| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit 16304a013432931e61e623c8d85e9fe24709d9ba, except
for its changes in src/port/snprintf.c; as well as commit
cac18a76bb6b08f1ecc2a85e46c9d2ab82dd9d23 which is no longer needed.
Fujii Masao reported that the previous commit caused failures in psql on
OS X, since if one exits the pager program early while viewing a query
result, psql sees an EPIPE error from fprintf --- and the wrapper function
thought that was reason to panic. (It's a bit surprising that the same
does not happen on Linux.) Further discussion among the security list
concluded that the risk of other such failures was far too great, and
that the one-size-fits-all approach to error handling embodied in the
previous patch is unlikely to be workable.
This leaves us again exposed to the possibility of the type of failure
envisioned in CVE-2015-3166. However, that failure mode is strictly
hypothetical at this point: there is no concrete reason to believe that
an attacker could trigger information disclosure through the supposed
mechanism. In the first place, the attack surface is fairly limited,
since so much of what the backend does with format strings goes through
stringinfo.c or psprintf(), and those already had adequate defenses.
In the second place, even granting that an unprivileged attacker could
control the occurrence of ENOMEM with some precision, it's a stretch to
believe that he could induce it just where the target buffer contains some
valuable information. So we concluded that the risk of non-hypothetical
problems induced by the patch greatly outweighs the security risks.
We will therefore revert, and instead undertake closer analysis to
identify specific calls that may need hardening, rather than attempt a
universal solution.
We have kept the portion of the previous patch that improved snprintf.c's
handling of errors when it calls the platform's sprintf(). That seems to
be an unalloyed improvement.
Security: CVE-2015-3166
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
All known standard library implementations of these functions can fail
with ENOMEM. A caller neglecting to check for failure would experience
missing output, information exposure, or a crash. Check return values
within wrappers and code, currently just snprintf.c, that bypasses the
wrappers. The wrappers do not return after an error, so their callers
need not check. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Popular free software standard library implementations do take pains to
bypass malloc() in simple cases, but they risk ENOMEM for floating point
numbers, positional arguments, large field widths, and large precisions.
No specification demands such caution, so this commit regards every call
to a printf family function as a potential threat.
Injecting the wrappers implicitly is a compromise between patch scope
and design goals. I would prefer to edit each call site to name a
wrapper explicitly. libpq and the ECPG libraries would, ideally, convey
errors to the caller rather than abort(). All that would be painfully
invasive for a back-patched security fix, hence this compromise.
Security: CVE-2015-3166
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This provides a mechanism for specifying conversions between SQL data
types and procedural languages. As examples, there are transforms
for hstore and ltree for PL/Perl and PL/Python.
reviews by Pavel Stěhule and Andres Freund
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch certain files through 9.0
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Update all files in head, and files COPYRIGHT and legal.sgml in all back
branches.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Fully update git head, and update back branches in ./COPYRIGHT and
legal.sgml files.
|
| |
|
|
| |
commit-fest.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
It was already on its last legs, and it turns out that it was
accidentally broken in commit 89e850e6fda9e4e441712012abe971fe938d595a
and no one cared. So remove the rest the support for it and update
the documentation to indicate that Python 2.3 is now required.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This moves the code around from one huge file into hopefully logical
and more manageable modules. For the most part, the code itself was
not touched, except: PLy_function_handler and PLy_trigger_handler were
renamed to PLy_exec_function and PLy_exec_trigger, because they were
not actually handlers in the PL handler sense, and it makes the naming
more similar to the way PL/pgSQL is organized. The initialization of
the procedure caches was separated into a new function
init_procedure_caches to keep the hash tables private to
plpy_procedures.c.
Jan Urbański and Peter Eisentraut
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
possible to trap an error inside a function rather than letting it
propagate out to PostgresMain. You still have to use AbortCurrentTransaction
to clean up, but at least the error handling itself will cooperate.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
look ... I'm not real certain which errors are strictly internal and which
are likely to be provoked by users.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
docs that CLIENT/LOG_MIN_MESSAGES now controls debug_* output location.
Doc changes included.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
o Change all current CVS messages of NOTICE to WARNING. We were going
to do this just before 7.3 beta but it has to be done now, as you will
see below.
o Change current INFO messages that should be controlled by
client_min_messages to NOTICE.
o Force remaining INFO messages, like from EXPLAIN, VACUUM VERBOSE, etc.
to always go to the client.
o Remove INFO from the client_min_messages options and add NOTICE.
Seems we do need three non-ERROR elog levels to handle the various
behaviors we need for these messages.
Regression passed.
|
| |
|
|
| |
initdb/regression tests pass.
|
| |
|
|
| |
spacing. Also adds space for one-line comments.
|
| |
|
|
| |
tests pass.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
remove useless files, beat some sense into Makefile. For me it builds
and sort of runs, so it's a start.
|
| |
|
