diff options
author | Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> | 2020-07-22 14:53:26 +0900 |
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committer | Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> | 2020-07-22 14:53:26 +0900 |
commit | dbf17ca1bfab1aec5783a1768d784875fb73a603 (patch) | |
tree | 576fc09176394c093b9559b3220ac861e4085ad1 | |
parent | 045d03fcaf208d45d509f0b0e6613c523d03cd2b (diff) | |
download | postgresql-dbf17ca1bfab1aec5783a1768d784875fb73a603.tar.gz postgresql-dbf17ca1bfab1aec5783a1768d784875fb73a603.zip |
Fix corner case with PGP decompression in pgcrypto
A compressed stream may end with an empty packet, and PGP decompression
finished before reading this empty packet in the remaining stream. This
caused a failure in pgcrypto, handling this case as corrupted data.
This commit makes sure to consume such extra data, avoiding a failure
when decompression the entire stream. This corner case was reproducible
with a data length of 16kB, and existed since its introduction in
e94dd6a. A cheap regression test is added to cover this case.
Thanks to Jeff Janes for the extra investigation.
Reported-by: Frank Gagnepain
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 9.5
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql | 21 |
3 files changed, 62 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out index 32b350b8fe0..d4c57feba30 100644 --- a/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out +++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out @@ -48,3 +48,33 @@ select pgp_sym_decrypt( Secret message (1 row) +-- check corner case involving an input string of 16kB, as per bug #16476. +SELECT setseed(0); + setseed +--------- + +(1 row) + +WITH random_string AS +( + -- This generates a random string of 16366 bytes. This is chosen + -- as random so that it does not get compressed, and the decompression + -- would work on a string with the same length as the origin, making the + -- test behavior more predictible. lpad() ensures that the generated + -- hexadecimal value is completed by extra zero characters if random() + -- has generated a value strictly lower than 16. + SELECT string_agg(decode(lpad(to_hex((random()*256)::int), 2, '0'), 'hex'), '') as bytes + FROM generate_series(0, 16365) +) +SELECT bytes = + pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea( + pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(bytes, 'key', + 'compress-algo=1,compress-level=1'), + 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1') + AS is_same + FROM random_string; + is_same +--------- + t +(1 row) + diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c index 57efe733386..631caa13693 100644 --- a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c +++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c @@ -244,6 +244,17 @@ decompress_read(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len, struct DecomprData *dec = priv; restart: + if (dec->stream.avail_in == 0) + { + uint8 *tmp; + + res = pullf_read(src, 8192, &tmp); + if (res < 0) + return res; + dec->stream.next_in = tmp; + dec->stream.avail_in = res; + } + if (dec->buf_data > 0) { if (len > dec->buf_data) @@ -257,17 +268,6 @@ restart: if (dec->eof) return 0; - if (dec->stream.avail_in == 0) - { - uint8 *tmp; - - res = pullf_read(src, 8192, &tmp); - if (res < 0) - return res; - dec->stream.next_in = tmp; - dec->stream.avail_in = res; - } - dec->stream.next_out = dec->buf; dec->stream.avail_out = dec->buf_len; dec->pos = dec->buf; diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql index ca9ee1fc008..87c59c6cabc 100644 --- a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql +++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql @@ -28,3 +28,24 @@ select pgp_sym_decrypt( pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key', 'compress-algo=2, compress-level=0'), 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=0'); + +-- check corner case involving an input string of 16kB, as per bug #16476. +SELECT setseed(0); +WITH random_string AS +( + -- This generates a random string of 16366 bytes. This is chosen + -- as random so that it does not get compressed, and the decompression + -- would work on a string with the same length as the origin, making the + -- test behavior more predictible. lpad() ensures that the generated + -- hexadecimal value is completed by extra zero characters if random() + -- has generated a value strictly lower than 16. + SELECT string_agg(decode(lpad(to_hex((random()*256)::int), 2, '0'), 'hex'), '') as bytes + FROM generate_series(0, 16365) +) +SELECT bytes = + pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea( + pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(bytes, 'key', + 'compress-algo=1,compress-level=1'), + 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1') + AS is_same + FROM random_string; |