nq5zEPR/VREHEpOAZzH8RujmVtWZDQ8glcrvy9OMNw7ZqFUn,p=BBwAKe0WjSvigB6RsmmArAC+hwucLeuwJrR5C/HQD5M='
Author: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAGECzQSoPHtZ4xe0raJ6FYSEiPPS+YWXBhOGo+Y1YecLgknF3g@mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Commit f4b54e1ed9, which introduced macros for protocol characters,
missed updating a few places in fe-auth.c.
Author: Jelte Fennema-Nio
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAGECzQSoPHtZ4xe0raJ6FYSEiPPS%2BYWXBhOGo%2BY1YecLgknF3g%40mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
After further review, we want to move in the direction of always
quoting GUC names in error messages, rather than the previous (PG16)
wildly mixed practice or the intermittent (mid-PG17) idea of doing
this depending on how possibly confusing the GUC name is.
This commit applies appropriate quotes to (almost?) all mentions of
GUC names in error messages. It partially supersedes a243569bf65 and
8d9978a7176, which had moved things a bit in the opposite direction
but which then were abandoned in a partial state.
Author: Peter Smith <smithpb2250@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/CAHut%2BPv-kSN8SkxSdoHano_wPubqcg5789ejhCDZAcLFceBR-w%40mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This refactors the SASL init flow to set password_needed on the two
SCRAM exchanges currently supported. The code already required this
but was set up in such a way that all SASL exchanges required using
a password, a restriction which may not hold for all exchanges (the
example at hand being the proposed OAuthbearer exchange).
This was extracted from a larger patchset to introduce OAuthBearer
authentication and authorization.
Author: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d1b467a78e0e36ed85a09adf979d04cf124a9d4b.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The SASL exchange callback returned state in to output variables:
done and success. This refactors that logic by introducing a new
return variable of type SASLStatus which makes the code easier to
read and understand, and prepares for future SASL exchanges which
operate asynchronously.
This was extracted from a larger patchset to introduce OAuthBearer
authentication and authorization.
Author: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d1b467a78e0e36ed85a09adf979d04cf124a9d4b.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Essentially this moves the non-interactive part of psql's "\password"
command into an exported client function. The password is not sent to the
server in cleartext because it is "encrypted" (in the case of scram and md5
it is actually hashed, but we have called these encrypted passwords for a
long time now) on the client side. This is good because it ensures the
cleartext password is never known by the server, and therefore won't end up
in logs, pg_stat displays, etc.
In other words, it exists for the same reason as PQencryptPasswordConn(), but
is more convenient as it both builds and runs the "ALTER USER" command for
you. PQchangePassword() uses PQencryptPasswordConn() to do the password
encryption. PQencryptPasswordConn() is passed a NULL for the algorithm
argument, hence encryption is done according to the server's
password_encryption setting.
Also modify the psql client to use the new function. That provides a builtin
test case. Ultimately drivers built on top of libpq should expose this
function and its use should be generally encouraged over doing ALTER USER
directly for password changes.
Author: Joe Conway
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/flat/b75955f7-e8cc-4bbd-817f-ef536bacbe93%40joeconway.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reported-by: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZZKTDPxBBMt3C0J9@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This commit introduces descriptively-named macros for the
identifiers used in wire protocol messages. These new macros are
placed in a new header file so that they can be easily used by
third-party code.
Author: Dave Cramer
Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera, Tatsuo Ishii, Peter Smith, Robert Haas, Tom Lane, Peter Eisentraut, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CADK3HHKbBmK-PKf1bPNFoMC%2BoBt%2BpD9PH8h5nvmBQskEHm-Ehw%40mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
fe-auth.c references CHAR_BIT since commit 3a465cc67, but it
did not #include <limits.h>, which per POSIX is where that
symbol is defined. This escaped notice so far because
(a) on most platforms, <sys/param.h> pulls in <limits.h>,
(b) even if yours doesn't, OpenSSL pulls it in, so compiling
with --with-openssl masks the omission.
Per bug #18026 from Marcel Hofstetter. Back-patch to v16.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/18026-d5bb69f79cd16203@postgresql.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We don't use getpwuid() anymore (see commit e757cdd6), so we don't need
locking around pg_get_user_name().
Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA%2BhUKGLtmexrpMtxBRLCVePqV_dtWG-ZsEbyPrYc%2BNBB2TkNsw%40mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Here are some notes about this change:
- As X509_get_signature_nid() should always exist (OpenSSL and
LibreSSL), hence HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID is now gone.
- OPENSSL_API_COMPAT is bumped to 0x10002000L.
- One comment related to 1.0.1e introduced by 74242c2 is removed.
Upstream OpenSSL still provides long-term support for 1.0.2 in a closed
fashion, so removing it is out of scope for a few years, at least.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion, Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZG3JNursG69dz1lr@paquier.xyz
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
That's how other boolean options are handled, so do likewise.
The previous coding with "enable" and "disable" was seemingly
modeled on gssencmode, but that's a three-way flag.
While at it, add PGGSSDELEGATION to the set of environment
variables cleared by pg_regress and Utils.pm.
Abhijit Menon-Sen, per gripe from Alvaro Herrera
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20230522091609.nlyuu4nolhycqs2p@alvherre.pgsql
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Complete the task begun in 9c0a0e2ed: we don't want to use the
abbreviation "deleg" for GSS delegation in any user-visible places.
(For consistency, this also changes most internal uses too.)
Abhijit Menon-Sen and Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/949048.1684639317@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit 3d03b24c3 (Revert Add support for Kerberos
credential delegation) which was committed on the grounds of concern
about portability, but on further review and discussion, it's clear that
we are better off explicitly requiring MIT Kerberos as that appears to
be the only GSSAPI library currently that's under proper maintenance
and ongoing development. The API used for storing credentials was added
to MIT Kerberos over a decade ago while for the other libraries which
appear to be mainly based on Heimdal, which exists explicitly to be a
re-implementation of MIT Kerberos, the API never made it to a released
version (even though it was added to the Heimdal git repo over 5 years
ago..).
This post-feature-freeze change was approved by the RMT.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZDDO6jaESKaBgej0%40tamriel.snowman.net
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit 3d4fa227bce4294ce1cc214b4a9d3b7caa3f0454.
Per discussion and buildfarm, this depends on APIs that seem to not
be available on at least one platform (NetBSD). Should be certainly
possible to rework to be optional on that platform if necessary but bit
late for that at this point.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3286097.1680922218@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Support GSSAPI/Kerberos credentials being delegated to the server by a
client. With this, a user authenticating to PostgreSQL using Kerberos
(GSSAPI) credentials can choose to delegate their credentials to the
PostgreSQL server (which can choose to accept them, or not), allowing
the server to then use those delegated credentials to connect to
another service, such as with postgres_fdw or dblink or theoretically
any other service which is able to be authenticated using Kerberos.
Both postgres_fdw and dblink are changed to allow non-superuser
password-less connections but only when GSSAPI credentials have been
delegated to the server by the client and GSSAPI is used to
authenticate to the remote system.
Authors: Stephen Frost, Peifeng Qiu
Reviewed-By: David Christensen
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CO1PR05MB8023CC2CB575E0FAAD7DF4F8A8E29@CO1PR05MB8023.namprd05.prod.outlook.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Replace the hardcoded value with a GUC such that the iteration
count can be raised in order to increase protection against
brute-force attacks. The hardcoded value for SCRAM iteration
count was defined to be 4096, which is taken from RFC 7677, so
set the default for the GUC to 4096 to match. In RFC 7677 the
recommendation is at least 15000 iterations but 4096 is listed
as a SHOULD requirement given that it's estimated to yield a
0.5s processing time on a mobile handset of the time of RFC
writing (late 2015).
Raising the iteration count of SCRAM will make stored passwords
more resilient to brute-force attacks at a higher computational
cost during connection establishment. Lowering the count will
reduce computational overhead during connections at the tradeoff
of reducing strength against brute-force attacks.
There are however platforms where even a modest iteration count
yields a too high computational overhead, with weaker password
encryption schemes chosen as a result. In these situations,
SCRAM with a very low iteration count still gives benefits over
weaker schemes like md5, so we allow the iteration count to be
set to one at the low end.
