REGTESTS: quic: undecryptable 0-RTT packets must not exhaust the Rx buffer
On a listener with "allow-0rtt", a 0-RTT packet whose header protection
cannot be removed is queued in the 0-RTT encryption level pqpkts list, with
a reference on the connection Rx buffer. That buffer is reclaimed in order
and stops at the first referenced packet, so a queued 0-RTT packet pins all
the data behind it. When no 0-RTT RX secret exists, because the early data
were rejected by the TLS stack or because the TLS library does not support
0-RTT, those packets can never be decrypted and are never released: past
about 64 kB, every packet of the connection is dropped until the idle
timeout.
The test completes a handshake, keeps the connection healthy with an HTTP/3
request, then injects 120 long header 0-RTT packets whose payload is
encrypted with keys haproxy does not know, which reproduces the state
reached when 0-RTT keys are absent. Dropped packets are counted as
dropped_pkt_bufoverrun, shown as dropbuff= by "show quic full", so the vtc
asserts through the CLI that this field does not appear: the Rx buffer was
not exhausted and the connection was not stalled.
It needs the Python client in reg-tests/quic/qclient, so it carries
'#REGTEST_EXTRA=qclient' and only runs when requested.
Covers
2335f9196.