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| author | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2014-02-17 09:33:31 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2014-02-17 09:33:32 -0500 |
| commit | 7a362a176a5c6621b58fb3897b2a4cb15b975810 (patch) | |
| tree | b6c052e2e69fe1424ee0e0868aa609fe2da28ebb /contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c | |
| parent | e4a4fa22352b062bc3548c91fa9bfc6caed7b073 (diff) | |
| download | postgresql-7a362a176a5c6621b58fb3897b2a4cb15b975810.tar.gz postgresql-7a362a176a5c6621b58fb3897b2a4cb15b975810.zip | |
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c b/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c index d0572afc1e3..b18e997748b 100644 --- a/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c +++ b/contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c @@ -448,6 +448,9 @@ boolop(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) static void findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos) { + /* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */ + check_stack_depth(); + #ifdef BS_DEBUG elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ? "%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val); @@ -508,7 +511,13 @@ bqarr_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), errmsg("empty query"))); + if (state.num > QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS) + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), + errmsg("number of query items (%d) exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)", + state.num, (int) QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS))); commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(state.num); + query = (QUERYTYPE *) palloc(commonlen); SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen); query->size = state.num; |