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author | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net> | 2018-04-02 11:34:52 -0400 |
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committer | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net> | 2018-04-02 11:37:40 -0400 |
commit | 2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a (patch) | |
tree | 2db3da15bec088237b5b32f83de90c8cc8817e9b /src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | |
parent | 7e0d64c7a57e28fbcf093b6da9310a38367c1d75 (diff) | |
download | postgresql-2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a.tar.gz postgresql-2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a.zip |
Make be-secure-common.c more consistent for future SSL implementations
Recent commit 8a3d9425 has introduced be-secure-common.c, which is aimed
at including backend-side APIs that can be used by any SSL
implementation. The purpose is similar to fe-secure-common.c for the
frontend-side APIs.
However, this has forgotten to include check_ssl_key_file_permissions()
in the move, which causes a double dependency between be-secure.c and
be-secure-openssl.c.
Refactor the code in a more logical way. This also puts into light an
API which is usable by future SSL implementations for permissions on SSL
key files.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 69 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c index fb1f6b5bbe7..edfe2c0751c 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c @@ -18,12 +18,10 @@ #include "postgres.h" -#include <sys/stat.h> #include <signal.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <ctype.h> #include <sys/socket.h> -#include <unistd.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H @@ -320,70 +318,3 @@ secure_raw_write(Port *port, const void *ptr, size_t len) return n; } - -bool -check_ssl_key_file_permissions(const char *ssl_key_file, bool isServerStart) -{ - int loglevel = isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG; - struct stat buf; - - if (stat(ssl_key_file, &buf) != 0) - { - ereport(loglevel, - (errcode_for_file_access(), - errmsg("could not access private key file \"%s\": %m", - ssl_key_file))); - return false; - } - - if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) - { - ereport(loglevel, - (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), - errmsg("private key file \"%s\" is not a regular file", - ssl_key_file))); - return false; - } - - /* - * Refuse to load key files owned by users other than us or root. - * - * XXX surely we can check this on Windows somehow, too. - */ -#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) - if (buf.st_uid != geteuid() && buf.st_uid != 0) - { - ereport(loglevel, - (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), - errmsg("private key file \"%s\" must be owned by the database user or root", - ssl_key_file))); - return false; - } -#endif - - /* - * Require no public access to key file. If the file is owned by us, - * require mode 0600 or less. If owned by root, require 0640 or less to - * allow read access through our gid, or a supplementary gid that allows - * to read system-wide certificates. - * - * XXX temporarily suppress check when on Windows, because there may not - * be proper support for Unix-y file permissions. Need to think of a - * reasonable check to apply on Windows. (See also the data directory - * permission check in postmaster.c) - */ -#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) - if ((buf.st_uid == geteuid() && buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) || - (buf.st_uid == 0 && buf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO))) - { - ereport(loglevel, - (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), - errmsg("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access", - ssl_key_file), - errdetail("File must have permissions u=rw (0600) or less if owned by the database user, or permissions u=rw,g=r (0640) or less if owned by root."))); - return false; - } -#endif - - return true; -} |