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| author | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2017-01-02 21:37:12 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> | 2017-01-02 21:37:12 -0500 |
| commit | de41869b64d57160f58852eab20a27f248188135 (patch) | |
| tree | a4d81157d9126c76d042d093ee7a4a08a37181aa /src/backend/libpq/auth.c | |
| parent | 1d63f7d2d180c8708bc12710254eb7b45823440f (diff) | |
| download | postgresql-de41869b64d57160f58852eab20a27f248188135.tar.gz postgresql-de41869b64d57160f58852eab20a27f248188135.zip | |
Allow SSL configuration to be updated at SIGHUP.
It is no longer necessary to restart the server to enable, disable,
or reconfigure SSL. Instead, we just create a new SSL_CTX struct
(by re-reading all relevant files) whenever we get SIGHUP. Testing
shows that this is fast enough that it shouldn't be a problem.
In conjunction with that, downgrade the logic that complains about
pg_hba.conf "hostssl" lines when SSL isn't active: now that's just
a warning condition not an error.
An issue that still needs to be addressed is what shall we do with
passphrase-protected server keys? As this stands, the server would
demand the passphrase again on every SIGHUP, which is certainly
impractical. But the case was only barely supported before, so that
does not seem a sufficient reason to hold up committing this patch.
Andreas Karlsson, reviewed by Michael Banck and Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/556A6E8A.9030400@proxel.se
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/libpq/auth.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c index 72306e639cd..da7ae16d502 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c @@ -348,28 +348,22 @@ ClientAuthentication(Port *port) */ if (port->hba->clientcert) { + /* If we haven't loaded a root certificate store, fail */ + if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations()) + ereport(FATAL, + (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), + errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available"))); + /* - * When we parse pg_hba.conf, we have already made sure that we have - * been able to load a certificate store. Thus, if a certificate is - * present on the client, it has been verified against our root + * If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is + * present on the client, then it has been verified against our root * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted * already if it didn't verify ok. */ -#ifdef USE_SSL if (!port->peer_cert_valid) - { ereport(FATAL, (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate"))); - } -#else - - /* - * hba.c makes sure hba->clientcert can't be set unless OpenSSL is - * present. - */ - Assert(false); -#endif } /* |