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authorPeter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>2018-01-27 13:47:52 -0500
committerPeter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>2018-01-30 22:56:24 -0500
commitf75a95915528646cbfaf238fb48b3ffa17969383 (patch)
tree39ae8490eadc1b2c965b569be2e43abe77ca1c49 /src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
parent38d485fdaa5739627b642303cc172acc1487b90a (diff)
downloadpostgresql-f75a95915528646cbfaf238fb48b3ffa17969383.tar.gz
postgresql-f75a95915528646cbfaf238fb48b3ffa17969383.zip
Refactor client-side SSL certificate checking code
Separate the parts specific to the SSL library from the general logic. The previous code structure was open_client_SSL() calls verify_peer_name_matches_certificate() calls verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name() calls wildcard_certificate_match() and was completely in fe-secure-openssl.c. The new structure is open_client_SSL() [openssl] calls pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate() [generic] calls pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts() [openssl] calls openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name() [openssl] calls pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name() [generic] calls wildcard_certificate_match() [generic] Move the generic functions into a new file fe-secure-common.c, so the calls generally go fe-connect.c -> fe-secure.c -> fe-secure-${impl}.c -> fe-secure-common.c, although there is a bit of back-and-forth between the last two. Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c')
-rw-r--r--src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c210
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 185 deletions
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
index 9ab317320a2..cade4e157cb 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
#include "libpq-int.h"
#ifdef WIN32
@@ -60,9 +61,8 @@
#endif
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-static bool verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *);
static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn,
+static int openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn,
ASN1_STRING *name,
char **store_name);
static void destroy_ssl_system(void);
@@ -492,76 +492,16 @@ verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/*
- * Check if a wildcard certificate matches the server hostname.
- *
- * The rule for this is:
- * 1. We only match the '*' character as wildcard
- * 2. We match only wildcards at the start of the string
- * 3. The '*' character does *not* match '.', meaning that we match only
- * a single pathname component.
- * 4. We don't support more than one '*' in a single pattern.
- *
- * This is roughly in line with RFC2818, but contrary to what most browsers
- * appear to be implementing (point 3 being the difference)
- *
- * Matching is always case-insensitive, since DNS is case insensitive.
- */
-static int
-wildcard_certificate_match(const char *pattern, const char *string)
-{
- int lenpat = strlen(pattern);
- int lenstr = strlen(string);
-
- /* If we don't start with a wildcard, it's not a match (rule 1 & 2) */
- if (lenpat < 3 ||
- pattern[0] != '*' ||
- pattern[1] != '.')
- return 0;
-
- if (lenpat > lenstr)
- /* If pattern is longer than the string, we can never match */
- return 0;
-
- if (pg_strcasecmp(pattern + 1, string + lenstr - lenpat + 1) != 0)
-
- /*
- * If string does not end in pattern (minus the wildcard), we don't
- * match
- */
- return 0;
-
- if (strchr(string, '.') < string + lenstr - lenpat)
-
- /*
- * If there is a dot left of where the pattern started to match, we
- * don't match (rule 3)
- */
- return 0;
-
- /* String ended with pattern, and didn't have a dot before, so we match */
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if a name from a server's certificate matches the peer's hostname.
- *
- * Returns 1 if the name matches, and 0 if it does not. On error, returns
- * -1, and sets the libpq error message.
- *
- * The name extracted from the certificate is returned in *store_name. The
- * caller is responsible for freeing it.
+ * OpenSSL-specific wrapper around
+ * pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(), converting the ASN1_STRING
+ * into a plain C string.
*/
static int
-verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn, ASN1_STRING *name_entry,
- char **store_name)
+openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn, ASN1_STRING *name_entry,
+ char **store_name)
{
int len;
- char *name;
const unsigned char *namedata;
- int result;
- char *host = PQhost(conn);
-
- *store_name = NULL;
/* Should not happen... */
if (name_entry == NULL)
@@ -573,9 +513,6 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn, ASN1_STRING *name_entry,
/*
* GEN_DNS can be only IA5String, equivalent to US ASCII.
