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authorHeikki Linnakangas <heikki.linnakangas@iki.fi>2016-12-05 13:42:59 +0200
committerHeikki Linnakangas <heikki.linnakangas@iki.fi>2016-12-05 13:42:59 +0200
commitfe0a0b5993dfe24e4b3bcf52fa64ff41a444b8f1 (patch)
tree7990f273fde3d545b5ecd2e813930b2077bf15d3 /contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
parent5dc851afde8d9ef9947f21799f7a1b08bf0bf812 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-fe0a0b5993dfe24e4b3bcf52fa64ff41a444b8f1.tar.gz
postgresql-fe0a0b5993dfe24e4b3bcf52fa64ff41a444b8f1.zip
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c')
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c10
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
index be95f2d0926..cb70fcba6cc 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
@@ -57,17 +57,16 @@ mp_clear_free(mpz_t *a)
static int
mp_px_rand(uint32 bits, mpz_t *res)
{
- int err;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
unsigned bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
int last_bits = bits & 7;
uint8 *buf;
buf = px_alloc(bytes);
- err = px_get_random_bytes(buf, bytes);
- if (err < 0)
+ if (!pg_strong_random((char *) buf, bytes))
{
px_free(buf);
- return err;
+ return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
}
/* clear unnecessary bits and set last bit to one */
@@ -84,6 +83,9 @@ mp_px_rand(uint32 bits, mpz_t *res)
px_free(buf);
return 0;
+#else
+ return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
+#endif
}
static void