aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:31 -0500
committerNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:33 -0500
commit12bbce15d93d7692ddff1405aa04b67f8a327f57 (patch)
tree296fbe9beb2b98b68d66a52979b335af7be529bd /contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
parentf416622be81d1320417bbc7892fd562cae0dba72 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-12bbce15d93d7692ddff1405aa04b67f8a327f57.tar.gz
postgresql-12bbce15d93d7692ddff1405aa04b67f8a327f57.zip
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter. Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow in related functions. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0. Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane. Security: CVE-2014-0064
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c')
-rw-r--r--contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c b/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
index 4e63f6d66c1..62294d1caba 100644
--- a/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
+++ b/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
@@ -451,6 +451,9 @@ boolop(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
static void
findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int4 *pos)
{
+ /* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
+ check_stack_depth();
+
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ?
"%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val);
@@ -511,7 +514,13 @@ bqarr_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("empty query")));
+ if (state.num > QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("number of query items (%d) exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ state.num, (int) QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS)));
commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(state.num);
+
query = (QUERYTYPE *) palloc(commonlen);
SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen);
query->size = state.num;