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author | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2019-05-06 12:45:59 -0400 |
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committer | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2019-05-06 12:46:27 -0400 |
commit | 585e8ffd195d868f23318caaed6fd586f8d56a0e (patch) | |
tree | 7bf856591e42cd496bd5e126be212e503b9ef0c8 | |
parent | 40353bcc67cd4a2b70179faf4d90984196d4ffff (diff) | |
download | postgresql-585e8ffd195d868f23318caaed6fd586f8d56a0e.tar.gz postgresql-585e8ffd195d868f23318caaed6fd586f8d56a0e.zip |
Last-minute updates for release notes.
Security: CVE-2019-10129, CVE-2019-10130
-rw-r--r-- | doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml index fc90f873d1a..d4e1e33c7ba 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml @@ -35,6 +35,28 @@ <listitem> <para> + Prevent row-level security policies from being bypassed via + selectivity estimators (Dean Rasheed) + </para> + + <para> + Some of the planner's selectivity estimators apply user-defined + operators to values found in <structname>pg_statistic</structname> + (e.g., most-common values). A leaky operator therefore can disclose + some of the entries in a data column, even if the calling user lacks + permission to read that column. In CVE-2017-7484 we added + restrictions to forestall that, but we failed to consider the + effects of row-level security. A user who has SQL permission to + read a column, but who is forbidden to see certain rows due to RLS + policy, might still learn something about those rows' contents via a + leaky operator. This patch further tightens the rules, allowing + leaky operators to be applied to statistics data only when there is + no relevant RLS policy. (CVE-2019-10130) + </para> + </listitem> + + <listitem> + <para> Avoid catalog corruption when a temporary table with <literal>ON COMMIT DROP</literal> and an identity column is created in a single-statement transaction (Peter Eisentraut) @@ -265,6 +287,23 @@ <listitem> <para> + Check the appropriate user's permissions when enforcing rules about + letting a leaky operator see <structname>pg_statistic</structname> + data (Dean Rasheed) + </para> + + <para> + When an underlying table is being accessed via a view, consider the + privileges of the view owner while deciding whether leaky operators + may be applied to the table's statistics data, rather than the + privileges of the user making the query. This makes the planner's + rules about what data is visible match up with the executor's, + avoiding unnecessarily-poor plans. + </para> + </listitem> + + <listitem> + <para> Speed up planning when there are many equality conditions and many potentially-relevant foreign key constraints (David Rowley) </para> |