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author | Igor Sysoev <igor@sysoev.ru> | 2005-11-09 17:25:55 +0000 |
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committer | Igor Sysoev <igor@sysoev.ru> | 2005-11-09 17:25:55 +0000 |
commit | 09c684b2d53b46b6ffb706c686ca4dbed62cf6da (patch) | |
tree | 28d1d57070b5e8d95c8608d45678298d63f9621d /src/http/ngx_http_parse.c | |
parent | 51425a465a22ad2e33e7048b880aa594c376f79c (diff) | |
download | nginx-release-0.3.8.tar.gz nginx-release-0.3.8.zip |
nginx-0.3.8-RELEASE importrelease-0.3.8
*) Security: nginx now checks URI got from a backend in
"X-Accel-Redirect" header line or in SSI file for the "/../" paths
and zeroes.
*) Change: nginx now does not treat the empty user name in the
"Authorization" header line as valid one.
*) Feature: the "ssl_session_timeout" directives of the
ngx_http_ssl_module and ngx_imap_ssl_module.
*) Feature: the "auth_http_header" directive of the
ngx_imap_auth_http_module.
*) Feature: the "add_header" directive.
*) Feature: the ngx_http_realip_module.
*) Feature: the new variables to use in the "log_format" directive:
$bytes_sent, $apache_bytes_sent, $status, $time_gmt, $uri,
$request_time, $request_length, $upstream_status,
$upstream_response_time, $gzip_ratio, $uid_got, $uid_set,
$connection, $pipe, and $msec. The parameters in the "%name" form
will be canceled soon.
*) Change: now the false variable values in the "if" directive are the
empty string "" and string starting with "0".
*) Bugfix: while using proxied or FastCGI-server nginx may leave
connections and temporary files with client requests in open state.
*) Bugfix: the worker processes did not flush the buffered logs on
graceful exit.
*) Bugfix: if the request URI was changes by the "rewrite" directive
and the request was proxied in location given by regular expression,
then the incorrect request was transferred to backend; the bug had
appeared in 0.2.6.
*) Bugfix: the "expires" directive did not remove the previous
"Expires" header.
*) Bugfix: nginx may stop to accept requests if the "rtsig" method and
several worker processes were used.
*) Bugfix: the "\"" and "\'" escape symbols were incorrectly handled in
SSI commands.
*) Bugfix: if the response was ended just after the SSI command and
gzipping was used, then the response did not transferred complete or
did not transferred at all.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/http/ngx_http_parse.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/http/ngx_http_parse.c | 94 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c b/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c index 302cd819a..0001286c6 100644 --- a/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c +++ b/src/http/ngx_http_parse.c @@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r) "s:%d in:'%Xd:%c', out:'%c'", state, ch, ch, *u); switch (state) { + case sw_usual: switch(ch) { #if (NGX_WIN32) @@ -810,7 +811,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r) switch(ch) { #if (NGX_WIN32) case '\\': - break; #endif case '/': break; @@ -837,7 +837,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r) switch(ch) { #if (NGX_WIN32) case '\\': - /* fall through */ #endif case '/': state = sw_slash; @@ -866,7 +865,6 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r) switch(ch) { #if (NGX_WIN32) case '\\': - /* fall through */ #endif case '/': state = sw_slash; @@ -923,6 +921,9 @@ ngx_http_parse_complex_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r) quoted_state = state; state = sw_quoted; break; + case '?': + r->args_start = p; + goto done; default: state = sw_usual; *u++ = ch; @@ -1003,6 +1004,92 @@ done: ngx_int_t +ngx_http_parse_unsafe_uri(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_str_t *uri, + ngx_str_t *args, ngx_uint_t *flags) +{ + u_char ch, *p; + size_t len; + + len = uri->len; + p = uri->data; + + if (len == 0 || p[0] == '?') { + goto unsafe; + } + + if (p[0] == '.' && len == 3 && p[1] == '.' && (p[2] == '/' +#if (NGX_WIN32) + || p[2] == '\\' +#endif + )) + { + goto unsafe; + } + + for ( /* void */ ; len; len--) { + + ch = *p++; + + if (ch == '?') { + args->len = len - 1; + args->data = p; + uri->len -= len; + + return NGX_OK; + } + + if (ch == '\0') { + *flags |= NGX_HTTP_ZERO_IN_URI; + continue; + } + + if (ch != '/' +#if (NGX_WIN32) + && ch != '\\' +#endif + ) + { + continue; + } + + if (len > 2) { + + /* detect "/../" */ + + if (p[2] == '/') { + goto unsafe; + } + +#if (NGX_WIN32) + + if (p[2] == '\\') { + goto unsafe; + } + + if (len > 3) { + + /* detect "/.../" */ + + if (p[3] == '/' || p[3] == '\\') { + goto unsafe; + } + } +#endif + } + } + + return NGX_OK; + +unsafe: + + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, r->connection->log, 0, + "unsafe URI \"%V\" was detected", uri); + + return NGX_ERROR; +} + + +ngx_int_t ngx_http_parse_multi_header_lines(ngx_array_t *headers, ngx_str_t *name, ngx_str_t *value) { @@ -1059,6 +1146,7 @@ ngx_http_parse_multi_header_lines(ngx_array_t *headers, ngx_str_t *name, return i; skip: + while (start < end) { ch = *start++; if (ch == ';' || ch == ',') { |