- *
- * There is no guarantee the string returned from the certificate is
- * NULL-terminated, so make a copy that is.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_ASN1_STRING_GET0_DATA
namedata = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name_entry);
@@ -583,45 +520,9 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn, ASN1_STRING *name_entry,
namedata = ASN1_STRING_data(name_entry);
#endif
len = ASN1_STRING_length(name_entry);
- name = malloc(len + 1);
- if (name == NULL)
- {
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(name, namedata, len);
- name[len] = '\0';
-
- /*
- * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common or alternative name to
- * prevent attacks like CVE-2009-4034.
- */
- if (len != strlen(name))
- {
- free(name);
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("SSL certificate's name contains embedded null\n"));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pg_strcasecmp(name, host) == 0)
- {
- /* Exact name match */
- result = 1;
- }
- else if (wildcard_certificate_match(name, host))
- {
- /* Matched wildcard name */
- result = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- result = 0;
- }
-
- *store_name = name;
- return result;
+ /* OK to cast from unsigned to plain char, since it's all ASCII. */
+ return pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, (const char *) namedata, len, store_name);
}
/*
@@ -629,33 +530,14 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(PGconn *conn, ASN1_STRING *name_entry,
*
* The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
*/
-static bool
-verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
{
- int names_examined = 0;
- bool found_match = false;
- bool got_error = false;
- char *first_name = NULL;
-
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *peer_san;
int i;
- int rc;
- char *host = PQhost(conn);
-
- /*
- * If told not to verify the peer name, don't do it. Return true
- * indicating that the verification was successful.
- */
- if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") != 0)
- return true;
-
- /* Check that we have a hostname to compare with. */
- if (!(host && host[0] != '\0'))
- {
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("host name must be specified for a verified SSL connection\n"));
- return false;
- }
+ int rc = 0;
/*
* First, get the Subject Alternative Names (SANs) from the certificate,
@@ -676,24 +558,20 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
{
char *alt_name;
- names_examined++;
- rc = verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn,
+ (*names_examined)++;
+ rc = openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn,
name->d.dNSName,
&alt_name);
- if (rc == -1)
- got_error = true;
- if (rc == 1)
- found_match = true;
if (alt_name)
{
- if (!first_name)
- first_name = alt_name;
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
else
free(alt_name);
}
}
- if (found_match || got_error)
+ if (rc != 0)
break;
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(peer_san);
@@ -706,7 +584,7 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
* (Per RFC 2818 and RFC 6125, if the subjectAltName extension of type
* dNSName is present, the CN must be ignored.)
*/
- if (names_examined == 0)
+ if (*names_examined == 0)
{
X509_NAME *subject_name;
@@ -719,55 +597,17 @@ verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
NID_commonName, -1);
if (cn_index >= 0)
{
- names_examined++;
- rc = verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(
+ (*names_examined)++;
+ rc = openssl_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(
conn,
X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(
X509_NAME_get_entry(subject_name, cn_index)),
- &first_name);
-
- if (rc == -1)
- got_error = true;
- else if (rc == 1)
- found_match = true;
+ first_name);
}
}
}
- if (!found_match && !got_error)
- {
- /*
- * No match. Include the name from the server certificate in the error
- * message, to aid debugging broken configurations. If there are
- * multiple names, only print the first one to avoid an overly long
- * error message.
- */
- if (names_examined > 1)
- {
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_ngettext("server certificate for \"%s\" (and %d other name) does not match host name \"%s\"\n",
- "server certificate for \"%s\" (and %d other names) does not match host name \"%s\"\n",
- names_examined - 1),
- first_name, names_examined - 1, host);
- }
- else if (names_examined == 1)
- {
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("server certificate for \"%s\" does not match host name \"%s\"\n"),
- first_name, host);
- }
- else
- {
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("could not get server's host name from server certificate\n"));
- }
- }
-
- /* clean up */
- if (first_name)
- free(first_name);
-
- return found_match && !got_error;
+ return rc;
}
#if defined(ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY) && defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_LOCK)
@@ -1441,7 +1281,7 @@ open_client_SSL(PGconn *conn)
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
}
- if (!verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
{
pgtls_close(conn);
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;