| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In an RLS query, we must ensure that security filter quals are evaluated
before ordinary query quals, in case the latter contain "leaky" functions
that could expose the contents of sensitive rows. The original
implementation of RLS planning ensured this by pushing the scan of a
secured table into a sub-query that it marked as a security-barrier view.
Unfortunately this results in very inefficient plans in many cases, because
the sub-query cannot be flattened and gets planned independently of the
rest of the query.
To fix, drop the use of sub-queries to enforce RLS qual order, and instead
mark each qual (RestrictInfo) with a security_level field establishing its
priority for evaluation. Quals must be evaluated in security_level order,
except that "leakproof" quals can be allowed to go ahead of quals of lower
security_level, if it's helpful to do so. This has to be enforced within
the ordering of any one list of quals to be evaluated at a table scan node,
and we also have to ensure that quals are not chosen for early evaluation
(i.e., use as an index qual or TID scan qual) if they're not allowed to go
ahead of other quals at the scan node.
This is sufficient to fix the problem for RLS quals, since we only support
RLS policies on simple tables and thus RLS quals will always exist at the
table scan level only. Eventually these qual ordering rules should be
enforced for join quals as well, which would permit improving planning for
explicit security-barrier views; but that's a task for another patch.
Note that FDWs would need to be aware of these rules --- and not, for
example, send an insecure qual for remote execution --- but since we do
not yet allow RLS policies on foreign tables, the case doesn't arise.
This will need to be addressed before we can allow such policies.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost and Dean Rasheed.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/8185.1477432701@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When converting an RTE with securityQuals into a security barrier
subquery RTE, ensure that the Vars in the new subquery's targetlist
all have varlevelsup = 0 so that they correctly refer to the
underlying base relation being wrapped.
The original code was creating new Vars by copying them from existing
Vars referencing the base relation found elsewhere in the query, but
failed to account for the fact that such Vars could come from sublink
subqueries, and hence have varlevelsup > 0. In practice it looks like
this could only happen with nested security barrier views, where the
outer view has a WHERE clause containing a correlated subquery, due to
the order in which the Vars are processed.
Bug: #13988
Reported-by: Adam Guthrie
Backpatch-to: 9.4, where updatable SB views were introduced
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch certain files through 9.1
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
During expand_security_quals, we take the security barrier quals on an
RTE and create a subquery which evaluates the quals. During this, we
have to replace any variables in the outer query which refer to the
original RTE with references to the columns from the subquery.
We need to also perform that replacement for any Vars in the
append_rel_list.
Only backpatching to 9.5 as we only go through this process in 9.4 for
auto-updatable security barrier views, which UNION ALL queries aren't.
Discovered by Haribabu Kommi
Patch by Dean Rasheed
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Previously, relation range table entries used a single Bitmapset field
representing which columns required either UPDATE or INSERT privileges,
despite the fact that INSERT and UPDATE privileges are separately
cataloged, and may be independently held. As statements so far required
either insert or update privileges but never both, that was
sufficient. The required permission could be inferred from the top level
statement run.
The upcoming INSERT ... ON CONFLICT UPDATE feature needs to
independently check for both privileges in one statement though, so that
is not sufficient anymore.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan
Reviewed-By: Andres Freund
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patch fixes two inadequacies of the PlanRowMark representation.
First, that the original LockingClauseStrength isn't stored (and cannot be
inferred for foreign tables, which always get ROW_MARK_COPY). Since some
PlanRowMarks are created out of whole cloth and don't actually have an
ancestral RowMarkClause, this requires adding a dummy LCS_NONE value to
enum LockingClauseStrength, which is fairly annoying but the alternatives
seem worse. This fix allows getting rid of the use of get_parse_rowmark()
in FDWs (as per the discussion around commits 462bd95705a0c23b and
8ec8760fc87ecde0), and it simplifies some things elsewhere.
