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authorHeikki Linnakangas <heikki.linnakangas@iki.fi>2024-04-08 04:24:49 +0300
committerHeikki Linnakangas <heikki.linnakangas@iki.fi>2024-04-08 04:24:49 +0300
commitd39a49c1e459804831302807c724fa6512e90cf0 (patch)
tree6c4c806f3e663ace026213bf719a89873fe7a7ab /src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c
parent05fd30c0e730bd5238f62d2fdfdcfaf28b16b225 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-d39a49c1e459804831302807c724fa6512e90cf0.tar.gz
postgresql-d39a49c1e459804831302807c724fa6512e90cf0.zip
Support TLS handshake directly without SSLRequest negotiation
By skipping SSLRequest, you can eliminate one round-trip when establishing a TLS connection. It is also more friendly to generic TLS proxies that don't understand the PostgreSQL protocol. This is disabled by default in libpq, because the direct TLS handshake will fail with old server versions. It can be enabled with the sslnegotation=direct option. It will still fall back to the negotiated TLS handshake if the server rejects the direct attempt, either because it is an older version or the server doesn't support TLS at all, but the fallback can be disabled with the sslnegotiation=requiredirect option. Author: Greg Stark, Heikki Linnakangas Reviewed-by: Matthias van de Meent, Jacob Champion
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c')
-rw-r--r--src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c98
1 files changed, 89 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c b/src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c
index 64df3ff32a2..b59df3f6603 100644
--- a/src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c
+++ b/src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
bool Trace_connection_negotiation = false;
static void BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac);
+static int ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port);
static int ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done);
static void SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(List *unrecognized_protocol_options);
static void process_startup_packet_die(SIGNAL_ARGS);
@@ -251,11 +252,15 @@ BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac)
RegisterTimeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, StartupPacketTimeoutHandler);
enable_timeout_after(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, AuthenticationTimeout * 1000);
+ /* Handle direct SSL handshake */
+ status = ProcessSSLStartup(port);
+
/*
* Receive the startup packet (which might turn out to be a cancel request
* packet).
*/
- status = ProcessStartupPacket(port, false, false);
+ if (status == STATUS_OK)
+ status = ProcessStartupPacket(port, false, false);
/*
* If we're going to reject the connection due to database state, say so
@@ -348,6 +353,77 @@ BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac)
}
/*
+ * Check for a direct SSL connection.
+ *
+ * This happens before the startup packet so we are careful not to actually
+ * read any bytes from the stream if it's not a direct SSL connection.
+ */
+static int
+ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port)
+{
+ int firstbyte;
+
+ Assert(!port->ssl_in_use);
+
+ pq_startmsgread();
+ firstbyte = pq_peekbyte();
+ pq_endmsgread();
+ if (firstbyte == EOF)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Like in ProcessStartupPacket, if we get no data at all, don't
+ * clutter the log with a complaint.
+ */
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (firstbyte != 0x16)
+ {
+ /* Not an SSL handshake message */
+ return STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First byte indicates standard SSL handshake message
+ *
+ * (It can't be a Postgres startup length because in network byte order
+ * that would be a startup packet hundreds of megabytes long)
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
+ {
+ /* SSL not supported */
+ goto reject;
+ }
+
+ if (secure_open_server(port) == -1)
+ {
+ /*
+ * we assume secure_open_server() sent an appropriate TLS alert
+ * already
+ */
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ Assert(port->ssl_in_use);
+
+ if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("direct SSL connection accepted")));
+ return STATUS_OK;
+#else
+ /* SSL not supported by this build */
+ goto reject;
+#endif
+
+reject:
+ if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("direct SSL connection rejected")));
+ return STATUS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
* Read a client's startup packet and do something according to it.
*
* Returns STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR, or might call ereport(FATAL) and
@@ -468,8 +544,13 @@ ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done)
char SSLok;
#ifdef USE_SSL
- /* No SSL when disabled or on Unix sockets */
- if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
+
+ /*
+ * No SSL when disabled or on Unix sockets.
+ *
+ * Also no SSL negotiation if we already have a direct SSL connection
+ */
+ if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX || port->ssl_in_use)
SSLok = 'N';
else
SSLok = 'S'; /* Support for SSL */
@@ -487,11 +568,10 @@ ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done)
(errmsg("SSLRequest rejected")));
}
-retry1:
- if (send(port->sock, &SSLok, 1, 0) != 1)
+ while (secure_write(port, &SSLok, 1) != 1)
{
if (errno == EINTR)
- goto retry1; /* if interrupted, just retry */
+ continue; /* if interrupted, just retry */
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("failed to send SSL negotiation response: %m")));
@@ -509,7 +589,7 @@ retry1:
* encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
* We report this case to the client.
*/
- if (pq_buffer_has_data())
+ if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"),
@@ -542,7 +622,7 @@ retry1:
(errmsg("GSSENCRequest rejected")));
}
- while (send(port->sock, &GSSok, 1, 0) != 1)
+ while (secure_write(port, &GSSok, 1) != 1)
{
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
@@ -563,7 +643,7 @@ retry1:
* encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
* We report this case to the client.
*/
- if (pq_buffer_has_data())
+ if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"),