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Backpatch certain files through 9.1
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Per discussion, the original name was a bit misleading, and
PQsslAttributeNames() seems more apropos. It's not quite too late to
change this in 9.5, so let's change it while we can.
Also, make sure that the pointer array is const, not only the pointed-to
strings.
Minor documentation wordsmithing while at it.
Lars Kanis, slight adjustments by me
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All the other new SSL information functions had dummy versions in
be-secure.c, but I missed PQsslAttributes(). Oops. Surprisingly, the linker
did not complain about the missing function on most platforms represented in
the buildfarm, even though it is exported, except for a few Windows systems.
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This makes it possible to query for things like the SSL version and cipher
used, without depending on OpenSSL functions or macros. That is a good
thing if we ever get another SSL implementation.
PQgetssl() still works, but it should be considered as deprecated as it
only works with OpenSSL. In particular, PQgetSslInUse() should be used to
check if a connection uses SSL, because as soon as we have another
implementation, PQgetssl() will return NULL even if SSL is in use.
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Backpatch certain files through 9.0
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This refactoring is in preparation for adding support for other SSL
implementations, with no user-visible effects. There are now two #defines,
USE_OPENSSL which is defined when building with OpenSSL, and USE_SSL which
is defined when building with any SSL implementation. Currently, OpenSSL is
the only implementation so the two #defines go together, but USE_SSL is
supposed to be used for implementation-independent code.
The libpq SSL code is changed to use a custom BIO, which does all the raw
I/O, like we've been doing in the backend for a long time. That makes it
possible to use MSG_NOSIGNAL to block SIGPIPE when using SSL, which avoids
a couple of syscall for each send(). Probably doesn't make much performance
difference in practice - the SSL encryption is expensive enough to mask the
effect - but it was a natural result of this refactoring.
Based on a patch by Martijn van Oosterhout from 2006. Briefly reviewed by
Alvaro Herrera, Andreas Karlsson, Jeff Janes.
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This includes removing tabs after periods in C comments, which was
applied to back branches, so this change should not effect backpatching.
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Commit 820f08cabdcbb8998050c3d4873e9619d6d8cba4 claimed to make the server
and libpq handle SSL protocol versions identically, but actually the server
was still accepting SSL v3 protocol while libpq wasn't. Per discussion,
SSL v3 is obsolete, and there's no good reason to continue to accept it.
So make the code really equivalent on both sides. The behavior now is
that we use the highest mutually-supported TLS protocol version.
Marko Kreen, some comment-smithing by me
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Per report from Jeffrey Walton, libpq has been accepting only TLSv1
exactly. Along the lines of the backend code, libpq will now support
new versions as OpenSSL adds them.
Marko Kreen, reviewed by Wim Lewis.
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Update all files in head, and files COPYRIGHT and legal.sgml in all back
branches.
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In libpq, we set up and pass to OpenSSL callback routines to handle
locking. When we run out of SSL connections, we try to clean things
up by de-registering the hooks. Unfortunately, we had a few calls
into the OpenSSL library after these hooks were de-registered during
SSL cleanup which lead to deadlocking. This moves the thread callback
cleanup to be after all SSL-cleanup related OpenSSL library calls.
I've been unable to reproduce the deadlock with this fix.
In passing, also move the close_SSL call to be after unlocking our
ssl_config mutex when in a failure state. While it looks pretty
unlikely to be an issue, it could have resulted in deadlocks if we
ended up in this code path due to something other than SSL_new
failing. Thanks to Heikki for pointing this out.
Back-patch to all supported versions; note that the close_SSL issue
only goes back to 9.0, so that hunk isn't included in the 8.4 patch.
Initially found and reported by Vesa-Matti J Kari; many thanks to
both Heikki and Andres for their help running down the specific
issue and reviewing the patch.
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We should really be reporting a useful error along with returning
a valid return code if pthread_mutex_lock() throws an error for
some reason. Add that and back-patch to 9.0 as the prior patch.
Pointed out by Alvaro Herrera
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I've been working with Nick Phillips on an issue he ran into when
trying to use threads with SSL client certificates. As it turns out,
the call in initialize_SSL() to SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
will modify our SSL_context without any protection from other threads
also calling that function or being at some other point and trying to
read from SSL_context.
To protect against this, I've written up the attached (based on an
initial patch from Nick and much subsequent discussion) which puts
locks around SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() and all of the other
users of SSL_context which weren't already protected.
Nick Phillips, much reworked by Stephen Frost
Back-patch to 9.0 where we started loading the cert directly instead of
using a callback.
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Per Coverity Scan
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We had two copies of this function in the backend and libpq, which was
already pretty bogus, but it turns out that we need it in some other
programs that don't use libpq (such as pg_test_fsync). So put it where
it probably should have been all along. The signal-mask-initialization
support in src/backend/libpq/pqsignal.c stays where it is, though, since
we only need that in the backend.
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Fully update git head, and update back branches in ./COPYRIGHT and
legal.sgml files.
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commit-fest.
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Both libpq and the backend would truncate a common name extracted from a
certificate at 32 bytes. Replace that fixed-size buffer with dynamically
allocated string so that there is no hard limit. While at it, remove the
code for extracting peer_dn, which we weren't using for anything; and
don't bother to store peer_cn longer than we need it in libpq.
This limit was not so terribly unreasonable when the code was written,
because we weren't using the result for anything critical, just logging it.