The new GUC is intentionally generically named such that it can
be made to support future SCRAM standards should they emerge.
At that point the value can be made into key:value pairs with
an undefined key as a default which will be backwards compatible
with this.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan S. Katz <jkatz@postgresql.org>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/F72E7BC7-189F-4B17-BF47-9735EB72C364@yesql.se
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The sslcertmode option controls whether the server is allowed and/or
required to request a certificate from the client. There are three
modes:
- "allow" is the default and follows the current behavior, where a
configured client certificate is sent if the server requests one
(via one of its default locations or sslcert). With the current
implementation, will happen whenever TLS is negotiated.
- "disable" causes the client to refuse to send a client certificate
even if sslcert is configured or if a client certificate is available in
one of its default locations.
- "require" causes the client to fail if a client certificate is never
sent and the server opens a connection anyway. This doesn't add any
additional security, since there is no guarantee that the server is
validating the certificate correctly, but it may helpful to troubleshoot
more complicated TLS setups.
sslcertmode=require requires SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(), available since
OpenSSL 1.0.2. Note that LibreSSL does not include it.
Using a connection parameter different than require_auth has come up as
the simplest design because certificate authentication does not rely
directly on any of the AUTH_REQ_* codes, and one may want to require a
certificate to be sent in combination of a given authentication method,
like SCRAM-SHA-256.
TAP tests are added in src/test/ssl/, some of them relying on sslinfo to
check if a certificate has been set. These are compatible across all
the versions of OpenSSL supported on HEAD (currently down to 1.0.1).
Author: Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Peter Eisentraut, David G. Johnston,
Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9e5a8ccddb8355ea9fa4b75a1e3a9edc88a70cd3.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Support for SCM credential authentication has been removed in the
backend in 9.1, and libpq has kept some code to handle it for
compatibility.
Commit be4585b, that did the cleanup of the backend code, has done
so because the code was not really portable originally. And, as there
are likely little chances that this is used these days, this removes the
remaining code from libpq. An error will now be raised by libpq if
attempting to connect to a server that returns AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS,
instead.
References to SCM credential authentication are removed from the
protocol documentation. This removes some meson and configure checks.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZBLH8a4otfqgd6Kn@paquier.xyz
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The new connection parameter require_auth allows a libpq client to
define a list of comma-separated acceptable authentication types for use
with the server. There is no negotiation: if the server does not
present one of the allowed authentication requests, the connection
attempt done by the client fails.
The following keywords can be defined in the list:
- password, for AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD.
- md5, for AUTH_REQ_MD5.
- gss, for AUTH_REQ_GSS[_CONT].
- sspi, for AUTH_REQ_SSPI and AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT.
- scram-sha-256, for AUTH_REQ_SASL[_CONT|_FIN].
- creds, for AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS (perhaps this should be removed entirely
now).
- none, to control unauthenticated connections.
All the methods that can be defined in the list can be negated, like
"!password", in which case the server must NOT use the listed
authentication type. The special method "none" allows/disallows the use
of unauthenticated connections (but it does not govern transport-level
authentication via TLS or GSSAPI).
Internally, the patch logic is tied to check_expected_areq(), that was
used for channel_binding, ensuring that an incoming request is
compatible with conn->require_auth. It also introduces a new flag,
conn->client_finished_auth, which is set by various authentication
routines when the client side of the handshake is finished. This
signals to check_expected_areq() that an AUTH_REQ_OK from the server is
expected, and allows the client to complain if the server bypasses
authentication entirely, with for example the reception of a too-early
AUTH_REQ_OK message.
Regression tests are added in authentication TAP tests for all the
keywords supported (except "creds", because it is around only for
compatibility reasons). A new TAP script has been added for SSPI, as
there was no script dedicated to it yet. It relies on SSPI being the
default authentication method on Windows, as set by pg_regress.
Author: Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, David G. Johnston, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9e5a8ccddb8355ea9fa4b75a1e3a9edc88a70cd3.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A patch sent by Jacob Champion has been touching this area of the code,
and the set of changes done in a9e9a9f has made a run of pgindent on
these files a bit annoying to handle. So let's clean up a bit the area,
first, to ease the work on follow-up patches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9e5a8ccddb8355ea9fa4b75a1e3a9edc88a70cd3.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 11
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This applies the new APIs to the code.
Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/7c0232ef-7b44-68db-599d-b327d0640a77@enterprisedb.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Per applicable standards, free() with a null pointer is a no-op.
Systems that don't observe that are ancient and no longer relevant.
Some PostgreSQL code already required this behavior, so this change
does not introduce any new requirements, just makes the code more
consistent.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/dac5d2d0-98f5-94d9-8e69-46da2413593d%40enterprisedb.com
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Run pgindent, pgperltidy, and reformat-dat-files.
I manually fixed a couple of comments that pgindent uglified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Since commit ffa2e4670, libpq accumulates text in conn->errorMessage
across a whole query cycle. In some situations, we may report more
than one error event within a cycle: the easiest case to reach is
where we report a FATAL error message from the server, and then a
bit later we detect loss of connection. Since, historically, each
error PGresult bears the entire content of conn->errorMessage,
this results in duplication of the FATAL message in any output that
concatenates the contents of the PGresults.
Accumulation in errorMessage still seems like a good idea, especially
in view of the number of places that did ad-hoc error concatenation
before ffa2e4670. So to fix this, let's track how much of
conn->errorMessage has been read out into error PGresults, and only
include new text in later PGresults. The tricky part of that is
to be sure that we never discard an error PGresult once made (else
we'd risk dropping some text, a problem much worse than duplication).
While libpq formerly did that in some code paths, a little bit of
rearrangement lets us postpone making an error PGresult at all until
we are about to return it.
A side benefit of that postponement is that it now becomes practical
to return a dummy static PGresult in cases where we hit out-of-memory
while trying to manufacture an error PGresult. This eliminates the
admittedly-very-rare case where we'd return NULL from PQgetResult,
indicating successful query completion, even though what actually
happened was an OOM failure.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ab4288f8-be5c-57fb-2400-e3e857f53e46@enterprisedb.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The point of this patch is to reduce inclusion spam by not needing
to #include <netdb.h> or <pwd.h> in port.h (which is read by every
compile in our tree). To do that, we must remove port.h's
declarations of pqGetpwuid and pqGethostbyname.
pqGethostbyname is only used, and is only ever likely to be used,
in src/port/getaddrinfo.c --- which isn't even built on most
platforms, making pqGethostbyname dead code for most people.
Hence, deal with that by just moving it into getaddrinfo.c.
To clean up pqGetpwuid, invent a couple of simple wrapper
functions with less-messy APIs. This allows removing some
duplicate error-handling code, too.
In passing, remove thread.c from the MSVC build, since it
contains nothing we use on Windows.
Noted while working on 376ce3e40.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1634252654444.90107@mit.edu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Experimenting with FIPS mode enabled, I saw
regression=# \password joe
Enter new password for user "joe":
Enter it again:
could not encrypt password: disabled for FIPS
out of memory
because PQencryptPasswordConn was still of the opinion that "out of
memory" is always appropriate to print.
Minor oversight in b69aba745. Like that one, back-patch to v14.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The existing cryptohash facility was causing problems in some code paths
related to MD5 (frontend and backend) that relied on the fact that the
only type of error that could happen would be an OOM, as the MD5
implementation used in PostgreSQL ~13 (the in-core implementation is
used when compiling with or without OpenSSL in those older versions),
could fail only under this circumstance.
The new cryptohash facilities can fail for reasons other than OOMs, like
attempting MD5 when FIPS is enabled (upstream OpenSSL allows that up to
1.0.2, Fedora and Photon patch OpenSSL 1.1.1 to allow that), so this
would cause incorrect reports to show up.
This commit extends the cryptohash APIs so as callers of those routines
can fetch more context when an error happens, by using a new routine
called pg_cryptohash_error(). The error states are stored within each
implementation's internal context data, so as it is possible to extend
the logic depending on what's suited for an implementation. The default
implementation requires few error states, but OpenSSL could report
various issues depending on its internal state so more is needed in
cryptohash_openssl.c, and the code is shaped so as we are always able to
grab the necessary information.
