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Fully update git head, and update back branches in ./COPYRIGHT and
legal.sgml files.
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commit-fest.
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Both libpq and the backend would truncate a common name extracted from a
certificate at 32 bytes. Replace that fixed-size buffer with dynamically
allocated string so that there is no hard limit. While at it, remove the
code for extracting peer_dn, which we weren't using for anything; and
don't bother to store peer_cn longer than we need it in libpq.
This limit was not so terribly unreasonable when the code was written,
because we weren't using the result for anything critical, just logging it.
But now that there are options for checking the common name against the
server host name (in libpq) or using it as the user's name (in the server),
this could result in undesirable failures. In the worst case it even seems
possible to spoof a server name or user name, if the correct name is
exactly 32 bytes and the attacker can persuade a trusted CA to issue a
certificate in which that string is a prefix of the certificate's common
name. (To exploit this for a server name, he'd also have to send the
connection astray via phony DNS data or some such.) The case that this is
a realistic security threat is a bit thin, but nonetheless we'll treat it
as one.
Back-patch to 8.4. Older releases contain the faulty code, but it's not
a security problem because the common name wasn't used for anything
interesting.
Reported and patched by Heikki Linnakangas
Security: CVE-2012-0867
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This makes it possible to use a libpq app with home directory set
to /dev/null, for example - treating it the same as if the file
doesn't exist (which it doesn't).
Per bug #6302, reported by Diego Elio Petteno
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This can be used to remove the overhead of SSL compression on
fast networks.
Laurenz Albe
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On balance, the need to cover this case changes my mind in favor of pushing
all error-message generation duties into the two fe-secure.c routines.
So do it that way.
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In many cases, pqsecure_read/pqsecure_write set up useful error messages,
which were then overwritten with useless ones by their callers. Fix this
by defining the responsibility to set an error message to be entirely that
of the lower-level function when using SSL.
Back-patch to 8.3; the code is too different in 8.2 to be worth the
trouble.
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This disables an entirely unnecessary "sanity check" that causes failures
in nonblocking mode, because OpenSSL complains if we move or compact the
write buffer. The only actual requirement is that we not modify pending
data once we've attempted to send it, which we don't. Per testing and
research by Martin Pihlak, though this fix is a lot simpler than his patch.
I put the same change into the backend, although it's less clear whether
it's necessary there. We do use nonblock mode in some situations in
streaming replication, so seems best to keep the same behavior in the
backend as in libpq.
Back-patch to all supported releases.
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Instead, just act as though the certificate file(s) are not present.
There is only one case where this need be a hard failure condition: when
sslmode is verify-ca or verify-full, not having a root cert file is an
error. Change the logic so that we complain only in that case, and
otherwise fall through cleanly. This is how it used to behave pre-9.0,
but my patch 4ed4b6c54e5fab24ab2624d80e26f7546edc88ad of 2010-05-26 broke
the case. Per report from Christian Kastner.
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parameter against server cert's CN field) to succeed in the case where
both host and hostaddr are specified. As with the existing precedents
for Kerberos, GSSAPI, SSPI, it is the calling application's responsibility
that host and hostaddr match up --- we just use the host name as given.
Per bug #5559 from Christopher Head.
In passing, make the error handling and messages for the no-host-name-given
failure more consistent among these four cases, and correct a lie in the
documentation: we don't attempt to reverse-lookup host from hostaddr
if host is missing.
Back-patch to 8.4 where SSL cert verification was introduced.
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additional cases correctly. The original coding failed to load additional
(chain) certificates from the client cert file, meaning that indirectly signed
client certificates didn't work unless one hacked the server's root.crt file
to include intermediate CAs (not the desired approach). Another problem was
that everything got loaded into the shared SSL_context object, which meant
that concurrent connections trying to use different sslcert settings could
well fail due to conflicting over the single available slot for a keyed
certificate.
To fix, get rid of the use of SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(), which is
deprecated anyway in the OpenSSL documentation, and instead just
unconditionally load the client cert and private key during connection
initialization. This lets us use SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(),
which does the right thing with additional certs, and is lots simpler than
the previous hacking about with BIO-level access. A small disadvantage is
that we have to load the primary client cert a second time with
SSL_use_certificate_file, so that that one ends up in the correct slot
within the connection's SSL object where it can get paired with the key.
