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authorNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2023-08-07 06:05:56 -0700
committerNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2023-08-07 06:06:00 -0700
commiteb044d8f0aee1ba4950b0867f6ca9328374318db (patch)
treeb5ea0cc1980197d5997d0a3edfff966554c78536 /src/backend/commands
parent001561235787970ce91b60469498aac898dda866 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-eb044d8f0aee1ba4950b0867f6ca9328374318db.tar.gz
postgresql-eb044d8f0aee1ba4950b0867f6ca9328374318db.zip
Reject substituting extension schemas or owners matching ["$'\].
Substituting such values in extension scripts facilitated SQL injection when @extowner@, @extschema@, or @extschema:...@ appeared inside a quoting construct (dollar quoting, '', or ""). No bundled extension was vulnerable. Vulnerable uses do appear in a documentation example and in non-bundled extensions. Hence, the attack prerequisite was an administrator having installed files of a vulnerable, trusted, non-bundled extension. Subject to that prerequisite, this enabled an attacker having database-level CREATE privilege to execute arbitrary code as the bootstrap superuser. By blocking this attack in the core server, there's no need to modify individual extensions. Back-patch to v11 (all supported versions). Reported by Micah Gate, Valerie Woolard, Tim Carey-Smith, and Christoph Berg. Security: CVE-2023-39417
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/commands')
-rw-r--r--src/backend/commands/extension.c16
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/commands/extension.c b/src/backend/commands/extension.c
index 7e81d848190..0f9edf68c3a 100644
--- a/src/backend/commands/extension.c
+++ b/src/backend/commands/extension.c
@@ -888,6 +888,16 @@ execute_extension_script(Oid extensionOid, ExtensionControlFile *control,
char *c_sql = read_extension_script_file(control, filename);
Datum t_sql;
+ /*
+ * We filter each substitution through quote_identifier(). When the
+ * arg contains one of the following characters, no one collection of
+ * quoting can work inside $$dollar-quoted string literals$$,
+ * 'single-quoted string literals', and outside of any literal. To
+ * avoid a security snare for extension authors, error on substitution
+ * for arguments containing these.
+ */
+ const char *quoting_relevant_chars = "\"$'\\";
+
/* We use various functions that want to operate on text datums */
t_sql = CStringGetTextDatum(c_sql);
@@ -912,6 +922,7 @@ execute_extension_script(Oid extensionOid, ExtensionControlFile *control,
*/
if (!control->relocatable)
{
+ Datum old = t_sql;
const char *qSchemaName = quote_identifier(schemaName);
t_sql = DirectFunctionCall3Coll(replace_text,
@@ -919,6 +930,11 @@ execute_extension_script(Oid extensionOid, ExtensionControlFile *control,
t_sql,
CStringGetTextDatum("@extschema@"),
CStringGetTextDatum(qSchemaName));
+ if (t_sql != old && strpbrk(schemaName, quoting_relevant_chars))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
+ errmsg("invalid character in extension \"%s\" schema: must not contain any of \"%s\"",
+ control->name, quoting_relevant_chars)));
}
/*