The core code is changed to adapt to the new error routine, painting
more "const" across the call stack where the static errors are stored,
particularly in authentication code paths on variables that provide
log details. This way, any future changes would warn if attempting to
free these strings. The MD5 authentication code was also a bit blurry
about the handling of "logdetail" (LOG sent to the postmaster), so
improve the comments related that, while on it.
The origin of the problem is 87ae969, that introduced the centralized
cryptohash facility. Extra changes are done for pgcrypto in v14 for the
non-OpenSSL code path to cope with the improvements done by this
commit.
Reported-by: Michael Mühlbeyer
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/89B7F072-5BBE-4C92-903E-D83E865D9367@trivadis.com
Backpatch-through: 14
|
|
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The following checks are added, to make the SASL infrastructure more
aware of defects when implementing new mechanisms:
- Detect that no output is generated by a mechanism if an exchange fails
in the backend, failing if there is a message waiting to be sent.
- Handle zero-length messages in the frontend. The backend handles that
already, and SCRAM would complain if sending empty messages as this is
not authorized for this mechanism, but other mechanisms may want this
capability (the SASL specification allows that).
- Make sure that a mechanism generates a message in the middle of the
exchange in the frontend.
SCRAM, as implemented, respects all these requirements already, and the
recent refactoring of SASL done in 9fd8557 helps in documenting that in
a cleaner way.
Analyzed-by: Jacob Champion
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3d2a6f5d50e741117d6baf83eb67ebf1a8a35a11.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The code of SCRAM and SASL have been tightly linked together since SCRAM
exists in the core code, making hard to apprehend the addition of new
SASL mechanisms, but these are by design different facilities, with
SCRAM being an option for SASL. This refactors the code related to both
so as the backend and the frontend use a set of callbacks for SASL
mechanisms, documenting while on it what is expected by anybody adding a
new SASL mechanism.
The separation between both layers is neat, using two sets of callbacks
for the frontend and the backend to mark the frontier between both
facilities. The shape of the callbacks is now directly inspired from
the routines used by SCRAM, so the code change is straight-forward, and
the SASL code is moved into its own set of files. These will likely
change depending on how and if new SASL mechanisms get added in the
future.
Author: Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3d2a6f5d50e741117d6baf83eb67ebf1a8a35a11.camel@vmware.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Protocol version 3 was introduced in PostgreSQL 7.4. There shouldn't be
many clients or servers left out there without version 3 support. But as
a courtesy, I kept just enough of the old protocol support that we can
still send the "unsupported protocol version" error in v2 format, so that
old clients can display the message properly. Likewise, libpq still
understands v2 ErrorResponse messages when establishing a connection.
The impetus to do this now is that I'm working on a patch to COPY
FROM, to always prefetch some data. We cannot do that safely with the
old protocol, because it requires parsing the input one byte at a time
to detect the end-of-copy marker.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane, Alvaro Herrera, John Naylor
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/9ec25819-0a8a-d51a-17dc-4150bb3cca3b%40iki.fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Previously, we had an undisciplined mish-mash of printfPQExpBuffer and
appendPQExpBuffer calls to report errors within libpq. This commit
establishes a uniform rule that appendPQExpBuffer[Str] should be used.
conn->errorMessage is reset only at the start of an application request,
and then accumulates messages till we're done. We can remove no less
than three different ad-hoc mechanisms that were used to get the effect
of concatenation of error messages within a sequence of operations.
Although this makes things quite a bit cleaner conceptually, the main
reason to do it is to make the world safer for the multiple-target-host
feature that was added awhile back. Previously, there were many cases
in which an error occurring during an individual host connection attempt
would wipe out the record of what had happened during previous attempts.
(The reporting is still inadequate, in that it can be hard to tell which
host got the failure, but that seems like a matter for a separate commit.)
Currently, lo_import and lo_export contain exceptions to the "never
use printfPQExpBuffer" rule. If we changed them, we'd risk reporting
an incidental lo_close failure before the actual read or write
failure, which would be confusing, not least because lo_close happened
after the main failure. We could improve this by inventing an
internal version of lo_close that doesn't reset the errorMessage; but
we'd also need a version of PQfn() that does that, and it didn't quite
seem worth the trouble for now.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/BN6PR05MB3492948E4FD76C156E747E8BC9160@BN6PR05MB3492.namprd05.prod.outlook.com
|
|
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 9.5
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: update all files in master, backpatch legal files through 9.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Similar to commit 7e735035f2, this commit makes the order of header file
inclusion consistent for non-backend modules.
