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authorIgor Sysoev <igor@sysoev.ru>2005-11-09 17:25:55 +0000
committerIgor Sysoev <igor@sysoev.ru>2005-11-09 17:25:55 +0000
commit09c684b2d53b46b6ffb706c686ca4dbed62cf6da (patch)
tree28d1d57070b5e8d95c8608d45678298d63f9621d /src/http/ngx_http_parse.c
parent51425a465a22ad2e33e7048b880aa594c376f79c (diff)
downloadnginx-release-0.3.8.tar.gz
nginx-release-0.3.8.zip
nginx-0.3.8-RELEASE importrelease-0.3.8
*) Security: nginx now checks URI got from a backend in "X-Accel-Redirect" header line or in SSI file for the "/../" paths and zeroes. *) Change: nginx now does not treat the empty user name in the "Authorization" header line as valid one. *) Feature: the "ssl_session_timeout" directives of the ngx_http_ssl_module and ngx_imap_ssl_module. *) Feature: the "auth_http_header" directive of the ngx_imap_auth_http_module. *) Feature: the "add_header" directive. *) Feature: the ngx_http_realip_module. *) Feature: the new variables to use in the "log_format" directive: $bytes_sent, $apache_bytes_sent, $status, $time_gmt, $uri, $request_time, $request_length, $upstream_status, $upstream_response_time, $gzip_ratio, $uid_got, $uid_set, $connection, $pipe, and $msec. The parameters in the "%name" form will be canceled soon. *) Change: now the false variable values in the "if" directive are the empty string "" and string starting with "0". *) Bugfix: while using proxied or FastCGI-server nginx may leave connections and temporary files with client requests in open state. *) Bugfix: the worker processes did not flush the buffered logs on graceful exit. *) Bugfix: if the request URI was changes by the "rewrite" directive and the request was proxied in location given by regular expression, then the incorrect request was transferred to backend; the bug had appeared in 0.2.6. *) Bugfix: the "expires" directive did not remove the previous "Expires" header. *) Bugfix: nginx may stop to accept requests if the "rtsig" method and several worker processes were used. *) Bugfix: the "\"" and "\'" escape symbols were incorrectly handled in SSI commands. *) Bugfix: if the response was ended just after the SSI command and gzipping was used, then the response did not transferred complete or did not transferred at all.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/http/ngx_http_parse.c')
-rw-r--r--src/http/ngx_http_parse.c94
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c b/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c
index 302cd819a..0001286c6 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c
@@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r)
"s:%d in:'%Xd:%c', out:'%c'", state, ch, ch, *u);
switch (state) {
+
case sw_usual:
switch(ch) {
#if (NGX_WIN32)
@@ -810,7 +811,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r)
switch(ch) {
#if (NGX_WIN32)
case '\\':
- break;
#endif
case '/':
break;
@@ -837,7 +837,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r)
switch(ch) {
#if (NGX_WIN32)
case '\\':
- /* fall through */
#endif
case '/':
state = sw_slash;
@@ -866,7 +865,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r)
switch(ch) {
#if (NGX_WIN32)
case '\\':
- /* fall through */
#endif
case '/':
state = sw_slash;
@@ -923,6 +921,9 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r)
quoted_state = state;
state = sw_quoted;
break;
+ case '?':
+ r->args_start = p;
+ goto done;
default:
state = sw_usual;
*u++ = ch;
@@ -1003,6 +1004,92 @@ done:
ngx_int_t
+ngx_http_parse_unsafe_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_str_t *uri,
+ ngx_str_t *args, ngx_uint_t *flags)
+{
+ u_char ch, *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = uri->len;
+ p = uri->data;
+
+ if (len == 0 || p[0] == '?') {
+ goto unsafe;
+ }
+
+ if (p[0] == '.' && len == 3 && p[1] == '.' && (p[2] == '/'
+#if (NGX_WIN32)
+ || p[2] == '\\'
+#endif
+ ))
+ {
+ goto unsafe;
+ }
+
+ for ( /* void */ ; len; len--) {
+
+ ch = *p++;
+
+ if (ch == '?') {
+ args->len = len - 1;
+ args->data = p;
+ uri->len -= len;
+
+ return NGX_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (ch == '\0') {
+ *flags |= NGX_HTTP_ZERO_IN_URI;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch != '/'
+#if (NGX_WIN32)
+ && ch != '\\'
+#endif
+ )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (len > 2) {
+
+ /* detect "/../" */
+
+ if (p[2] == '/') {
+ goto unsafe;
+ }
+
+#if (NGX_WIN32)
+
+ if (p[2] == '\\') {
+ goto unsafe;
+ }
+
+ if (len > 3) {
+
+ /* detect "/.../" */
+
+ if (p[3] == '/' || p[3] == '\\') {
+ goto unsafe;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NGX_OK;
+
+unsafe:
+
+ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0,
+ "unsafe URI \"%V\" was detected", uri);
+
+ return NGX_ERROR;
+}
+
+
+ngx_int_t
ngx_http_parse_multi_header_lines(ngx_array_t *headers, ngx_str_t *name,
ngx_str_t *value)
{
@@ -1059,6 +1146,7 @@ ngx_http_parse_multi_header_lines(ngx_array_t *headers, ngx_str_t *name,
return i;
skip:
+
while (start < end) {
ch = *start++;
if (ch == ';' || ch == ',') {