But now that there are options for checking the common name against the
server host name (in libpq) or using it as the user's name (in the server),
this could result in undesirable failures. In the worst case it even seems
possible to spoof a server name or user name, if the correct name is
exactly 32 bytes and the attacker can persuade a trusted CA to issue a
certificate in which that string is a prefix of the certificate's common
name. (To exploit this for a server name, he'd also have to send the
connection astray via phony DNS data or some such.) The case that this is
a realistic security threat is a bit thin, but nonetheless we'll treat it
as one.
Back-patch to 8.4. Older releases contain the faulty code, but it's not
a security problem because the common name wasn't used for anything
interesting.
Reported and patched by Heikki Linnakangas
Security: CVE-2012-0867
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This makes it possible to use a libpq app with home directory set
to /dev/null, for example - treating it the same as if the file
doesn't exist (which it doesn't).
Per bug #6302, reported by Diego Elio Petteno
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This can be used to remove the overhead of SSL compression on
fast networks.
Laurenz Albe
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On balance, the need to cover this case changes my mind in favor of pushing
all error-message generation duties into the two fe-secure.c routines.
So do it that way.
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In many cases, pqsecure_read/pqsecure_write set up useful error messages,
which were then overwritten with useless ones by their callers. Fix this
by defining the responsibility to set an error message to be entirely that
of the lower-level function when using SSL.
Back-patch to 8.3; the code is too different in 8.2 to be worth the
trouble.
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This disables an entirely unnecessary "sanity check" that causes failures
in nonblocking mode, because OpenSSL complains if we move or compact the
write buffer. The only actual requirement is that we not modify pending
data once we've attempted to send it, which we don't. Per testing and
research by Martin Pihlak, though this fix is a lot simpler than his patch.
I put the same change into the backend, although it's less clear whether
it's necessary there. We do use nonblock mode in some situations in
streaming replication, so seems best to keep the same behavior in the
backend as in libpq.
Back-patch to all supported releases.
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Instead, just act as though the certificate file(s) are not present.
There is only one case where this need be a hard failure condition: when
sslmode is verify-ca or verify-full, not having a root cert file is an
error. Change the logic so that we complain only in that case, and
otherwise fall through cleanly. This is how it used to behave pre-9.0,
but my patch 4ed4b6c54e5fab24ab2624d80e26f7546edc88ad of 2010-05-26 broke
the case. Per report from Christian Kastner.
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parameter against server cert's CN field) to succeed in the case where
both host and hostaddr are specified. As with the existing precedents
for Kerberos, GSSAPI, SSPI, it is the calling application's responsibility
that host and hostaddr match up --- we just use the host name as given.
Per bug #5559 from Christopher Head.
In passing, make the error handling and messages for the no-host-name-given
failure more consistent among these four cases, and correct a lie in the
documentation: we don't attempt to reverse-lookup host from hostaddr
if host is missing.
Back-patch to 8.4 where SSL cert verification was introduced.
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additional cases correctly. The original coding failed to load additional
(chain) certificates from the client cert file, meaning that indirectly signed
client certificates didn't work unless one hacked the server's root.crt file
to include intermediate CAs (not the desired approach). Another problem was
that everything got loaded into the shared SSL_context object, which meant
that concurrent connections trying to use different sslcert settings could
well fail due to conflicting over the single available slot for a keyed
certificate.
To fix, get rid of the use of SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(), which is
deprecated anyway in the OpenSSL documentation, and instead just
unconditionally load the client cert and private key during connection
initialization. This lets us use SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(),
which does the right thing with additional certs, and is lots simpler than
the previous hacking about with BIO-level access. A small disadvantage is
that we have to load the primary client cert a second time with
SSL_use_certificate_file, so that that one ends up in the correct slot
within the connection's SSL object where it can get paired with the key.
Given the other overhead of making an SSL connection, that doesn't seem
worth worrying about.
Per discussion ensuing from bug #5468.
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at least in some Windows versions, these functions are capable of returning
a failure indication without setting errno. That puts us into an infinite
loop if the previous value happened to be EINTR. Per report from Brendan
Hill.
Back-patch to 8.2. We could take it further back, but since this is only
known to be an issue on Windows and we don't support Windows before 8.2,
it does not seem worth the trouble.
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attacks where an attacker would put <attack>\0<propername> in the field and
trick the validation code that the certificate was for <attack>.
This is a very low risk attack since it reuqires the attacker to trick the
CA into issuing a certificate with an incorrect field, and the common
PostgreSQL deployments are with private CAs, and not external ones. Also,
default mode in 8.4 does not do any name validation, and is thus also not
vulnerable - but the higher security modes are.
Backpatch all the way. Even though versions 8.3.x and before didn't have
certificate name validation support, they still exposed this field for
the user to perform the validation in the application code, and there
is no way to detect this problem through that API.
Security: CVE-2009-4034
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sockopt(SO_NOSIGPIPE) or the MSG_NOSIGNAL flag to send().
We assume these features are available if (1) the symbol is defined at
compile time and (2) the kernel doesn't reject the call at runtime.
It might turn out that there are some platforms where (1) and (2) are
true and yet the signal isn't really blocked, in which case applications
would die on server crash. If that sort of thing gets reported, then
we'll have to add additional defenses of some kind.
Jeremy Kerr
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most external engines.
Per report and initial code from Lars Kanis
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provided by Andrew.
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"verify-ca" and "verify-full".
Since "prefer" remains the default, this will make certificate validation
off by default, which should lead to less upgrade issues.
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but not OpenSSL (or perhaps vice versa, if that's possible).
Andrew Chernow, with minor editorialization by me.
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to the documented API value. The previous code got it right as
it's implemented, but accepted too much/too little compared to
the API documentation.
Per comment from Zdenek Kotala.
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