In passing, fix the case where we were using angle brackets (<>) for the
local module includes instead of quotes ("").
Author: Vignesh C
Reviewed-by: Amit Kapila
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALDaNm2Sznv8RR6Ex-iJO6xAdsxgWhCoETkaYX=+9DW3q0QCfA@mail.gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Within the context of SCRAM, "verifier" has a specific meaning in the
protocol, per RFCs. The existing code used "verifier" differently, to
mean whatever is or would be stored in pg_auth.rolpassword.
Fix this by using the term "secret" for this, following RFC 5803.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/be397b06-6e4b-ba71-c7fb-54cae84a7e18%402ndquadrant.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When using a client compiled without channel binding support (linking to
OpenSSL 1.0.1 or older) to connect to a server which supports channel
binding (linking to OpenSSL 1.0.2 or newer), libpq would generate a
confusing error message with channel_binding=require for an SSL
connection, where the server sends back SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS:
"channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication
method that supports channel binding."
This is confusing because the server did send a SASL mechanism able to
support channel binding, but libpq was not able to detect that
properly.
The situation can be summarized as followed for the case described in
the previous paragraph for the SASL mechanisms used with the various
modes of channel_binding:
1) Client supports channel binding.
1-1) channel_binding = disable => OK, with SCRAM-SHA-256.
1-2) channel_binding = prefer => OK, with SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS.
1-3) channel_binding = require => OK, with SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS.
2) Client does not support channel binding.
2-1) channel_binding = disable => OK, with SCRAM-SHA-256.
2-2) channel_binding = prefer => OK, with SCRAM-SHA-256.
2-3) channel_binding = require => failure with new error message,
instead of the confusing one.
This commit updates case 2-3 to generate a better error message. Note
that the SSL TAP tests are not impacted as it is not possible to test
with mixed versions of OpenSSL for the backend and libpq.
Reported-by: Tom Lane
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Jeff Davis, Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/24857.1569775891@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Coverity pointed out that it's pretty silly to check for a null pointer
after we've already dereferenced the pointer. To fix, just swap the
order of the two error checks. Oversight in commit d6e612f83.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Allow clients to require channel binding to enhance security against
untrusted servers.
Author: Jeff Davis
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/227015d8417f2b4fef03f8966dbfa5cbcc4f44da.camel%40j-davis.com
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Author: Alexander Lakhin
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/af27d1b3-a128-9d62-46e0-88f424397f44@gmail.com
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Author: Justin Pryzby
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190330224333.GQ5815@telsasoft.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
On both the frontend and backend, prepare for GSSAPI encryption
support by moving common code for error handling into a separate file.
Fix a TODO for handling multiple status messages in the process.
Eliminate the OIDs, which have not been needed for some time.
Add frontend and backend encryption support functions. Keep the
context initiation for authentication-only separate on both the
frontend and backend in order to avoid concerns about changing the
requested flags to include encryption support.
In postmaster, pull GSSAPI authorization checking into a shared
function. Also share the initiator name between the encryption and
non-encryption codepaths.
For HBA, add "hostgssenc" and "hostnogssenc" entries that behave
similarly to their SSL counterparts. "hostgssenc" requires either
"gss", "trust", or "reject" for its authentication.
Similarly, add a "gssencmode" parameter to libpq. Supported values are
"disable", "require", and "prefer". Notably, negotiation will only be
attempted if credentials can be acquired. Move credential acquisition
into its own function to support this behavior.
Add a simple pg_stat_gssapi view similar to pg_stat_ssl, for monitoring
if GSSAPI authentication was used, what principal was used, and if
encryption is being used on the connection.
Finally, add documentation for everything new, and update existing
documentation on connection security.
Thanks to Michael Paquier for the Windows fixes.
Author: Robbie Harwood, with changes to the read/write functions by me.
Reviewed in various forms and at different times by: Michael Paquier,
Andres Freund, David Steele.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/jlg1tgq1ktm.fsf@thriss.redhat.com
|