From: Christopher Faulet Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 10:42:17 +0000 (+0100) Subject: BUG/MINOR: tcpcheck: fix out-of-bounds reads on truncated LDAP bind responses X-Git-Url: https://git.kaiwu.me/http/ngx_http_auth_basic_module.html?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a62a434a10ea58e5b6026360b97c26bc5e6bbc55;p=haproxy.git BUG/MINOR: tcpcheck: fix out-of-bounds reads on truncated LDAP bind responses The LDAP health-check relies on the min-recv parameter of the expect rule matching the first byte of the bind response to guarantee enough data are received before parsing the message. But this parameter is only honored while data are still expected: on a FIN or a connection error, the last read is already reached and the rule is evaluated on the received data only. A truncated response may thus be parsed with fewer bytes than the parser assumes: - With a single byte received, the message size is read one byte past the received data. - With a message announcing a size lower than 4, the 4-byte comparison on the message ID and the bindResponse tag reads up to 3 bytes past the received data. The bytes past the received data are stale buffer content: the parsing and the check result are then driven by bytes never sent by the server. The LDAP parser now validates the received data itself: the message size must be received, and the message must be at least 5 bytes to cover the message ID, the bindResponse tag and its length. Shorter responses are reported as truncated. It is a read past the received data, inside the check buffer, so it requires a non-compliant server, which is out of the threat model (servers are trusted). There is no security impact, only a check status that depends on stale data. It should be backported to all supported versions. (Reported-by: Gleb Lizunov) --- diff --git a/reg-tests/checks/ldap-check.vtc b/reg-tests/checks/ldap-check.vtc index 2329f681c..2202afdf9 100644 --- a/reg-tests/checks/ldap-check.vtc +++ b/reg-tests/checks/ldap-check.vtc @@ -29,6 +29,16 @@ server s4 { sendhex "00 04000400" } -start +server s5 { + recv 14 + sendhex "30" +} -start + +server s6 { + recv 14 + sendhex "300302010 1" +} -start + syslog S1 -level notice { recv expect ~ "[^:\\[ ]\\[${h1_pid}\\]: Health check for server be1/srv succeeded, reason: Layer7 check passed.+info: \"Success\".+check duration: [[:digit:]]+ms, status: 1/1 UP." @@ -49,6 +59,16 @@ syslog S4 -level notice { expect ~ "[^:\\[ ]\\[${h1_pid}\\]: Health check for server be4/srv succeeded, reason: Layer7 check passed.+info: \"Success\".+check duration: [[:digit:]]+ms, status: 1/1 UP." } -start +syslog S5 -level notice { + recv + expect ~ "[^:\\[ ]\\[${h1_pid}\\]: Health check for server be5/srv failed, reason: Layer7 invalid response.+check duration: [[:digit:]]+ms, status: 0/1 DOWN." +} -start + +syslog S6 -level notice { + recv + expect ~ "[^:\\[ ]\\[${h1_pid}\\]: Health check for server be6/srv failed, reason: Layer7 invalid response.+check duration: [[:digit:]]+ms, status: 0/1 DOWN." +} -start + haproxy h1 -conf { global .if feature(THREAD) @@ -92,9 +112,23 @@ haproxy h1 -conf { tcp-request content reject server srv ${s1_addr}:${s1_port} + backend be5 + log ${S5_addr}:${S5_port} daemon + option log-health-checks + option ldap-check + server srv ${s5_addr}:${s5_port} check inter 1s rise 1 fall 1 + + backend be6 + log ${S6_addr}:${S6_port} daemon + option log-health-checks + option ldap-check + server srv ${s6_addr}:${s6_port} check inter 1s rise 1 fall 1 + } -start syslog S1 -wait syslog S2 -wait syslog S3 -wait syslog S4 -wait +syslog S5 -wait +syslog S6 -wait diff --git a/src/tcpcheck.c b/src/tcpcheck.c index 80fd4ad68..31f4a6544 100644 --- a/src/tcpcheck.c +++ b/src/tcpcheck.c @@ -685,10 +685,11 @@ enum tcpcheck_eval_ret tcpcheck_ldap_expect_bindrsp(struct check *check, struct */ ptr = b_head(&check->bi); end = ptr + b_data(&check->bi); - ptr++; /* First byte was already matched by the previous expect rule - * and at least 14 bytes are available - * (see do_parse_ldap_check_opt) - */ + ptr++; /* First byte was already matched by the previous expect rule. + * The message size is read first, it must be available. + */ + if (ptr >= end) + goto too_short; /* size of LDAPMessage */ if (*ptr & 0x80) { @@ -713,7 +714,7 @@ enum tcpcheck_eval_ret tcpcheck_ldap_expect_bindrsp(struct check *check, struct msglen = *ptr; ptr += 1 + nbytes; - if (end - ptr < msglen) + if (end - ptr < msglen || msglen < 5) goto too_short; /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4511#section-4.2.2