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author | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2025-02-10 18:16:25 -0500 |
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committer | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2025-02-10 18:16:25 -0500 |
commit | 7e06ffbc6230a6f3e4cdc7599a5617d081d611f7 (patch) | |
tree | ebcee09e78e7153d56ddf318428cb13edf60a44b | |
parent | 0075a5c6ce5bb6f3ee005a54cd5b518f16659655 (diff) | |
download | postgresql-7e06ffbc6230a6f3e4cdc7599a5617d081d611f7.tar.gz postgresql-7e06ffbc6230a6f3e4cdc7599a5617d081d611f7.zip |
Last-minute updates for release notes.
Security: CVE-2025-1094
-rw-r--r-- | doc/src/sgml/release-16.sgml | 96 |
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-16.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-16.sgml index 470761bd411..c729f3d313c 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/release-16.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-16.sgml @@ -35,6 +35,102 @@ <listitem> <!-- +Author: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> +Branch: master [5dc1e42b4] 2025-02-10 10:03:37 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [43a77239d] 2025-02-10 10:03:38 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [92e4170f4] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [370c94d4c] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [e0ef3d776] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [c906bfe1b] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: master [4dc289635] 2025-02-10 10:03:37 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [7d43ca6fe] 2025-02-10 10:03:38 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [6e05b195d] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [703b3fd5d] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [5bc33cbea] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [db3eb0e82] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: master [3e98c8ce5] 2025-02-10 10:03:37 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [61ad93cdd] 2025-02-10 10:03:38 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [56aa2dcdd] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [b1756da75] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [2ae54ae17] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [5df4e1632] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: master [ac00ff1c9] 2025-02-10 10:03:37 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [02d4d87ac] 2025-02-10 10:03:38 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [01784793f] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [de4b92f33] 2025-02-10 10:03:39 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [46ddf98df] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [4ea3f5ef3] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Branch: master [979205e47] 2025-02-10 12:12:14 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [05abb0f83] 2025-02-10 12:12:53 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [41343f840] 2025-02-10 12:12:56 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [a085fa731] 2025-02-10 12:12:58 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [4a6825c76] 2025-02-10 12:12:59 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [7beb2af5e] 2025-02-10 12:13:02 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [00f1a1f66] 2025-02-10 10:03:40 -0500 +Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> +Branch: master [5bf12323b] 2025-02-10 16:30:03 -0500 +Branch: REL_17_STABLE [85c1fcc65] 2025-02-10 16:30:31 -0500 +Branch: REL_16_STABLE [0075a5c6c] 2025-02-10 16:30:37 -0500 +Branch: REL_15_STABLE [9862de917] 2025-02-10 16:30:54 -0500 +Branch: REL_14_STABLE [e1f1b030d] 2025-02-10 16:31:01 -0500 +Branch: REL_13_STABLE [f9fceef6e] 2025-02-10 16:31:09 -0500 +--> + <para> + Harden <function>PQescapeString</function> and allied functions + against invalidly-encoded input strings (Andres Freund, Noah Misch) + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;92e4170f4">§</ulink> + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;6e05b195d">§</ulink> + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;56aa2dcdd">§</ulink> + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;01784793f">§</ulink> + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;41343f840">§</ulink> + <ulink url="&commit_baseurl;0075a5c6c">§</ulink> + </para> + + <para> + Data-quoting functions supplied by <application>libpq</application> + now fully check the encoding validity of their input. If invalid + characters are detected, they report an error if possible. For the + ones that lack an error return convention, the output string is + adjusted to ensure that the server will report invalid encoding and + no intervening processing will be fooled by bytes that might happen + to match single quote, backslash, etc. + </para> + + <para> + The purpose of this change is to guard against SQL-injection attacks + that are possible if one of these functions is used to quote crafted + input. There is no hazard when the resulting string is sent + directly to a <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server (which + would check its encoding anyway), but there is a risk when it is + passed through <application>psql</application> or other client-side + code. Historically such code has not carefully vetted encoding, and + in many cases it's not clear what it should do if it did detect such + a problem. + </para> + + <para> + This fix is effective only if the data-quoting function, the server, + and any intermediate processing agree on the character encoding + that's being used. Applications that insert untrusted input into + SQL commands should take special care to ensure that that's true. + </para> + + <para> + Applications and drivers that quote untrusted input without using + these <application>libpq</application> functions may be at risk of + similar problems. They should first confirm the data is valid in + the encoding expected by the server. + </para> + + <para> + The <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> Project thanks + Stephen Fewer for reporting this problem. + (CVE-2025-1094) + </para> + </listitem> + + <listitem> +<!-- Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> Branch: master [34486b609] 2024-12-28 16:08:50 -0500 Branch: REL_17_STABLE [15b4c46c3] 2024-12-28 16:08:50 -0500 |