Second, that the representation assumed that all child tables in an
inheritance hierarchy would use the same RowMarkType. That's true today
but will soon not be true. We add an "allMarkTypes" field that identifies
the union of mark types used in all a parent table's children, and use
that where appropriate (currently, only in preprocess_targetlist()).
In passing fix a couple of minor infelicities left over from the SKIP
LOCKED patch, notably that _outPlanRowMark still thought waitPolicy
is a bool.
Catversion bump is required because the numeric values of enum
LockingClauseStrength can appear in on-disk rules.
Extracted from a much larger patch to support foreign table inheritance;
it seemed worth breaking this out, since it's a separable concern.
Shigeru Hanada and Etsuro Fujita, somewhat modified by me
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In 6f9bd50eabb0a4960e94c83dac8855771c9f340d, we modified
expand_security_quals() to tell expand_security_qual() about when the
current RTE was the targetRelation. Unfortunately, that commit
initialized the targetRelation variable used outside of the loop over
the RTEs instead of at the start of it.
This patch moves the variable and the initialization of it into the
loop, where it should have been to begin with.
Pointed out by Dean Rasheed.
Back-patch to 9.4 as the original commit was.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In expand_security_qual(), we were handling locking correctly when a
PlanRowMark existed, but not when we were working with the target
relation (which doesn't have any PlanRowMarks, but the subquery created
for the security barrier quals still needs to lock the rows under it).
Noted by Etsuro Fujita when working with the Postgres FDW, which wasn't
properly issuing a SELECT ... FOR UPDATE to the remote side under a
DELETE.
Back-patch to 9.4 where updatable security barrier views were
introduced.
Per discussion with Etsuro and Dean Rasheed.
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch certain files through 9.0
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This clause changes the behavior of SELECT locking clauses in the
presence of locked rows: instead of causing a process to block waiting
for the locks held by other processes (or raise an error, with NOWAIT),
SKIP LOCKED makes the new reader skip over such rows. While this is not
appropriate behavior for general purposes, there are some cases in which
it is useful, such as queue-like tables.
Catalog version bumped because this patch changes the representation of
stored rules.
Reviewed by Craig Ringer (based on a previous attempt at an
implementation by Simon Riggs, who also provided input on the syntax
used in the current patch), David Rowley, and Álvaro Herrera.
Author: Thomas Munro
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This function created new Vars with varno different from varnoold, which
is a condition that should never prevail before setrefs.c does the final
variable-renumbering pass. The created Vars could not be seen as equal()
to normal Vars, which among other things broke equivalence-class processing
for them. The consequences of this were indeed visible in the regression
tests, in the form of failure to propagate constants as one would expect.
I stumbled across it while poking at bug #11457 --- after intentionally
disabling join equivalence processing, the security-barrier regression
tests started falling over with fun errors like "could not find pathkey
item to sort", because of failure to match the corrupted Vars to normal
ones.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In some cases, not all Vars were being correctly marked as having been
modified for updatable security barrier views, which resulted in invalid
plans (eg: when security barrier views were created over top of
inheiritance structures).
In passing, be sure to update both varattno and varonattno, as _equalVar
won't consider the Vars identical otherwise. This isn't known to cause
any issues with updatable security barrier views, but was noticed as
missing while working on RLS and makes sense to get fixed.
Back-patch to 9.4 where updatable security barrier views were
introduced.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This includes removing tabs after periods in C comments, which was
applied to back branches, so this change should not effect backpatching.
|
|
|
Views which are marked as security_barrier must have their quals
applied before any user-defined quals are called, to prevent
user-defined functions from being able to see rows which the
security barrier view is intended to prevent them from seeing.
Remove the restriction on security barrier views being automatically
updatable by adding a new securityQuals list to the RTE structure
which keeps track of the quals from security barrier views at each
level, independently of the user-supplied quals. When RTEs are
later discovered which have securityQuals populated, they are turned
into subquery RTEs which are marked as security_barrier to prevent
any user-supplied quals being pushed down (modulo LEAKPROOF quals).
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Craig Ringer, Simon Riggs, KaiGai Kohei
|