Given the other overhead of making an SSL connection, that doesn't seem
worth worrying about.
Per discussion ensuing from bug #5468.
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at least in some Windows versions, these functions are capable of returning
a failure indication without setting errno. That puts us into an infinite
loop if the previous value happened to be EINTR. Per report from Brendan
Hill.
Back-patch to 8.2. We could take it further back, but since this is only
known to be an issue on Windows and we don't support Windows before 8.2,
it does not seem worth the trouble.
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attacks where an attacker would put <attack>\0<propername> in the field and
trick the validation code that the certificate was for <attack>.
This is a very low risk attack since it reuqires the attacker to trick the
CA into issuing a certificate with an incorrect field, and the common
PostgreSQL deployments are with private CAs, and not external ones. Also,
default mode in 8.4 does not do any name validation, and is thus also not
vulnerable - but the higher security modes are.
Backpatch all the way. Even though versions 8.3.x and before didn't have
certificate name validation support, they still exposed this field for
the user to perform the validation in the application code, and there
is no way to detect this problem through that API.
Security: CVE-2009-4034
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sockopt(SO_NOSIGPIPE) or the MSG_NOSIGNAL flag to send().
We assume these features are available if (1) the symbol is defined at
compile time and (2) the kernel doesn't reject the call at runtime.
It might turn out that there are some platforms where (1) and (2) are
true and yet the signal isn't really blocked, in which case applications
would die on server crash. If that sort of thing gets reported, then
we'll have to add additional defenses of some kind.
Jeremy Kerr
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most external engines.
Per report and initial code from Lars Kanis
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provided by Andrew.
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"verify-ca" and "verify-full".
Since "prefer" remains the default, this will make certificate validation
off by default, which should lead to less upgrade issues.
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but not OpenSSL (or perhaps vice versa, if that's possible).
Andrew Chernow, with minor editorialization by me.
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to the documented API value. The previous code got it right as
it's implemented, but accepted too much/too little compared to
the API documentation.
Per comment from Zdenek Kotala.
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hardcoded paths for SSL rootcert/crl/clientcert/key.
As noted by Andrew Chernow
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and certificate revokation list by using connection parameters or environment
variables.
Original patch by Mark Woodward, heavily reworked by Alvaro Herrera and
Magnus Hagander.
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make the code do what the comment says...
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Kris Jurka
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it's connection. This is required for applications that unload
the libpq library (such as PHP) in which case we'd otherwise
have pointers to these functions when they no longer exist.
This needs a bit more testing before we can consider a backpatch,
so not doing that yet.
In passing, remove unused functions in backend/libpq.
Bruce Momjian and Magnus Hagander, per report and analysis
by Russell Smith.
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the * character at the beginning of a pattern, and it does not match
subdomains.
Since this means we no longer need fnmatch, remove the imported implementation
from port, along with the autoconf check for it.
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it out for now so the buildfarm recovers.
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This uses the function fnmatch() which is not available on all platforms
(notably Windows), so import the implementation from NetBSD into src/port.
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Add config parameter "sslverify" to control the verification. Default
is to do full verification.
Clean up some old SSL code that never really worked.
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end-user documentation that lives in the actual documentation.
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should always succeed, but in the likely event of a failure we would
previously fall through *without locking* - the new code will exit(1).
Printing the error message on stderr will not work for all applications, but
it's better than nothing at all - and our API doesn't provide a way to return
the error to the caller.
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key files that are similar to the one for the postmaster's data directory
permissions check. (I chose to standardize on that one since it's the most
heavily used and presumably best-wordsmithed by now.) Also eliminate explicit
tests on file ownership in these places, since the ensuing read attempt must
fail anyway if it's wrong, and there seems no value in issuing the same error
message for distinct problems. (But I left in the explicit ownership test in
postmaster.c, since it had its own error message anyway.) Also be more
specific in the documentation's descriptions of these checks. Per a gripe
from Kevin Hunter.
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verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(), clarify some of the function's
variables and logic, and update a comment. This should make SSL
improvements easier in the future.
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are known to write on the socket sometimes and thus we are vulnerable to
being killed by the signal if the server happens to go away unexpectedly.
Noticed while trying (futilely) to reproduce bug #3902.
This bug has been there all along, but since the situation is usually
only of interest to developers, I chose not to back-patch the changes.
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